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 Introduction
Precarious Migrant Protest in Europe
“You, new brothers and sisters, who have left the misery, crossed the desert and 
the Mediterranean and have made it to Paris. You are very welcome to us. We 
march every Friday. Because when we march, we disrupt. If we do not disrupt, no 
one cares about us – we are invisible but always in danger.”1
Abstract
Migrant protest has proliferated worldwide in the last two decades, explicitly 
posing questions of identity, rights, and equality in a globalized world. None-
theless, such mobilizations are considered anomalies in social movement 
studies, and political sociology more broadly, due to “weak interests” and a 
particularly disadvantageous position of “outsiders” to claim rights connected 
to citizenship. In an attempt to address this seeming paradox, this book 
explores the interactions and spaces shaping the emergence, trajectory, and 
fragmentation of migrant protest in unfavorable contexts of marginalization. 
Such a perspective unveils both the odds of precarious mobilizations, and the 
ways they can be temporarily overcome. While adopting the encompassing 
terminology of “migrant,” the book focuses on precarious migrants, including 
both asylum seekers and “illegalized” migrants.
Keywords: political sociology; migration; contentious politics; protest; 
asylum
Migrant protest has proliferated worldwide in the last two decades, explicitly 
posing questions of identity, rights, and equality in a globalized world. 
Nonetheless, such mobilizations are considered anomalies in social move-
ment studies, and political sociology more broadly, due to “weak interests” 
1 Field notes, Paris, 16 June 2017.
Steinhilper, E., Migrant Protest: Interactive Dynamics in Precarious Mobilizations. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press 2021
doi: 10.5117/9789463722223_intro
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and a particularly disadvantageous position of “outsiders” to claim rights 
connected to citizenship. In an attempt to address this seeming paradox, 
this book explores the interactions and spaces shaping the emergence, 
trajectory, and fragmentation of migrant protest in unfavorable contexts 
of marginalization. Such a perspective unveils both the odds of precarious 
mobilizations, and the ways they can be temporarily overcome. While 
adopting the encompassing terminology of “migrant” (Carling 2015; Scheel 
and Squire 2014), the book focuses on precarious migrants, including both 
asylum seekers and “illegalized” migrants (Bauder 2013).
Borders and Protest in an “Age of Migration”
Cross-border human mobility of all kinds has reached a historic peak in 
the “age of migration” (Castles, De Haas, and Miller 2014). Such patterns 
of migration include a wide range of individuals leaving their countries of 
origin for reasons of war, individual or group-based persecution, and poverty 
(Betts 2013; Carling 2015). This has led to mixed responses in migration policy. 
Countries in the so-called Global North have partly liberalized their entry 
policies to attract selected foreign labor (De Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2016), 
yet, particularly since the 1980s, have also reacted with tightened immigra-
tion policies, including stricter border controls, increased deportations, 
and widespread encampment of those deemed “unwanted” (Agier 2011; De 
Genova 2017; Boswell 2003; De Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2016). Recent years 
have furthermore witnessed an intensif ied selection and differentiation of 
migrants into “deserving” and “undeserving,” “good” and “bad,” “legitimate” 
and “illegitimate,” and ultimately “legal” and “illegal” (Gibney 2014; Neumayer 
2005; de Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2016). In this process of securitization 
and differentiation of migration, the international norm of asylum has also 
been curtailed in various European countries (Fassin 2012; Crépeau 1995; 
Noiriel 1999; Bade and Oltmer 2005a, 2005b).
The presence of migrants has been accompanied at times by heated social 
and political controversies, between conservatives and multiculturalists, 
about migrant reception in the Global North, national conceptions of citizen-
ship, and legitimate motives of migration (Balibar 2009; Benhabib 2004; 
Betts and Loescher 2011; Ghosh 2000; Isin 2012). Migrant rights movements 
have gradually emerged in various countries in North America and Europe 
from the late 1970s onward and organized multiple campaigns at the local, 
national, and transnational levels (Nicholls and Uitermark 2016; Monforte 
2014; Giugni and Passy 2001).
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Yet, the last two decades were a turning point, insofar as precarious 
migrants themselves have systematically engaged in struggles over rights 
and recognition. Political mobilizations by migrants have proliferated on all 
continents in the last two decades (Tyler and Marciniak 2013; Ataç, Rygiel, 
and Stierl 2016; Anderson 2010; Nicholls and Uitermark 2016). Imogen Tyler 
and Katarzyna Marciniak speak of “an explosion” (Tyler and Marciniak 2013: 
143) of migrant and migrant solidarity activism in this period; Ilker Ataç 
et al. observe a “new era of protest” (Ataç et al. 2015).2 Precarious migrants’ 
claims range from respect for human rights, freedom of movement, access 
to labor markets, a liberalized asylum process to critiques of deportation 
migrant death at borders.
The forms of mobilization, and the characteristics of individuals involved, 
are contingent in space and time. In Europe, the geographical focus of this 
book, widespread migrant protest sparked in the 1990s, when undocumented 
migrants, self-identifying as “sans-papiers”,3 engaged in occupations, hunger 
strikes, and marches. Their political protests brought questions of migrant 
political subjectivity to the attention of a wider public for the first time (Cissé 
2002; Freedman 2004; McNevin 2006; Siméant 1998). The undocumented 
migrant movement quickly diffused to other big cities in France. Subse-
quently, it inspired protests and activist networks in various other European 
countries, including Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Germany, and Greece (Tyler 
and Marciniak 2013: 143). Restrictive asylum policies have furthermore 
fueled protest against them, the detention of asylum seekers, mandatory 
residence requirements, exclusion from the job market, encampment in 
remote areas, the suspension of family reunif ication, and deportations.
With radical actions such as sit-ins, hunger strikes, lip sewing, 
occupations,4 squats, and street camps as well as long-distance marches, 
migrants have left their attributed place at the margins of society and 
voiced claims for rights and recognition (Monforte and Dufour 2011, 2013). 
Despite their increasing frequency and the use of a predominantly disruptive 
2 Despite this general tendency, multiple forms of migrant mobilizations such as migrant 
self-help organizations and migrant worker strikes (Però and Solomos 2010) have a far longer 
history (for France, see, e.g., GISTI 2014).
3 Sans-papiers, French for “without papers,” is the self-identif ication adopted by the illegalized 
migrants’ movement in France. The term has rapidly proliferated and is still widely used in the 
Francophone world (Siméant 1998).
4 In this book, two terms are used to denote the appropriation of buildings by contentious 
actors. “Occupation” is used when the purpose of action is primarily protest oriented and 
disruptive, whereas it is referred to as a “squat” when the action also includes an element of 
providing shelter for precarious residents.
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and radical repertoire of action, such political mobilizations have only 
occasionally received resonance in both public discourse and academia. 
In addition to the proven disproportionally low representation of migrant 
voices in the mass media (Bleich, Bloemraad, and De Graauw 2015),5 migrant 
mobilizations also hardly correspond with the dominant public portrayal of 
migrants and established theories of political mobilization. Discursively, the 
f igure of the precarious migrant is either constructed as a passive victim and 
needy object of (non)governmental humanitarianism (Malkki 1996; Fassin 
2012) or as a stigmatized outsider and intruder in a national “order of things” 
(Bigo 2003; Nicholls 2013a). This results in migrants being both “casualties 
of care” (Ticktin 2011) and casualties of “excessive governance” (Stierl 2017). 
Precarious migrants’ claims in the public sphere are, hence, considered to 
be disturbing “noise” rather than legitimate “voice” (Nicholls 2013a, 2013b).
A Fragmented Academic Landscape
Migrant agency has also received only limited attention in the social sciences. 
Systematic reflection on the issue has only recently started to grow, and 
remains scattered across disciplines. While an extensive philosophical 
literature exists on citizenship and the exclusion from rights (Agamben 
1998; Nussbaum 1998; Sassen 2014; Benhabib 2004), empirically oriented 
contributions with an explicit focus on migrant protest continue to be 
scarce. In political science, the issue of migration has predominantly been 
addressed from a top-down perspective concentrating on the question of 
how migration could be “effectively” governed (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 
1999; Truong and Maas 2011; Boswell 2003)6 or, in its critical turn, how 
governmentality impacts the lives of migrants (Balzacq 2008; Bigo 2003). Yet, 
few contributions exist on acts of contention against “excessive governance” 
(Stierl 2018), or “migration governance from below” (Rother 2013b) by both 
migrants and promigrant groups.
Bottom-up perspectives on politics have been developed extensively 
in political sociology, and the issue of migration has obtained a key role in 
studies of political conflict and contention (Cinalli 2016; Kriesi et al. 2012; 
Koopmans et al. 2005). However, mostly, migrants have been studied as 
5 The issue of migration is, indeed overrepresented, while migrant perspectives and voices 
are underrepresented in relation to the migrant population.
6 For an excellent overview on the specif ic research strand of global migration governance, 
see Rother (2013a).
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“the object of claims of other actors, including political parties looking for 
votes, interest groups, policymakers, social movements, as well as a large 
volume of other allies and opponents within civil society” (Cinalli 2016: 86). 
Contributions on contentious acts by migrants, have with notable exceptions 
(Zepeda-Millán 2017; Nicholls and Uitermark 2016; Siméant 1998) remained 
scarce.7 Despite recognizing protest as a means of the disenfranchised, “re-
searchers have given the most attention to those movements endowed with 
endogenous organisational resources and exogenous political opportunities, 
which were considered in explaining their emergence, strength, forms, and 
outcomes” (della Porta 2018a: 1).8 In this vein, migrants as uprooted, often 
weakly resourced and “deportable” actors have been considered unlikely 
candidates for political mobilization (Cinalli 2016). Even compared to other 
disadvantaged social groups, such as the unemployed, the disabled, and the 
mentally ill, migrants were expected to be less inclined to mobilize, as the 
public discourse on membership in a society organized as a nation-state 
is strongly biased toward formal citizens of a polity: “The nation state may 
proclaim equality for all, but equality of rights is only reserved for its core 
members” (Nicholls 2013a: 171).9
The sociological variant of migration studies has ever since been sensitive 
to migrant experiences (Faist, Fauser, and Reisenauer 2013; Vertovec 2009; 
Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003), but largely neglected the contentious side 
of transnational migration (Steinhilper 2018). A growing body of literature, 
commonly referred to as “autonomy of migration” (Mezzadra 2010; Transit 
Migration 2008; Tsianos and Karakayali 2010), has stressed the inherent 
subversion in cross-border migration, yet has largely avoided an empirical 
analysis of the conditions and trajectories of migrant protest. The most 
explicit contribution in this regard was made in critical citizenship studies, 
where Engin Isin introduced the notion of “acts of citizenship” (2008). He 
conceptualizes citizenship as a social practice, also performed by marginal-
ized migrants acting “as if” they were entitled to citizenship rights (Isin and 
Nielsen 2008). Along these lines, a burgeoning literature has emerged, which 
aims at thinking migration politics “from the margins” (Ataç, Rygiel, and 
Stierl 2017). The seminal edited volume Citizenship, Migrant Activism and 
the Politics of Movement by Peter Nyers and Kim Rygiel (Nyers and Rygiel 
7 For a more comprehensive discussion of the literature on migrant and pro-migrant protest, 
see Chapter 1.
8 Notable exceptions are Piven and Cloward (1979) and Chabanet and Royall (2014).
9 Manlio Cinalli has even argued that asylum seekers and undocumented migrants as “weak 
immigrants” are “passive protagonists” and “incapable of speaking on their own behalf” (2008: 
300).
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2012), but also subsequent contributions from the same theoretical angle 
(Stierl 2012; Ataç et al. 2015; Ataç, Rygiel, and Stierl 2016; Stierl 2018), have 
provided most of the insightful analyses of migrant agency in contexts of 
marginalization. However, this community of scholars has partly maintained 
a certain skepticism toward theories of mobilization and rarely quotes any 
social movement literature on the issue (Stierl 2018).
As this cursory overview shows, academic reflections on migrant protest 
remain scattered across various disciplines and are poorly integrated. 
In the same vein, Nina Eggert and Marco Giugni note in their chapter 
in The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements that “[w]ork on migrants’ 
movements is particularly necessary, as this represents one of the main 
blind spots in the extant literature” (Eggert and Giugni 2015). The “long 
summer of migration” of 2015 in Europe has dynamized the f ield, yet recent 
contributions on the issue tend to either perpetuate a focus on relatively 
strong migrant support activists (della Porta 2018b) at the expense of a 
closer look into the dynamics of precarious protest, or address the issue of 
migrant resistance in the distinct theoretical tradition of critical migration 
studies without an explicit engagement with theories of political protest 
(Stierl 2018). My hope is that this book contributes to fostering a dialogue 
between those two strands of literature, which complement each other 
in important ways.
Research Approach
In an abductive research tradition, the book draws from and complements 
existing work on migrant activism and theories of political mobilization 
more broadly, to explore how niches for political mobilization are appropri-
ated, expanded, contested and lost. This entails a scrutiny of the spaces 
and interactions, through which precarious actors (temporarily) break 
invisibility, gain access to resources and allies against all evident obstacles 
of mobilizing in contexts of marginalization. Predominantly rooted in the 
theoretical universe of social movement studies, the book aims for opening 
this body of literature to precarious and volatile forms of protest and to 
suggest bridges to migration studies. With social movement studies, this 
analysis shares the general empirical focus and interest in the conditions, 
dynamics and forms of political mobilization (see also della Porta 2018a: 2) 
and approaches migrant activism from a “players and arenas” perspective 
(Jasper and Duyvendak 2014). In light of the structural obstacles to precarious 
migrant mobilizations, it shifts the attention to the microinteractions of 
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precarious migrants with other individual and compound players at the 
local level. Secondly, the research adopts an explicitly spatial perspec-
tive to contentious politics (Nicholls, Miller, and Beaumont 2013; Martin 
and Miller 2003), which allows scrutinizing the patterns of spatial and 
social exclusion of precarious migrants, and the spatialities of both protest 
emergence and fragmentation. Lastly, it bridges social movement theories 
to migration and citizenship studies. As this literature has broadened the 
conceptualization of migrant agency to the everyday practices or “invisible” 
resistances by migrants in almost all contexts of restrictive border regimes 
(Ataç et al. 2015; Stierl 2018). With critical citizenship studies, it shares the 
perspective of citizenship as being performative (Isin 2017), and hence, 
subject to constant transformations. This concept of citizenship, in turn, 
brings migrant mobilizations closer to a longstanding interest of social 
movement studies: mobilizations for citizenship rights. Given this analyti-
cal focus, the interest in the interactive dynamics of precarious migrant 
protest in Europe, or, in other words, in protest emergence, incubation, and 
fragmentation in contexts of marginalization is specif ied in the following 
main guiding question: How do interactions among players in spatial and 
regulatory settings (arenas) shape the emergence and trajectory of precarious 
migrant protest?
Given this focus on interactions in concrete spatial settings (arenas), the 
analysis is situated at the local level. According to Kathleen Blee, “[m]uch 
of the salient context of grassroots activism is local” (Blee 2012: 15). This is 
especially true for migrant mobilizations, which have particularly prolifer-
ated in large urban centers with more favorable conditions for creating 
social ties, both within migrant communities and with migrant support 
organizations, such as human rights NGOs, faith-based groups, the radical 
left and trade unions (Nicholls and Vermeulen 2012; Plöger 2014; Nicholls 
and Uitermark 2016; McNevin 2006).
The book compares migrant protests in two urban settings, Berlin and 
Paris. This selection builds upon previous research on the two countries, 
which has identif ied a number of important spatial and relational differ-
ences in the issue area of migration. According to Rogers Brubaker’s seminal 
work, France and Germany represent two ideal types of modern citizenship 
regimes – the German ius sanguinis and the French ius solis (Brubaker 1992). 
Koopmans et al. have found that such seemingly abstract differences indeed 
have an impact on political mobilizations by migrants (Koopmans et al. 2005). 
Furthermore, the countries represent distinct “borderline citizenship regimes” 
(Monforte and Dufour 2011), in which daily lives for undocumented migrants 
and asylum seekers differ strongly. Whereas the German asylum system 
18 Migrant Protest
is characterized by accentuated isolation and illegalized migrants often 
remain strongly controlled by the state (Duldung), the daily life of asylum 
seekers and undocumented migrants in Paris has been less constrained due 
to fewer controls and larger ethnic networks, as well as access to the job 
market in a larger informal economy (Monforte and Dufour 2011). Monforte 
has furthermore shown that not only political opportunity structures differ, 
but also the availability of promigrant allies. Whereas in France, social 
movement organizations involved in migration and asylum issues are deeply 
entrenched in society, and highly concentrated in Paris, the German case 
(at least until the “summer of migration” in 2015) is much more fragmented, 
since contention related with migration issues is dispersed throughout the 
federal polity (Monforte 2014). Despite these contextual differences, both 
cities have witnessed periods of heightened migrant protest.10 Paris is a crucial 
case in this regard, as it constitutes the cradle of the sans-papiers movement 
in Europe, with regular episodes of contention since more than two decades. 
Berlin, on the other hand, has been the nucleus of the most prominent and 
visible asylum seekers protests in recent years in Europe (Plöger 2014), and 
has witnessed the largest arrival of asylum seekers in Europe in the course 
of the crisis of the European border regime.
Upholding the virtue of cumulative knowledge production, the research 
is strongly informed by existing scholarship on migrant protest in Europe, 
particularly the work of Siméant (1998), Monforte and Dufour (2011, 2013), 
and Nicholls and Uitermark (2016). Yet, it complements these contributions 
in various regards: Firstly, none of the previous contributions explicitly 
addressed protest of asylum seekers.11 This book intends to shed light on 
the particularities of asylum regimes and their impact on political protest, 
as well as the overlap illegalized migrants’ mobilizations. Secondly, in 
contrast to Nicholls and Uitermark, the analysis does adopt a historical 
perspective on transformations in migrant rights movements, but rather in 
the contentious interactions unfolding within specif ic arenas. By focusing 
on shorter time frames, it adds more specif ic insights into the interactionist 
and spatial patterns and dynamics at play. Lastly, the empirical chapters 
of the book studies recent episodes of contention in time periods that have 
not been scrutinized so far.
10 The expression “periods of heightened migrant protest” underlines that precarious migrant 
protests are also often clustered in space and time, yet they are not suff iciently structured to 
qualify as protest “waves” or “cycles” (Koopmans 2006).
11 Monforte and Dufour include German “refugee” activists in their analysis, yet treat them 
as “undocumented” migrants.
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In addition to shedding light on both specificities and patterns of precari-
ous migrant protest in the tradition of “political ethnography”, the book 
informs social movement studies more broadly. It documents the potential 
of interactive and cultural theories of social movements to study precarious 
and volatile forms of protest. Where structural models lack the sensitivity 
for detail and dynamism, the more recent “cultural” theories combined with 
an openness to the precious knowledge produced in neighboring disciplines 
offer alternatives to address forms of contention, which have received less 
attention and only f it awkwardly in the dominant theoretical toolkit. An 
“arena” perspective moves toward a middle ground, combining the effects 
of macrostructures and microprocesses. Underlining how actors perceive, 
strategize and act upon regulatory and discursive contexts, it contributes to 
the moderation of old disciplinary turf wars between structure and agency.
The research scrutinizes and thickly describes the dynamics of migrant 
protest in two locations. In line with an arena approach to contentious 
politics (Jasper 2014), however, the unit of analysis is the protest arena, not 
the city. The case-oriented comparison in my research consists of a total 
of four arenas, two in each location. From a comparison of dynamics in 
highly distinct contexts, as well as comparing arenas within one location, 
the research generates insights on the patterns of interactions and strategic 
dilemmas typical to such kinds of political activism while, at the same time, 
pointing to the respective specif icities of the cases studied.
Both the subject of migrant protest and theoretical angle adopted in this 
research require particular methodological choices, taking at least two 
aspects into account: the dynamic, interactive nature of precarious protest 
(“volatility”), and the involvement of stigmatized and disenfranchised actors 
(“subalternity”). Blee indeed argues that the inherent conceptual and practi-
cal challenges of studying precarious activism have prevented most scholars 
from investigating them in the f irst place (Blee 2012). Those few working 
on small-scale and emerging activism (Blee 2012), weakly resourced groups 
(Chabanet and Royall 2014) or migrant protest (Nicholls and Uitermark 2016; 
Zepeda-Millán 2017) have all advocated for a range of f lexible qualitative 
approaches. Furthermore, in contexts of marginalization, stigmatization 
or repression, trust building and negotiation is part of research reality for 
both ethical and practical reasons. Elusive information and valid data can 
often only be gathered if research resembles more “normal communica-
tion”, and, even more importantly, if it can be adapted to the respective 
interlocutors. For these reasons, this research applied a variant of “political 
ethnography” (Schatz 2009b), which is characterized by a particularizing 
impulse and attention to details on the one hand (“ethnography”), and to 
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aim at (some degree) of deduction and comparison (“political”) on the other. 
This “creative tension” (Schatz 2009a) poses specific challenges since political 
ethnographers seek to study several cases and broader political processes. 
Hence, they tend to spend much shorter periods (months, rather than years) 
in one setting, and triangulate insights generated through participant 
observation, with a range of other data. At times, political ethnographers also 
immerse themselves in a specif ic context retrospectively through historical 
reconstruction, adding as much information as possible through archival 
work and interviews (Schatz 2009c). This book is based on fieldwork in Berlin 
(January-August 2016; July-December 2018) and Paris (April-July 2017).12
Ethics of an Engaged Social Science
A growing community of scholars highlight academia’s duty to contribute 
to the understanding of key social problems and an intervention in public 
debates (Burawoy 2005). From this perspective, the proliferation of migrant 
protest points to one of these crucial questions of our time. In many ways, 
the precarious migrant protagonists of this book embody the contradiction 
of a global situation: poverty, war, exploitation, environmental degradation 
due to climate change, among others, remain unequally distributed at a 
global scale. Vastly disparate life and survival chances are importantly 
determined by the “lottery of birthplace” (Betts 2009; Gibney 2014). While 
root causes of migration are multifaceted, many have argued that they are 
importantly coproduced and reproduced by particular modes of production 
in a globalized capitalist economy with an unequal distribution of gains 
and losses (Brand and Wissen 2012; Žižek 2015), postcolonial continuities, 
and geopolitical patterns of domination and dependency (see, e.g., Hardt 
and Negri 2000). In current times, according to Zygmunt Bauman, “mobility 
has become the most powerful and most coveted stratifying factor.” The 
global elites are able to cross borders at will, while the poor are meant to 
stay at home: “the riches are global, the misery is local” (Bauman 1998: 9, 
74). Consequently, the very presence of precarious migrants in the Global 
North is fundamentally political, as it highlights a global reality of social 
inequalities combined with widespread politics of closure. Such contexts 
produce friction, in which the idea of a smooth “migration governance” is 
illusionary (Geiger and Pécoud 2010). Against this background, protest by 
precarious “noncitizens” constitutes a “rupture” of the political order, urging 
12 For details on the methodological approach, see the Appendix.
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renegotiations of rights and belonging (May 2008; Rancière 2010; Schwiertz 
2016). For these reasons, Angela Davis, the eminent f igure of the US civil 
rights movement, has called the “refugee movement […] the movement of 
the twenty-f irst century”, as it is “the movement that is challenging the 
effects of global capitalism, it is the movement that is calling for civil rights 
for all human beings.”13
Despite these fundamental political and moral questions, the true 
protagonists of this book are human beings, predominantly striving for a 
life in economic and physical security for themselves and their families. 
Many of their practices are precarious and contradictory and indeed, the 
fragmented nature of migrant protest, the multiple internal conflicts, il-
lustrate the countless challenges of precarious and “unwanted” (Agier 2011) 
human beings to organize and be recognized as political actors. Following 
these groups and individuals is one part in the mosaic of understanding the 
contradictory realities of a globalized twenty-f irst century, in which both 
precarious migration and migrant protest are likely to proliferate.
Outline of the Book
The seven chapters that follow this introduction scrutinize how precarious 
migrant protest emerges against all evident odds, how it at times incubates 
through interactions in certain spatial settings, and how it fragments as 
a result of hostile contexts, internal disputes, or exhaustion. Chapter 1 
elaborates on a theoretical perspective, which integrates interactionist and 
spatial theories of protest, and provides a bridge to migration and citizenship 
studies. Chapter 2 introduces comparatively the two “borderline citizenship” 
(Monforte and Dufour 2011) regimes in Germany and France, carving out 
the grievances as well as discursive and political opportunities they entail. 
The following four chapters present empirical evidence on the interac-
tive dynamics in four periods of heightened migrant protest in Paris and 
Berlin. Chapter 3 analyzes the Bourse du Travail protests by undocumented 
migrants from 2008 to 2010 in Paris, paying particular attention to the 
fragility of alliances in episodes of precarious migrant protest. Chapter 4 
traces interactive dynamics during protests by asylum seekers at La Chapelle 
from 2015 to 2016. It shows how precarious resistance sparks and incubates 
even in the most disadvantageous contexts of marginalization. Chapter 5 
13 Angela Davis, during a meeting with migrant activists in Berlin on 14 May 2015. Statement 
recorded and accessible on Vimeo: https://vimeo.com/127986504.
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shifts the focus to Berlin, following the most disruptive series of precarious 
migrant protest in Germany so far, the Oranienplatz protests from 2012 to 
2014. The chapter carves out the role of particular spaces of contention, 
which temporarily allow the amplif ication of precarious protest into larger 
mobilization. Chapter 6 traces protests by (rejected) Afghan asylum seekers 
against deportations between 2016 and 2017 in Berlin, documenting the 
role of established exile communities in amplifying marginalized voices.
The f inal chapter of the book moves away from the close-up analyses of 
interactive dynamics in the four case studies to identify both commonali-
ties and particularities, capitalizing on the twofold potential of “political 
ethnography” (Schatz 2009b). It singles out patterns of interaction, strategic 
dilemmas, and spatial configurations influential for migrant protest across 
space and time. It also lays out the core differences rooted in distinct regula-
tory and discursive contexts.
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1. Theorizing Migrant Protest
A Microinteractionist and Spatial Perspective
“The study of weakly resourced and less organized forms of protest […] requires 
that we pay more attention to the sociological analysis of constituencies, the 
patterns of their immediate social environment and the disruptive activities 
embedded within them. The macroscopic pictures of political 
contentions need thus to be complemented by a microscopic analysis 
of the social fabric of disruptive practices.”1
Abstract
Despite their precarious legal status, largely hostile contexts, and limited 
social and cultural capital as newcomers in “host” societies, precarious 
migrants have (temporarily) appropriated niches to organize collectively, 
against all the odds. However, restrictive contexts and contentious in-
teractions of players with competing interests have kept mobilizations 
precarious and prone to fragmentation. To scrutinize such dynamics 
of protest in contexts of marginalization, this chapter draws from and 
integrates insights from theories of political mobilization, migration, and 
(performative) citizenship. Building upon these literatures, the chapter 
develops a microinteractionist framework for analyzing precarious migrant 
protest. Such a perspective draws particular attention to the lived experi-
ences of the actors involved, their concrete interactive practices, and the 
spatial settings of these encounters.
Keywords: migrant protest; interactions; space; arenas
Many migrants have opted against hiding in the shadows and have ar-
ticulated political claims using disruptive means such as hunger strikes, 
1 Lahusen (2014: 157).
Steinhilper, E., Migrant Protest: Interactive Dynamics in Precarious Mobilizations. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press 2021
doi: 10.5117/9789463722223_ch01
30 Migrant Protest
marches, inner-city protest camps, lip sewing, and squatting. Despite their 
precarious legal status, largely hostile contexts, and limited social and 
cultural capital as newcomers in “host” societies, precarious migrants have 
(temporarily) appropriated niches to organize collectively, against all the 
odds. However, restrictive contexts and contentious interactions of players 
with competing interests have kept mobilizations precarious and prone 
to fragmentation. To scrutinize such dynamics of protest in contexts of 
marginalization, this book draws on and integrates insights from theories of 
political mobilization, migration, and (performative) citizenship. Building 
upon these literatures, the book develops a microinteractionist framework 
for analyzing precarious migrant protest. Such a perspective draws particular 
attention to the lived experiences of the actors involved, their concrete 
interactive practices, and the spatial settings of these encounters. In combin-
ing various strands of theory, the book capitalizes on a historical strength 
of social movement research, where interdisciplinary cross-fertilization 
has proven to be particularly valuable for shedding light on understudied 
phenomena (della Porta 2014).
Microinteractive Dynamics in Precarious Migrant Protest
At the core of social movement theory lies the expectation that grievances 
alone do not suff ice to explain political mobilization. Social actors need 
to control certain resources such as knowledge, money, and logistics to 
transform eruptions of dissent into sustained mobilizations.2 In conse-
quence, social movement studies have intuitively concentrated on “strong” 
movements (della Porta 2018) and only occasionally addressed protest of 
the marginalized, since, in these terms, they were considered unlikely 
contentious subjects. Following the same line of reasoning, precarious 
migrants are seen as the least likely subjects of mobilization. In addition 
to scarce resources, constructed as “others,” they encounter closed political 
and discursive opportunities in nationally def ined polities (Eggert and 
Giugni 2015).
Notwithstanding, protests also unfold in highly hostile contexts, where 
threats to the identity or even the very survival of the individuals involved 
are serious: mobilizations of the unemployed have emerged in times of 
economic recession (Chabanet 2001; Lahusen 2013), the civil rights movement 
sparked in the most racist setting of the US South (Morris 1984), peasants 
2 For an overview, see della Porta and Diani (2009) and Jasper (2014b).
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organized uprisings during famines (Piven and Cloward 1979), and migrants 
have often organized protests upon concrete threats (Zepeda-Millán 2017; 
Nicholls and Uitermark 2016). This, however, does not suggest that political 
opportunities and resources are irrelevant for the explanation of precarious 
protest. On the contrary, they matter most to those who lack them. It is, 
therefore, essential to provide detailed accounts of how resources can be 
accessed despite disadvantageous contexts, and how they are often lost again.
Assertions such as “contentious politics is nothing if it is not relational” 
(Tarrow 2011: 14), and “networks matter” (Passy 2003) are unequivocal proof 
of the relevance of networks and interactions for political mobilizations. 
While the literature on the issue has considerably diversif ied in the last 
decade, adding cultural perspectives to the dominant structuralist core 
(Diani and Mische 2015; Jasper and Duyvendak 2014), the roots of a relational 
approach to social movements date back decades. In the 1970s, proponents 
of “resource mobilization theory” to social movements (McCarthy and Zald 
1977) had already argued that networks provide important resources for 
social movement actors. Social movement literature has since then widely 
demonstrated that certain resources such as recruits, money, and trust 
are indispensable for transforming sparks of resistance into sustained 
mobilizations (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; della Porta and Diani 
2009). Mark Granovetter’s work on “weak ties” (Granovetter 1973) has been 
a strong inspiration for research on the role of brokers, and the diffusion 
of material and cognitive resources within a movement space. Building 
upon Granovetter, Alessandro Pizzorno (1986), and also Florence Passy 
(2003), have demonstrated that not only weak ties but particularly “strong 
ties” are also important for the participation in social movements under 
situations of uncertainty, as they provide individuals with trust. Trust is, for 
evident reasons, even more critical for high-risk activism, in which heavy 
repression is likely (McAdam 1986). Networks, including weak and strong 
ties, are of particular importance for resource-poor actors that structurally 
depend on the support of more established players to compensate their lack 
of economic, social, and cultural capital (Chabanet and Royall 2014; Passy 
2001; Chabanet 2001; Nicholls 2013). Cinalli has shown in his contributions 
on pro-beneficiary activism that resources can travel from the more to the 
less resourceful (2016).
While relational perspectives have hence become orthodox in social 
movement studies, the bulk of scholarship operationalizes relations as 
networks, and thus, adopts a structuralist perspective (Diani 2000; Diani and 
McAdam 2003; Cinalli and Fuglister 2008; Caiani and Parenti 2013). Therefore, 
a blind spot of most relational approaches, among others, is their widespread 
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ignorance of the meanings actors attach to social relations, and how they 
change over time: hence a temporal (or dynamic) and cultural perspective 
(Diani and Mische 2015). James M. Jasper has pioneered a relatively recent 
trend in theories of protest “toward the micro rather than the macro” (2014a: 
9). Both in his single-authored monographs (1997, 2008) and collaborations 
(Goodwin, Jasper, and Poletta 2009; Jasper and Duyvendak 2014), Jasper has 
observed a fundamental misf it between the relatively static theories and 
the highly fluid, amorphous and elusive social phenomena they intend to 
capture. In particular, the volume Players and Arenas, coedited with Jan 
Willem Duyvendak (Jasper and Duyvendak 2014), outlined the contours of 
an interactionist perspective on protest. The seminal book is informed by 
a relational perspective, yet, it also differs in signif icant ways. It describes 
social movements as foremost being shaped by complex microinteractions 
of various actors (“players”) within material and social spaces (“arenas”) 
(Jasper 2014b).
Jasper, therefore, argues that calling this perspective “relational” is 
somewhat misleading. It “takes the choice and dynamism out of it,” since 
interactions are not predetermined by existing relations, but often aim to 
“challenge or reinforce prior relations” (Jasper 2010: 973). Jasper argues for 
breaking down networks into the interactions they are composed of “to see 
a variety of exchanges and influences that occur through these interactions, 
including the emotions felt by the players in the networks – part of the 
‘historical contingency’ of networks” (Jasper 2019a: 132). While relational 
approaches stress structure, interactionist approaches stress agency, and 
thus, strategy (Jasper 2014c, 2008). This strategic notion is captured in the 
language of the “player,” which includes both individual and compound 
actors.
Bringing forward the agency of protesters requires scrutiny of their lived 
experiences, cultural work, and strategic decisions during contentious 
episodes. Such an approach unveils that “the goals of compound players are 
especially unstable because factions and individuals are forever competing 
to make their own goals into the off icial goals of the team” (Jasper 2014a: 
10). It also allows us to capture the fact that individuals and collectives are 
constantly confronted with “strategic dilemmas” on which way to go forward 
(Jasper 2008), even more so when they are highly heterogeneous. While 
dominant social movement theories tend to reify homogeneity despite their 
internal heterogeneity, an interactive perspective explicitly accounts for their 
inherent friction and interactive dynamics. This makes an interactionist 
perspective particularly valuable for understanding the mobilizations of 
precarious migrants. If political protest even by comparatively privileged 
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actors, such as most protagonists of the so-called new social movements, 
struggle to sustain organizational structures and continuity, the additional 
hurdles to leave the shadows and organize collectively in public are evident 
for marginalized challengers.
Migrants, in particular, are a highly heterogeneous group, diverse in terms 
of origin, religion, gender, age, class, and origin, to name but a few (Sigona 
2014). This provides additional obstacles to collective identity formation, 
and even more so, for sustained mobilizations (Mokre 2018). Furthermore, 
precarious migrant protest usually involves both migrants and promigrant 
supporters. The latter is considered to be – indeed – indispensable to ac-
cess resources (Voss and Bloemraad 2011; Cappiali 2016; Giugni and Passy 
2001), even though such diverse alliances entail both opportunities and 
constraints (Cappiali 2017; Nicholls 2013). At times, many pro-beneficiary 
NGOs’ organizational identity of representing migrants, and a focus on 
long-term “strategies,” fundamentally collide with some migrants’ radical 
protest repertoire, and their attempts to emancipate from a predominantly 
white migrant rights movement, and the society at large (Nicholls 2013). Such 
disputes can be systematized as strategic dilemmas, which are common in 
contentious politics (Jasper 2008: 126, 153).
Relatedly, migration scholars scrutinizing agency in contexts of mar-
ginalization have argued that resistance often takes contradictory or less 
visible forms:
In such a precarious context, their claims are necessarily existential, by 
which we mean aspirations and actions that tend to be of an immediate, 
instrumental and individualistic nature. […] As long as refugees are in a 
situation of vulnerability, they will not be able to afford less-instrumental 
behavior, and ambivalence will be part of the way in which they act and 
mobilize. […] It is not a claim for structural changes but only an existential 
claim and yet it is subversive only by the presence of people who were 
not entitled to be there. (Chimienti 2017: 5)
Indeed, an extensive literature on migrant resistance in contexts of margin-
alization has emerged in the tradition of critical migration and citizenship 
studies, with relatively few references to explicit theories of protest (Stierl 
2018; Ataç, Rygiel, and Stierl 2017; Nyers and Rygiel 2012). In a nutshell, they 
trace, “how resistant subjects enact and appropriate (citizenship) rights they 
may not off icially hold and escape regimes of control through (excessive 
and imperceptible) movement” (Ataç, Rygiel, and Stierl 2016: 531, italics in 
original). Sharing “a strong normative concern with reimagining political 
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life from the margins, particularly in relation to those inhabiting mobile 
and precarious lives” (Moulin and Thomaz 2016: 599), these scholars have 
criticized the social movement community for exclusively addressing visible 
acts of protest, and as such, downplaying “invisible” forms of everyday 
resistance, which are not captured by “common regimes of visibility [but] 
rather attempt to elude their gaze and seek to remain imperceptible” (Ataç 
et al. 2015: 7).3
Thus, in this vein, taking migrant struggles seriously entails considering 
overtly articulated political claims to be just the tip of the iceberg. Agier 
argues, in contexts of extreme precariousness and marginality, “the only 
revolt that is logically possible, [is] embodying a politics of resistant life” 
(Agier 2011: 155). The everyday practices of organizing life in contexts of 
exclusion and repression can, accordingly, be understood as continuous 
political acts. Networks of self-help are, in many cases, a prerequisite for 
survival on the way to Europe, and within the context of destination. These 
latent ties can, at times, be activated for high-risk public protest (Steinhilper 
2018). Often, “strong ties” of trust are established in everyday struggles. 
Ataç et al. even argue: “It is precisely through these less spectacular, often 
invisible everyday struggles, for example for employment, housing, and 
the freedom of movement that the status quo is called into question” (2015: 
7). These “acts of resistance” dismantle existing power relations and make 
fundamental antagonisms visible, and by this, accessible to contentious 
scrutiny. Critical migration studies, thus, suggest that scrutiny of migrant 
agency requires a shift from a somewhat narrow focus on disruptive social 
movements, to a broader conceptualization of resistance. The embodiment 
of resistance in the specif ic context of precarious migrants is not only mir-
rored in practices of everyday struggle, but also in an embodied repertoire 
of protest, including hunger strikes, lip sewing, self-harm, and, indeed, 
suicide to avoid deportation. If other means are absent, what remains as a 
tool of protest is the body itself (Clochard 2016; Edkins and Pin-Fat 2005).
A microinteractionist perspective on precarious migrant protest looking 
at (inter)acting human beings, allows for embracing and integrating these 
insights from migration studies to provide nuanced accounts of the complex 
protest dynamics at play. Jasper argues: “to understand why and how people 
organize themselves to protest against things they dislike, we need to know 
what they care about, how they see their place in the world, what language 
they use to describe [social or material] entities” (Jasper 1997: 11).
3 According to Uday Chandra, “[t]o resist is, in ordinary parlance, to oppose or f ight off what 
is pernicious or threatening to one’s existence” (2015: 563).
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Particularly for the understanding of precarious migrant protest, this 
entails novel attention to grievances. Yet, even though considered a core 
ingredient of social movements, for a long time, the root causes for mobiliza-
tion – human suffering – have been largely downplayed by theories of social 
movements. They were considered ubiquitous, of little variation, and hence 
of little explanatory power for political action, which is why theories have 
instead focused on endogenous resources, and exogenous opportunities 
(della Porta 2018).
The context of migration, however, seems to require a readjustment of 
this dominant perspective. As many migration scholars recall, the tight-
ening of border controls, the expansion of deportation regimes, and the 
increased categorizing into “wanted” and “unwanted” migrants has led to 
a proliferation of resistance by migrants on all continents (Ataç et al. 2015, 
2016; Nicholls and Uitermark 2016; Zepeda-Millán 2014, 2016). Ataç et al. 
hence argue: “In particular during the past three years, the border regime 
itself produced new migratory actors, subjectivities and forms of political 
articulation that are at once a manifestation and a consequence of the crisis” 
(Ataç et al. 2015: 3). Similar to other recent contributions on mobilizations 
in times of crisis, it is hence argued that not only opportunities but also 
threats can trigger protest (della Porta 2015; Zepeda-Millán 2016). Indeed, 
the numerous restrictions against migrants, particularly the “deportation 
regime” enacted against those deemed unwanted, has planted multiple 
“seeds of resistance” (Nicholls and Uitermark 2016: 9).
An interactionist perspective deviates strongly from previous analytic 
lenses, arguing that “the main constraints on what protestors can ac-
complish are not determined directly by economic and political structures 
so much as they are imposed by other players with different goals and 
interests” (Jasper 2014a: 9). Despite their contingency in space and time, 
interactions of players in arenas do not unfold in a social or spatial vacuum. 
On the contrary, “dispositionalist interactionism” (Duyvendak and Fillieule 
2014: 295) conceives interactions as being rooted in established social 
norms, histories of interactions, and identities of the players involved 
(Duyvendak and Fillieule 2014: 299). In turn, interactions also shape future 
encounters since they evoke certain emotions, and feed into players’ 
biographies: “Each person carries a complex biography, developed through 
past interactions, strategic and communicative, with other individuals.
[…] We cannot even imagine such a thing, individuals as non-social and 
lacking any history” (McGarry et al. 2016: 639). Compound players also 
regularly mobilize memories of past interactions for present contentious 
encounters.
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Accordingly, while highlighting the role of agency, an interactionist per-
spective is not structureless; it equally acknowledges structural limitations on 
agency. Resources or political opportunities do still matter, yet, they need to 
be acted upon by proponents or opponents as they are dynamic and are partly 
reconfigured through interaction. In a similar vein, Nicholls has underlined 
the importance of temporary “niche openings” (2014) and small f issures in 
structurally hermetic environments, upon which migrants act politically. By 
definition, such niches can only be occupied by small groups, which is why 
conflicts and divisions on strategies, within compound players of challengers, 
are at the core of such precarious mobilizations. Nicholls’s niche openings 
is part of a broader shift in political opportunity theory. Also, Joshua Bloom 
has illustrated that opportunities differ across groups, and eventually, that 
they are rather microinteractional than structural (Bloom 2015).
A microinteractionist perspective necessarily includes a spatial compo-
nent, which takes into account the material conditions in which contentious 
players act. Jasper suggests the terminology of “arena” defined as “physical 
places where players interact to generate decisions and other outcomes; 
they may contain objects ranging from doors and seats to quotes chiseled 
into marble walls to illumination and amplif ication devices, but they also 
have formal rules and informal expectations, as well as something at stake 
in the decisions made” (Jasper 2019b: 2).
Interactive approaches to protest, thus, entail an important spatial 
component. However, other contributions both in social movement and 
migration studies have been even more specif ic in fleshing out the relation-
ship between spatial conditions and political agency.
Ambivalent Spatialities of Precarious Mobilizations
Almost simultaneously with the relational turn, social movement studies 
have undergone a spatial turn (Sewell 2001; Tilly 2000; Leitner, Sheppard, 
and Sziarto 2008; Martin and Miller 2003; Nicholls, Miller, and Beaumont 
2013b). In 2003 Martin and Miller argued:
[W]here the “spatial turn” has transformed many areas of social and 
economic scholarship, research on social movements and contentious 
politics has generally downplayed the spatial constitution and context of 
its central concepts such as identity, grievances, political opportunities, 
and resources. As a result, this body of scholarship remains by and large 
aspatial. (Martin and Miller 2003: 143)
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Since then, signif icant progress has been made. Most importantly, the 
volume Spaces of Contention, edited by Walter Nicholls, Byron Miller, and 
Justin Beaumont (2013b), provided the f irst systematic overview of the 
multiple spatialities and their coimplications for contentious politics.
Most spatial analyses build upon the work of Henri Lefebvre, who has 
revolutionized the reflection on space with his claim of space being socially 
produced and constantly re-enacted in everyday life (Lefebvre 1992, 2003). 
Informed by these insights, social movement scholars have looked into 
the interaction of geography and social relations in processes of political 
mobilization. In a nutshell, “[s]pace matters because it is relational. It is 
the medium through which all social relations are made or broken – and 
making and breaking relationships is at the core of all questions of collective 
action” (Miller 2013: 286).
It has been extensively shown that certain environments are more favorable 
for providing resources for political protest than others (Nicholls, Miller, 
and Beaumont 2013b; Sewell 2001; Uitermark, Nicholls, and Loopmans 2012). 
Geography enables or constrains the visibility of actors, and the interac-
tions of individuals. Spatial proximity provides more opportunities for new 
connections and relationships to establish: “it reduces the costs and risks 
associated with making these links happen” (Nicholls 2009: 83). As banal as 
it might sound: place sets the base for collective action to evolve. Face-to-face 
interactions are favorable for creating affective feelings and “strong ties” among 
protesters. Furthermore, William Sewell and many others have shown that 
safe places as a “sine qua non of social movements” (Sewell 2001: 69), in which 
challengers can form and reinforce a collective identity, organize activities, 
mobilize resources, and recruit activists. Place is relevant not only in material, 
physical terms but also in its symbolic dimension. For theorists such as Iris 
Marion Young (1990), Doreen Massey (1991), Tim Cresswell (2006), and Sewell 
(2001), places are an active medium through which identities are created and 
contested. Sewell emphasizes that by occupying symbolic locations,
protest marches and demonstrations not only gain the public limelight 
but make a particular sort of statement – that the cause they represent 
belongs at the top of the national agenda. But while insurgent movements 
make use of the pre-existing meaning of places, they can also – either 
intentionally or unintentionally – transform the signif icance of protest 
locations. (Sewell 2001: 65)
Protesters regularly use symbolic places such as public spaces, includ-
ing central streets and squares and government buildings, to underline 
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their claims. Protest events organized in capital cities convey explicitly or 
implicitly a claim to centrality.
Most social movements are formed around place-based hubs, and com-
parisons show that spaces have distinct “relational qualities,” with some 
being more likely to incubate protest than others (Nicholls and Uitermark 
2016). To scrutinize these relational qualities requires specif ic attention to 
the local scale, even more so if mobilizations of marginalized groups are 
to be studied (Lahusen 2014; Blee 2012; Nicholls and Uitermark 2016). In 
this vein, Nicholls and his colleagues have amply demonstrated how the 
urban environment “breeds” contention. Cities both produce grievances for 
a right to the city (Castells 1983) and serve as an incubator for the realiza-
tion of “rights through the city” (Nicholls and Vermeulen 2012), that are 
not limited to the urban structure, such as migrant and LGBTQI rights.4 
Similarly, Chris Zepeda-Millán has demonstrated that dense local migrant 
networks connecting individuals in certain neighborhoods serve as the 
“weapons of the (not) so weak” (2016: 269). Even if they have previously 
not been politicized, they embed social capital and relationships of trust, 
which can be activated in contentious episodes. Meindert Fennema and 
Jean Tillie equally found that the level of migrant communities’ political 
engagement is largely affected by the density of ethnic organizational 
networks (1999, 2001).
Nicholls has argued that social movements are “uneven” terrains, being 
asymmetrically structured around some people and places, such as cities 
or neighborhoods (2011). The resulting movement “hubs” often become 
magnetic, attracting activists based in other places to join hubs, and by 
this, reinforcing their importance and allowing for the sustainability of 
contentious activity. Understanding social movements hence requires not 
only an explicit analysis of concrete places but also of how distant locations 
are connected into social spaces, and how mobility is used in creating and 
sustaining social networks. Leitner et al. have accordingly demonstrated 
for the case of migrant activism in the US, that mobile protests such as bus 
tours have proven to be effective tools for networking of isolated, often 
forcefully immobilized actors, as well as for accessing unevenly distributed 
and scarce “safe spaces” and advantageous political opportunity structures 
(Leitner, Sheppard, and Sziarto 2008).
Evidently, not all sparks of protest grow into visible disruptions. “Seeds 
of resistance” (Nicholls and Uitermark 2016), which are regularly planted 
4 See also Miller and Nicholls (2013), Nicholls et al. (2013b), and Nicholls (2009).
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when states exclude human beings, are expected to only grow into disruptive 
mobilizations if certain spatial conditions are met:
Not all places provide suff icient conditions to grow small seeds into big 
mobilizations. […] Detention centers in the Netherlands are homes for 
hundreds of hunger strikes each year but these strikes are largely ignored 
by the media, public, support groups, and politicians because they take 
place in environments that do not possess the full range of resources 
needed to nurture their growth and maturation. These resistances end up 
passing largely unnoticed, presenting only minor and uneventful disrup-
tions in the circuits of state power. In other instances, early resistances 
may f ind more supportive and enriching environments, providing […] 
conditions for further growth. (Nicholls and Uitermark 2016: 10)
Migration scholars have made similar observations in their investigation of 
the relationship between precarious spatial settings, including informal mi-
grant camps or “slums,” and political subjectivity (Sanyal 2014; Ramadan 2013; 
Rygiel 2012; Sigona 2015; Huysmans 2008). In contrast to Giorgio Agamben’s 
pessimistic view (1998), even in a “state of exception” in which individuals 
are stripped off rights and are dehumanized as “bare life,” individuals do 
resist (Sanyal 2014; Ramadan 2013; Rygiel 2012; Sigona 2015; Huysmans 
2008). Informal migrant camps were shown to have ambivalent effects on 
producing and reproducing precariousness but also at times offering “to 
newcomers who had limited resources and no rights, […] access to (some 
kind of) protection and recognition, as well as some practical benef its” 
(Sigona 2015: 12). Camps literally assemble bodies in the streets, which at 
times produce visibility, and draw attention and resources to previously 
disenfranchised individuals and groups.
Yet, the incubating effects of proximity and encounter in certain spaces 
are also known to movement opponents. The state has usually concentrated 
means in urban centers to challenge the protesters and intervene in the 
fragile relations they develop with allies. Governments and bureaucracies 
regularly enacts laws that disperse subversive actors and isolate unwanted 
populations from social support (Minca 2015; Agamben 1998): “While place 
can enhance the mobilization powers of activists by strengthening relations 
and building common mobilizing frames and identities, states may attempt 
to short-circuit and disrupt movements by enacting a range of place-based 
strategies” (Nicholls, Miller, and Beaumont 2013a: 5). Miller, therefore, argues 
that space should be understood in a Foucauldian perspective, foremost 
as a technology of power: “Spatial technologies of power are particular 
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types of technologies that shape the formation and breaking of relation-
ships – technologies that are employed, counter-deployed, and altered in 
processes of social struggle. Such technologies may be employed by any 
actor – individual or collective, civil society or state” (Miller 2013: 289).
In addition to a scrutiny of the local level, migration scholars have urged 
the social sciences to reflect on a widespread “methodological nationalism” 
and take into account the “transnational social spaces” most migrants are 
embedded (Pries 2001; Vertovec 2009; Faist, Fauser, and Reisenauer 2013). 
These “pluri-local, durable and dense conf igurations of social practices, 
systems of symbols and artifacts that span places in different countries” 
(Pries 2001: i) are “constituted by the various forms of resources or capital of 
spatially mobile and immobile persons, on the one hand, and the regulations 
imposed by nation-states and various other opportunities and constraints, 
on the other” (Faist 1998: 217).
For many migrants, the nation-state is a real but rather artif icial 
container, as their lifeworlds span different localities in their everyday 
life, through contact with their families at home or in other countries, 
through identif ication with their country of origin or opposition with the 
government in power. Even though they are located in a specif ic country 
or city of destination, their life worlds are never purely local. In Doreen 
Massey’s terms, their lives are place based but not place bound (Massey 
1991). Social spaces that connect individuals in at times geographically 
distant places also shape practices of protest. While relations to natives in 
localities of destination are inherently complicated by cultural, legal, and 
linguistic differences, it is often the relationships among migrants with 
shared experiences and memories of violence and exclusion in transmigra-
tion, and the locality of reception, which provide trust and set the basis 
for political mobilization. Many migrants also create social ties to activist 
environments, and to fellow migrants on the move, which are often kept 
and can be activated for political protest in “transnational contentious 
spaces” (Steinhilper 2018).
Conclusion
Scrutinizing precarious and often volatile protest in contexts of margin-
alization prof its from a cross-fertilization of spatial and interactionist 
approaches, which have been developed in both migration and social move-
ment studies. Hence, this book intends to provide a microscopic account of 
the complex dynamics of precarious protest, paying particular attention to 
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the biographies and cultural work of the individuals involved, their strategic 
decisions, their interactions with other activists, allies and opponents, and 
the (transnational) spatial and regulatory contexts in which they act. Such an 
approach is certainly ambitious as it intends to integrate various individual, 
relational and contextual elements. Yet, it promises a way forward to bring 
light to the dynamics of precarious protest, which received less attention, 
precisely because they complicate an analysis with the traditional (strongly 
structural) theoretic toolkit.
The four case studies on dynamics of precarious migrant protest in Berlin 
and Paris have documented instances in which unlikely challengers have 
appeared as political subjects through the interaction, with a range of other 
actors, allies, and opponents in protest “arenas.” According to Duyvendak 
and Fillieule, such “arenas do not exist at the time the problem appears. It 
is the emergence of a problem that generates its contours as a function of 
individuals and groups which intervene in the situation, and mobilize a 
specif ic part of the social world, or f ield, either openly or discreetly” (2014: 
306). Accordingly, the arenas take different shapes and are populated by 
different actors in the four case studies.
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2. Contentious Migration in Context
Law, Discourse and Mobilization in Germany and France
“In an asylum accommodation system [like the French one], which leaves 
the vast majority without any accommodation, there is no way for those 
few who have received accommodation to express dissent. 
No matter how diff icult the circumstances are.”1
Abstract
Protest never emerges in a vacuum, but is strongly shaped by sociopo-
litical contexts. Situating episodes of precariousness therefore requires 
scrutinizing the respective regulatory, discursive and social movement 
contexts in which marginalized actors mobilize. They influence both the 
arenas of migrant protest and the players acting therein. This chapter 
maps the context of precarious migrant protest in Germany and France, 
tracing the history of politicization of migration, the regulatory context 
of irregularity and asylum and the histories of migration-related protest 
in the two countries.
Keywords: Germany; France; asylum; irregular migration; protest
Protest never emerges in a vacuum, but is strongly shaped by sociopolitical 
contexts. Situating episodes of precarious migrant protest in Germany and 
France therefore requires a scrutiny of the respective regulatory, discursive 
and social movement contexts, in which marginalized actors mobilize. They 
influence both the arenas of migrant protest and the players acting therein.
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Steinhilper, E., Migrant Protest: Interactive Dynamics in Precarious Mobilizations. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press 2021
doi: 10.5117/9789463722223_ch02
50 Migrant Protest
The Politicization of Precarious Migration
In most European countries, including France and Germany, migration was 
hardly considered a contested topic in the f irst two decades after World 
War II (Wangen 2016; Fassin 2016a). The two relevant groups in this regard, 
the survivors of the war camps and those escaping from Eastern European 
communist regimes, were both by and large welcomed (Fassin 2016b). In 
the time of economic upturn in the 1950s and 1960s, these positive attitudes 
resonated with the thirst of growing national economies for cheap labor 
(Fassin 2016a). Both France and Germany in this period actively attracted 
hundreds of thousands of migrants as a foreign workforce. In Germany 
foreign labor was recruited predominantly from Italy, Spain and Greece, 
later from Yugoslavia and Turkey (Bade and Oltmer 2004). In France mainly 
from Francophone colonies in Africa, including Senegal and Mali but mostly 
Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. The foreign population grew rapidly in the 
1960s but this type of economic migration remained hardly politicized 
(Blanc-Chaléard 2006; Herbert 2001) since it was erroneously considered 
a temporary phenomenon. In such a context of liberal migration policies, 
many migrants, who would have formally been eligible for international 
protection relinquished the asylum application, and never appeared in 
any off icial asylum statistics. The comparatively low number of political 
refugees from the communist East were furthermore considered as proof of 
Western capitalist superiority (Bade and Oltmer 2005). Economic migration 
was welcomed and the legal norm of asylum was numerically irrelevant and 
morally appealing (Bade 2015). Until 1963, in Germany, asylum applications 
only once surpassed 3,000 a year. Even in the year of the oil crisis in 1973 
and the consequential end of active foreign workforce recruitment, asylum 
applications remained marginal (BAMF 2016). In France, too, the number of 
asylum applications remained below 3,000 until 1973 and consisted mainly 
of Europeans, particularly from Spain, and migrants from a range of Soviet 
republics.
The economic downturn in the early 1970s introduced fundamental 
changes in both countries. France was increasingly confronted with ris-
ing unemployment due to the restructuring of the industrial sector and 
increasing automation (Crépeau 1995). With an economy in recession, 
the need for foreign labor rapidly decreased and translated into profound 
restrictions on migration. The so-called circulaire Marcellin-Fontanet Law 
of 1972 modif ied the regulations on the renewal of residence permits. From 
this moment on, a person’s right to stay in France was conditional not only 
on their having a work contract but also their being able to prove they 
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had access to “decent housing,” which many precarious workers could not 
afford. Overnight, a large share of migrant workers was rendered irregular 
through legal reform (Abdallah 2000). The oil crisis of 1973 also added to 
this economic transformation and for the f irst time irregular migration 
became widely problematized and contested, particularly migration from 
the Maghreb (GISTI 2014). Following restrictions on labor migration, the 
number of asylum applications rose, because other channels of migra-
tion were blocked. Nevertheless, asylum migration remained relatively 
insignif icant and hardly contested throughout the 1970s. In France, the 
main groups of asylum seekers at the time, Chilean dissidents escaping 
the military dictatorship of Pinochet and the so-called “boat people” 
from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, mostly f leeing communist regimes, 
received widespread sympathy both in public and government discourse 
(Fassin 2016a). Asylum migration maintained a positive image (GISTI 2014) 
and asylum law was even liberalized. From 1977 onward, asylum seekers 
obtained the right to work from the moment the asylum claim was f iled 
(Wangen 2016). In Germany, instead, the economic downturn translated 
into an increasing politicization of asylum. In the year of the oil crisis, 
1973, asylum applications were just above 5,000, however, the number 
exponentially rose in the second half of the 1970s, exceeding 100,000 in 1980 
(Bade and Oltmer 2004: 87). Firstly, this was due to the restrictive migration 
policies introduced to f ight the economic recession. In consequence, the 
asylum procedure had become the only remaining bottleneck of legal 
migration, including cases of family reunif ication of the “guest workers.” 
Secondly, changing patterns of migration at a global scale, including the 
consequences of decolonization and economic globalization, increased 
migration from the Global South to Europe. Given the rapid rise in the 
number and an alarming public discourse, for the f irst time, asylum became 
a highly contentious issue during the national election campaign in 1980 
(Bade and Oltmer 2004). The notion of the “bogus asylum seeker,” and the 
criminalization of migration, were established in public discourse. What 
followed was the implementation of stricter rules for asylum seekers (Bade 
and Oltmer 2005). Understood as explicit means of deterrence, obligatory 
accommodation in collective asylum facilities, restrictions to mobility and 
a work ban were introduced in the 1980s.
Migration had become a core issue of political conflict in Germany and, 
in contrast to France, the issue of asylum was at its core. Despite successive 
restrictions, the number only temporarily decreased, and rose again to 
over 250,000 in 1991 (BAMF 2016). The largest share of applications, then, 
constituted ethnic minorities from the Balkans, fleeing the violent implosion 
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of Yugoslavia. In the meantime, however, “refugees” had lost their symbolic 
relevance in the Cold War confrontation. The objective situation of victims 
of violence and prosecution had not changed, but rather the “affects and 
values, mobilized in the determination of their situation” (Fassin 2016b: 62, 
author’s translation). During the early 1990s, public controversies further 
sharpened. Germany witnessed an interplay of xenophobic discourses in 
both the media and parts of the established political parties, preparing the 
ground for racist riots and murders in various cities, including Hoyerswerda, 
Rostock-Lichtenhagen, and Mölln (Herbert 2001: 308). In this climate of 
strong politicization of asylum, in late 1992 the two largest parties, the 
CDU2 and the SPD,3 agreed on the so-called “asylum compromise,” which 
strongly curtailed the right to asylum enshrined in the German constitution 
(Bade and Oltmer 2004: 112). The insertion of concepts such as “safe third 
country” and “safe country of origin” combined with the so-called “airport 
procedure” made it almost impossible to apply for asylum in Germany. 
This constitutional reform had an immediate effect. The number of asylum 
applications nosedived from the temporary peak of 438,000 in 1993 to 127,000 
in 1995 (BAMF 2016) and deportations increased to over 100,000 in 1993 
(Kirchhoff and Lorenz 2017: 52).
In France, also, from the 1980s onward, the public perception and the 
attitudes of political elites regarding migration changed drastically. Under 
the socialist president François Mitterrand, elected in 1980, migration poli-
cies f irst seemed to shift toward a more liberal and rights-based approach. 
The new government regularized around 130,000 undocumented migrants 
between 1981 and 1982 (Abdallah 2000: 17). Furthermore, migrants were 
given the right to form interest organizations (Nicholls and Uitermark 
2016: 144ff.). When the far-right Front National won in popularity in the 
early 1980s, however, the socialist government soon reverted to a tougher 
stance on migration. Following the victory of the conservatives in the 
parliamentary elections in 1986 and a subsequent “cohabitation,”4 the 
so-called Pasqua Law package was introduced. The package curtailed the 
right to asylum, introduced stricter rules for acquiring citizenship and 
facilitated deportations (Noiriel 1999). In this time of heightened political 
conflict around migration, asylum applications increased to a peak of 62,000 
in 1989 (OFPRA 2013). However, they remained low in comparison to the 
2 Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany).
3 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany).
4 This French particularity describes the situation when a president of one party is obliged 
to share power with a prime minister from another party.
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German peak of more than 430,000 in 1993 (BAMF 2016). Nevertheless, due 
to increasing unemployment and the rise of the far right, migration became 
central to an increasingly hostile public debate. Both in public discourse and 
administrative decisions, African boat people received far less compassion 
than those from Southeast Asia had a decade before (Fassin 2016a). Similar 
to Germany, the f igure of the previously “welcome refugee” was gradually 
replaced by the “unwanted asylum seeker” or the “real refugee” by the 
“bogus asylum seeker” (Julien-Laferrière 2016; Crépeau 1995). In 1991, a 
widespread antimigrant sentiment culminated in the “Circulaire Cresson” 
migration law reform, which explicitly aimed at eliminating a “pull effect” 
for asylum migration by inserting far-reaching restrictions. Among others, 
work permits for asylum seekers were made subject to a priority clause for 
French citizens. Dropping recognition rates and rising rejections5 triggered 
the f irst widespread protests initiated by rejected asylum seekers in 1991, 
involving Kurds, Angolans and Chileans among others, who had been in 
France for years waiting for decisions on their cases (Delahaye 1991). Instead 
of mobilizing against an asylum system considered unjust, they demanded 
regularization through other legal channels. These protests marked the 
beginning of an era of contention around undocumented migration in 
France, in which migrants themselves played a prominent role throughout 
the 1990s (Siméant 1998).
In Germany, instead, the major asylum law reforms in 1993 and the sub-
sequent decreases in applications initiated a time of stasis and the salience 
of migration temporarily faded. In 2000 the f irst Social Democrat-Green 
government introduced a citizenship reform, complementing the restrictive 
German ius sanguinis with elements of a birthplace, ius solis. This was the 
f irst time a federal government publicly acknowledged the German reality 
as a country of immigration (Bade and Oltmer 2004). Despite this critical 
novelty in migration legislation, in asylum law the government contributed 
to an ongoing process of securitization of migration at the European level. It 
was the German Minister of the Interior at the time, Otto Schily (SPD), who 
pressed for the continuation of the Dublin regulation in 2003 (Baumann 
2008) that attributed the responsibility to process asylum applications to 
the country where asylum seekers f irst entered European territory and 
helped Germany to keep applications decreasing to reach the levels of the 
early 1980s by 2008 (BAMF 2016).
The salience and politicization of migration started to increase again 
from 2012 in response to the rising number of asylum applications due to 
5 An estimated 100,000 asylum seekers were rejected in France in 1991 (Abdallah 2000: 40).
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the escalation of the Libyan and Syrian crises. The rising number rein-
troduced debates on “asylum abuse” and culminated in a major asylum 
law reform with contradictory effects in 2014. The new law introduced 
restrictions for asylum seekers from Balkan countries, but it also entailed 
liberalizing steps, including a partial lifting of an extensive work ban for 
asylum seekers. The increasing polarization in attitudes toward migration 
(Decker, Kiess, and Brähler 2014) were illustrated by two contradictory, yet 
interrelated trends accentuating in 2014 (Weisskircher and Berntzen 2019). 
On the one hand, the xenophobic movement PEGIDA6 started marching 
on a weekly basis in Dresden in October 2014 (Rucht 2014), and rapidly 
spread to other cities. Furthermore, from 2014 onward, the originally 
anti-Euro party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) gradually shifted 
toward an explicit xenophobic and antimigration prof ile and started to 
enter regional parliaments. On the other hand, simultaneously, a citizens’ 
mobilization in support of migrants gained in strength (Karakayali and 
Kleist 2015).
These developments foreshadowed the critical juncture for migration 
politics in Germany, in the summer of 2015. The number of asylum applica-
tions in Germany rose, due to the escalating war in Syria, and a shortage of 
funding for refugee camps in the neighboring countries. In contrast to the 
1990s, the rising number did not provoke a hegemonic rejection of asylum 
seekers, but led to a gradual (and temporary) proliferation of supportive 
attitudes referred to as a new German “welcome culture” (Fleischmann 
and Steinhilper 2017; Hamann and Karakayali 2017). Chancellor Merkel’s 
statement “Wir schaffen das” (“We can do this”) became emblematic for a 
liberal German approach to forced displacement (Mushaben 2017). However, 
society became further polarized. The right-wing party AfD subsequently 
entered numerous regional parliaments, while 2015 witnessed the highest 
number of violent attacks on asylum seekers and asylum facilities ever 
counted in a single year (Pro Asyl 2016c). In this climate, the grand coali-
tion of CDU and SPD in autumn 2015 enacted the most rigid asylum laws 
since 1993, which facilitated deportations and limited family reunif ication 
(Bundesregierung 2016; Pro Asyl 2016b). In 2015, migration and particularly 
asylum had become the dominant issue of public debate in Germany.
In France, meanwhile, the issue of precarious migration remained long 
dominated by debates on undocumented migration, since thousands of 
undocumented individuals without a regular status built the backbone of 
6 Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, which roughly translates 
to “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident.”
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certain sectors of the French economy, including construction, restaurants, 
and cleaning, repeatedly politicizing their presence and exploitation. The 
far-right Front National continued to mobilize opposition to immigration 
with Jean-Marie Le Pen ending second in the presidential elections of 2002. 
Asylum, yet, remained marginal, since many precarious migrants refrained 
from applying for asylum in France due to the comparatively low recognition 
rates (Neumayer 2005; Bendel 2013). Instead, they attempted to reach the 
United Kingdom. This temporarily changed in the early 2000s when in 
Calais thousands of precarious migrants got stranded and, in the absence 
of public accommodation, they built makeshift camps and squats soon to 
be referred to as the “Jungle of Calais.” Yet, this remained one of the few 
explicitly asylum-related controversies since, in general, the number of 
asylum applications in France remained comparatively low, reaching just 
below 60,000 in 2015 (OFPRA 2016) and around 80,000 in 2016. Consequently, 
the notion of a “summer of migration” applied to Germany, but far less so 
to France. Whereas the EU witnessed the largest arrival of asylum seekers 
in its history – with 745,000 applications in Germany in 2016 alone (BAMF 
2016), while France remained, despite an increase, relatively little affected 
in quantitative terms.
This cursory overview suggests that following similar dynamics in the 
two decades after World War II, the issue has been distinctly politicized 
in these two countries. In Germany, the issue of asylum was at the core 
of heated contention around migration, whereas in France the issue of 
undocumented migration has been central. The diverging patterns can 
only be partly explained by the number of asylum applications, and point 
at differences in an “irregularity-asylum” nexus, which is discussed in 
further detail below.
Regulatory Contexts of Asylum and Undocumented Migration
The notion of precarious migration, understood in this book as a “form of 
life” (Fassin, Wilhelm-Solomon, and Segatti 2017) induced by an insecure 
legal status applies to asylum seekers, undocumented migrants and 
individuals with a temporary suspension of deportation.7 These statuses 
are both intimately related in empirical and analytical terms. In contexts 
of increasing restrictions on legal migration, including asylum, undocu-
mented migration is a widespread side effect (Stobbe 2004; Nicholls and 
7 See below for the German particularity of Duldung, which roughly translates as “tolerance.”
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Uitermark 2016). Many asylum seekers turn undocumented, when their 
cases are rejected. Others never apply for international protection, aware 
that their complex biographies of forced migration do not fulf ill the strict 
criteria required for them to be granted refugee status. While precarious 
migration exists both in France and Germany, the underlying regulatory 
contexts differ, with far-reaching effects on the everyday life of precarious 
migrants, but also the grievances, opportunities and resources for political 
mobilization.
Irregularity in Germany and France
Even though no robust estimations exist, at least 200,000 individuals without 
a right to stay are estimated to reside in both Germany and France (Vogel 
2015; Courau 2009). Despite being an empirical fact, the public percep-
tion and regulatory context of this social phenomenon differ. Comparing 
“borderline citizenship” regimes in Germany and France, Monforte and 
Dufour have identif ied highly distinct levels of exclusion of undocumented 
migrants (Monforte and Dufour 2011). In France, vivid public debates around 
irregular migration date back to the early 1970s. This is partly related to a 
large share of undocumented migrants originating from former French 
colonies, adding a layer of historical or moral responsibility to the debate. 
While restrictions on irregular migration proliferated, a wide range of newly 
founded associations and established human rights NGOs started to support 
the rights of undocumented migrants. Given the linguistic advantage and 
a large informal job market particularly in the catering sector, care work, 
construction and cleaning, many undocumented migrants remained de 
facto relatively well included in the society and contributed signif icantly 
to the French economy, despite their irregular status (Brun 2006; Monforte 
and Dufour 2011; Abdallah 2000; Courau 2009).
Furthermore, as a “civic” type of citizenship regime, France had always 
been more open to migration compared to Germany, which for a long times 
denied its reality as a country of immigration (Bade and Oltmer 2004). 
Accordingly, France witnessed various waves of large-scale regularization 
of undocumented migrants, including around 130,000 in 1981 and around 
90,000 in 1997/98 (Courau 2009). Moreover, in France, the vast majority 
of precarious migrants from countries with a relatively low recognition 
rate, including many Sub-Saharan African countries, opt against f iling an 
asylum case. Following the vast mobilizations of undocumented migrants 
supporting associations and citizens in the second half of the 1990s, even a 
process of automatic regularization was introduced in 1999. The procedure 
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entailed that if an irregular migrant could prove a permanence of ten years 
on French territory, the person could apply for a right to stay. This resulted 
in the regularization of around 25,000 individuals annually. Even though the 
automatic procedure of regularization was abolished in May 2006 (Courau 
2009), its previous existence documents a degree of normalization of ir-
regular migration in French public debates and administration. Strikingly, 
however, the issue was largely discussed separately from the asylum system.
In Germany, in turn, undocumented migration has never witnessed this 
degree of politicization, and has been treated differently in administrative 
terms (Cyrus 2009) due to its intimate relation to the asylum system. The 
German particularity of Duldung, which roughly translates to “tolerance,” 
plays an important role in this regard. It describes a precarious situation, 
in which individuals are denied a right to stay, yet their deportation is 
temporarily suspended for medical or practical reasons (Kirchhoff and 
Lorenz 2017). The latter applies, for instance, when countries of origin fail 
to cooperate and do not issue the documents necessary for international 
transport. The status is usually renewed on a monthly basis. However, it 
expires immediately the moment when a deportation notice is sent. Neither 
regularized nor undocumented, individuals with a Duldung are locked 
into a status of limbo and precariousness. Originally, this legal status was 
understood as an exception, yet, its prevalence has reached an enormous 
scale, applying to 94,000 persons in 2013 (Deutscher Bundestag 2014: 24) 
and as many as 159,678 individuals in 2016 (Deutscher Bundestag 2017: 
29). In most cases, the individuals initially apply for asylum, no matter 
how unlikely a positive decision is and remain tolerated, once their case is 
rejected. Consequently, persons with a Duldung are usually accommodated 
in the same centralized structures as asylum seekers and many rules apply to 
both groups, including a partial work ban and mobility restrictions. Despite 
these restrictions, in Germany, many rejected asylum seekers tend to remain 
in the situation of Duldung rather than opting for complete irregularity as 
it at least guarantees precarious accommodation and monetary transfers 
(Cyrus 2009). Similarly, many precarious migrants apply for asylum, even if 
their biographies of migration make refugee status determination unlikely. 
This is also related to much more regular policing of public space, as well 
as largely inaccessible job and housing markets for individuals without 
papers, which add additional burdens to a life in irregularity in Germany 
(Monforte and Dufour 2011; Stobbe 2004). In contrast to France, further-
more, an undocumented status constitutes a dead end in Germany, since 
regularizations are rare, and only apply to individuals with a long-term 
status of Duldung (AutorInnenkollektiv 2000; Kirchhoff and Lorenz 2017) 
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combined with a higher likelihood of deportation in case of apprehension 
(Kirchhoff and Lorenz 2017).
Given these differences in the two “borderline citizenship” regimes, for 
individuals with an irregular status, the room for maneuver, both with 
regard to discursive opportunities and everyday life realities, is larger in 
France compared to Germany. Besides, considerable differences between 
the countries exist in the regulatory context of the asylum system.
The Asylum Systems in Germany and France
Despite repeated attempts to harmonize asylum systems in the European 
Union, the respective traditions, legal frameworks and administrative 
implementations differ sharply between countries. The German asylum 
system is characterized by three features: the dispersal of asylum seekers 
throughout the country, centralized accommodation, and Residenzpflicht8 
(restrictions on mobility). For reasons of both “burden sharing” and deter-
rence, directly after applying for asylum, individuals are geographically 
distributed on a no-choice basis, according to the so-called Königstein 
quota that takes into account the tax revenue and number of inhabitants 
in each state (Hinger 2016; Boswell 2003).9 As the f irst step, asylum seekers 
are sent to “f irst reception centers” (Erstaufnahmeeinrichtung) run by the 
states in cooperation with private companies or welfare organizations. 
In these often large centers, hosting hundreds or at times thousands 
of people, asylum seekers are required to stay up to six months before 
being either deported or transferred to a subsequent accommodation 
(Anschlussunterbrinung) organized by the municipalities. The dispersal 
of asylum seekers was introduced as part of a series of restrictive asylum 
laws in the late 1970s and 1980s, which also entailed obligatory centralized 
accommodation (Bade and Oltmer 2005). The initial obligation to live 
in collective accommodation centers introduced in 1982 originally was, 
and still is, meant to deter (potential) asylum seekers. Lothar Späth, the 
CDU governor of Baden-Württemberg, was quoted in 1982: “The number 
of asylum seekers only decreased when the bush drums signaled – don’t 
go to Baden-Württemberg, there you have to live in a camp” (quoted in 
Müller 2010: 197, author’s translation). Based on the same rationale, until 
8 A major asylum law reform, which entered into force in 2015, limited the applicability of 
Residenzpflicht, yet it has not abolished the law as such (Kirchhoff and Lorenz 2017).
9 Unlike in other domains, the “burden sharing” between the states (Länder) does not consist 
of a f inancial compensation mechanism but of a physical dispersal of asylum seekers.
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2013 the Bavarian Ordinance on the Implementation of Asylum (Asyldurch-
führungsverordnung) explicitly stated that conditions during the asylum 
procedure should “encourage” asylum seekers to return to their countries 
of origin (Bayrische Staatsregierung 2013). Justif ied with both budgetary 
constraints and deterrence, centralized accommodation is often highly 
precarious and entails a number of hardships (Johansson 2016; Wendel 
2014). Usually various adults share bedrooms, and entire corridors share 
bathrooms and kitchens. The location of collective accommodation varies, 
yet mostly, they are concentrated in peripheral urban industrial or rural 
areas (Pieper 2008; Selders 2009).10 As a result of peripheral location, limited 
private space and many people sharing the few kitchens and bathrooms, 
life in collective accommodation has been proven to be highly precarious 
and conflict laden (Wendel 2014; Johansson 2016). The other side of this 
rigid system is that, in contrast to France, no asylum seeker is left to the 
streets and has a place allocated in a facility.11 Geographical dispersal 
and centralized accommodation were complemented in Germany until 
2015 by the Residenzpflicht. This law does not only determine the local-
ity of residence of asylum seekers (and individuals with Duldung), but 
prohibits individuals from leaving certain administrative boundaries 
(Jakob 2016). The administrative boundaries in which mobility was allowed 
varied (Selders 2009), yet predominantly referred to the municipal and in 
some cases state boundaries (Jakob 2016). Exemptions had to be formally 
requested and violations could be sanctioned with f ines of up to €2,500 
(Jakob 2016). Since 2015, the scope of the mobility restriction has been 
limited for asylum seekers, but it continues to apply to most individuals with 
Duldung. Both centralized accommodation and the mobility restriction 
have amounted to a system of “organized disintegration” (Täubig 2009), 
which served as means to discipline asylum seekers, minimize contact 
with the local population and facilitate potential deportation (Jakob 2016).
In France, the administrative organization of asylum procedures differs 
signif icantly. In contrast to Germany, asylum cases are usually processed 
10 This passage refers to ordinary collective accommodation centers. From summer 2015 
onward, numerous emergency shelters have been opened with much more precarious living 
conditions. In one of these centers, Berlin Tempelhof Airport (which had ceased operating as an 
airport in 2008), various thousands of asylum seekers were hosted for months with extremely 
limited privacy (Berliner Morgenpost 2015).
11 While these general characteristics distinguish Germany’s asylum accommodation system 
from other countries, differences exist within the federal country. Whereas some municipalities 
have also allowed for decentralized accommodation in private flats, others adhere to centralized 
accommodation (Steinhilper and Hinger 2017).
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in the préfecture (administration of the region), in which the asylum 
application was initially f iled. As the administrative system does not 
foresee a systematic dispersal on a no-choice basis similar to Germany, 
mandatory residence or mobility restrictions have never been in place. This 
has resulted in a particularly high concentration of asylum applications in 
urban areas, especially in the capital region of Paris. Until the late 1980s, 
asylum seekers could furthermore, choose to live in accommodation offered 
by the state or opt for a private solution (Noiriel 1999). Also, until the early 
1990s, no restrictions to the right to work applied. The turning point in 
1991 marked the separation of accommodation facilities for asylum seekers 
(CADAs12) and recognized refugees (Kobelinski 2014). Subsequently, the 
option to obtain housing allowances for asylum seekers was replaced by 
compulsory and centralized housing offered by the state, yet still in the 
region, in which the asylum application was f iled. Compared to Germany, 
France has opted for an opposite stance in discouraging asylum seekers. 
Considering itself mainly as a transit country, and deliberately intend-
ing to avoid a “pull effect,” the French system of asylum accommodation 
has been purposefully undersized (Projet Babels 2017). In the 1990s, only 
10% of asylum seekers were accommodated in CADAs, mainly women, 
children and elderly people. The rest were left with the choice of staying 
in temporary emergency shelters, or without accommodation offer by the 
state at all (Julien-Laferrière 2016). The degree of this shortage became 
particularly evident in the course of 2015. By the end that year, there were 
50,000 places in CADAs or emergency shelters for the entire country (Senate 
of France 2016; see also Le Parisien Online 2015) in spite of the fact that 
there were 80,000 asylum applications in 2015 alone and thousands of 
cases still pending from previous years (OFPRA 2016). This shortage, which 
is also recognized by public institutions (Senate of France 2016: 5), has 
contributed to the emergence of makeshift street camps of thousands of 
asylum seekers, particularly in Paris and the Calais region (Projet Babels 
2017). As a self-organized alternative to temporary emergency shelters 
and makeshift street camps, particularly in Paris, squatting has become a 
common practice for precarious migrants to obtain shelter (Bouillon 2017; 
Aguilera 2013; Péchu 2010). Given the limited number of places in CADAs, 
they are considered as a “privilege” within the French asylum system, 
compared to the short-term solutions in emergency shelters and life in the 
streets, even though as semi-closed structures, they entail considerable 
socio-psychological hardships (Kobelinski 2010, 2014).
12 Centres d’accueil pour demandeurs d’asile, or reception centers for asylum seekers.
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These distinct features of the asylum systems in the two countries have 
an influence on the everyday life experiences of asylum seekers, tolerated 
individuals and undocumented migrants. As the following section shows, 
this has produced distinct grievances and mobilizations for liberal migration 
policies in Germany and France. For instance, migrant support organizations 
in France have usually advocated for the establishment of more asylum 
reception centers rather than their abolition as in the case of Germany. 
The limited availability of long-term housing for asylum seekers, has also 
discouraged migrants from protesting against precarious conditions in 
CADA. As the former director of a large migrant rights organization in 
France noted in an interview: “In a system which leaves the vast major-
ity without any accommodation, there is no way for those few who have 
received accommodation to express dissent. No matter how diff icult the 
circumstances are” (Interview P18).
Mobilizations for and by Precarious Migrants
Country-specif ic migration histories, regulatory contexts and public dis-
courses have influenced the grievances, resources and networks of those 
mobilizing for migrant rights.13 In France, a migrant rights movement 
emerged in the early 1970s during the f irst severe restrictions of migration 
law, which rendered numerous migrant workers illegal and led to a rise in 
deportations and acts of contestation against them (Abdallah 2000; GISTI 
2014). In this period, well-established human rights associations such as 
LDH and Cimade worked alongside the more recently founded migrant 
support groups, including GISTI and FASTI (Monforte 2014).14 Given the low 
salience of asylum in the public sphere until the late 1970s, the organiza-
tions mainly focused on the human rights of undocumented migrants and 
migrant workers, as well as antiracism and anticolonialism. Colonialism 
was a particularly highly contentious issue in France due to the violent 
decolonization struggles in Algeria at the time (Abdallah 2000). Due to the 
high number of migrant workers who had become illegalized following the 
immigration law reforms from the mid-1970s onward, various trade unions 
13 More extensive historical accounts of the migrant rights movements up to the mid-2000s 
can be found in Monforte (2014) and Nicholls and Uitermark (2016).
14 LDH stands for La ligue des droits de l’homme; GISTI for Groupe d’information et de 
soutien des immigrés; and FASTI for Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tous-te-s 
les immigré-e-s.
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had also become engaged in migrant (worker) solidarity, among them were 
also the large unions CGT and CFDT.15 Thus, in contrast to Germany, since 
its emergence, the migrant rights movement in France has been closely 
related to mobilizations by migrants themselves, who had organized hunger 
strikes and strikes in the workplaces from the early 1970s onward (Nicholls 
and Uitermark 2016). The large-scale regularization of undocumented 
migrants by the socialist government in the 1980s was also a result of civil 
society pressure by human rights organizations, trade unions and newly 
established migrant associations, including ATMF and ATF (Abdallah 
2000).16 In 1983, when the far-right Front national gained electoral success, 
second-generation migrants, the so-called beurs, sparked the Marche pour 
l’égalité et contre le racisme to which 100,000 demonstrators showed up in 
Paris (Willems 1999: 185).
In the late 1980s, when both undocumented migration and asylum 
became more contested in public debates, the most inf luential human 
rights and migrant support associations founded the Réseau d’information 
et de solidarité (Information and Solidarity Network) to improve their 
coordination and contest deportations of undocumented migrants, includ-
ing rejected asylum seekers (Monforte 2014). The associations involved 
argued that restrictive laws in the realms of both asylum and irregular 
migration led to disenfranchised individuals with precarious residence 
status and advocated for a broad alliance in support of migrant rights. 
Consequently, when the French central administration in charge of the 
examination of asylum claims, the Off ice français de protection des 
réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA), was reformed in the early 1990s, resulting 
in increasing rejection rates and subsequent hunger strikes by rejected 
asylum seekers, a broad alliance of human rights associations, antiracist 
groups and trade unions was mobilized (Siméant 1998). These associa-
tions also joined forces against the subsequent migration law restrictions, 
including the Pasqua Law (1993) and the Debré Law (1996) (Monforte 
2014). In March 1996, precarious migrants initiated the most disruptive 
migration-related protests in French history (Blin 2008; Siméant 1998). 
Around 300 undocumented migrants left the shadows, launched hunger 
15 CGT stands for Confédération générale du travail (General Confederation of Labor); CFDT 
for the Confédération française democratique du travail (French Democratic Confederation of 
Labor).
16 A number of migrant self-organizations emerged in the early 1980s, when the socialist 
government allowed the establishment of such associations. ATMF stands for the Association 
des travailleurs maghrébins en France (Association of Workers from the Maghreb in France) 
and ATF for Association des tunisiens de France (Association of Tunisians in France).
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strikes and eventually occupied the St. Bernard church in northeast Paris. 
Numerous human rights associations, trade unions, celebrities and public 
intellectuals supported the protest (Diop 1997; Terray 2006). With the 
eviction of the occupiers from the church in August 1996, protests by 
precarious migrants self-identifying as “sans-papiers” (without papers) 
continued in various migrant “collectives” (Abdallah 2000; Terray 2006). 
Despite multiple conflicts among the supporting associations and between 
the self-organized sans-papiers and supporters, the events in summer 1996 
resonated strongly among members of the French left. By early 1997, the 
combination of increasing electoral success of the far-right Front national, 
the passage of the restrictive Debré Law and the self-organized protests 
of sans-papiers fueled an unprecedented solidarity, mirrored in a turnout 
of more than 100,000 participants at a demonstration in February 1997 
(Libération 1997). The socialist government that entered into off ice soon 
after these incidents issued the circulaire Chevènement, which introduced 
specif ic criteria for the regularization of undocumented migrants (Courau 
2009). This period of heightened conflict around migration, consequently, 
initiated and consolidated regular interaction within a highly active and 
centralized migrant rights movement in France, addressing both issues 
of asylum and immigration more broadly (Monforte 2014).17 Yet, the role 
of the sans-papiers collectives gradually diminished in controversies 
over representation, autonomy and leadership (Cissé 2003; Nicholls and 
Uitermark 2016). In the 2000s, the increasing Europeanization of migration 
policies and the desolate situation for asylum seekers in the Calais region 
became core issues of mobilization for French migrant-support associa-
tions (Monforte 2014). This focus intensif ied during the “long summer of 
migration” in 2015 (Pette 2019; Colombeau 2019; Projet Babels 2017). However, 
in contrast to Germany, it did not lead to a fundamental restructuring of 
the migrant rights movement. In France, a well-connected movement had 
already existed long before, which continued mobilizing. Furthermore, 
France was far less and only locally affected by the so-called Syrian crisis 
and the related increase in forced migration to Europe.
In Germany, political mobilizations by and in support of migrants also 
date back various decades. Nevertheless, these have long remained far 
more localized, more focused on asylum and less integrated into a broader 
movement compared to France. When asylum became a highly contested 
17 Important exceptions are France terre d’asile (FTdA) and the Forum réfugiés, which have 
concentrated on the issue of asylum and have opted out from a politicized movement engaged 
in service provision with a more consensual relationship with the French state (Monforte 2014).
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issue in the late 1970s and early 1980s and a series of restrictive laws were 
enacted, various groups and associations in support of precarious migrants, 
in Germany mainly asylum seekers, started to form. Regional “refugee 
councils”18 emerged as well as the Germany-wide network Asyl in der 
Kirche,19 which aimed at protecting migrants from deportation through 
church asylum (Flüchtlingsrat Berlin 2011). In 1986 the umbrella organiza-
tion Pro Asyl was formed by a broad alliance of trade unions, welfare 
associations, human rights organizations, faith-based associations and the 
regional refugee councils (Pro Asyl 2016a). With increasing restrictions and 
a hostile public discourse, the set of actors involved in protest in support 
of migrants diversif ied. The series of racist riots in various towns in the 
early 1990s spurred antiracist mass protests and the so-called “chains of 
lights” with tens of thousands of participants in various German cities 
(Herbert 2001: 317f.). Largely independent from the activities of the refugee 
councils and Pro Asyl, various antiracist groups also emerged.20 Yet, neither 
in the professionalized associations nor in the grassroots movement did 
migrants hold a prominent role. In consequence, the f irst self-organized 
political groups of precarious migrants in Germany started their protest 
without the support of powerful allies.21 In the midst of a hostile discourse, 
in 1996, mostly Nigerian asylum seekers founded The Voice Africa Forum 
(later renamed The Voice Refugee Forum) in an isolated asylum facility in 
Thuringia, in the eastern part of Germany, where conditions for asylum 
seekers were particularly harsh (Jakob 2016: 21). The group organized protest 
activities against the hardships of the asylum system they experienced 
on a daily basis, like the Residenzpflicht (restrictions on mobility) and 
deportations (Jakob 2016). Almost simultaneously, although independent 
from the protest of mostly African asylum seekers in Thuringia, 250 asylum 
seekers accommodated in miserable conditions on a ship in the coal harbor 
of Bremen went on hunger strike (Gerling 2015; Siekmeier 1995). In early 1998, 
a group of eventually 300 Kurdish asylum seekers under threat of imminent 
18 Refugee councils are regional networks for the coordination of proasylum activities.
19 “Church Asylum”.
20 In this period, various influential antiracist organizations were founded, such as the Antiras-
sistische Initiative Berlin (Antiracist Initiative Berlin) in 1988, the Antirassismusbüro Bremen 
(Antiracism Off ice Bremen) in 1991, the Berlin-based Forschungsstelle Flucht und Migration 
(Flight and Migration Research Center) in 1994, and the Internationaler Menschenrechtsverein 
Bremen (International Human Rights Association Bremen) in 1996.
21 Practices of resistance by precarious migrants, such as hunger strikes and self-mutilation, 
can be traced throughout the history of migration and restrictive politics enacted against asylum 
seekers in Germany. However, scattered, episodic acts of resistance were not knit together in 
organized groups or networks until the mid-1990s.
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deportation sought protection in churches in the German region of North 
Rhine-Westphalia (Morgengrauen 1998; Joch-Joisten 1999). The campaign 
received support from various prominent f igures, including German 
novelist Günter Grass (Joch-Joisten 1999). Nevertheless, the mobilizations 
resonated far less than its French counterpart at the St. Bernard church. 
Also in 1998, antiracist groups in Bremen were among the key organizers 
of the f irst Caravan for the Rights of Refugees and Migrants, which for 
the f irst time connected the previously scattered nodes of precarious 
migrant activism with long-distance marches and bus tours (Karawane 
1998). The migrant support groups in 1997 formed the national network 
Kein Mensch ist illegal (No Human Is Illegal) to bridge a highly diverse 
spectrum of groups and individuals, from private volunteers, to anarchist 
groups and priests (Cross the Border 1999). In 1999, German activists were 
vital in the foundation of the transnational No Border Network to counter 
the increasing Europeanization and securitization of border politics in 
Europe (Anderson, Sharma, and Wright 2012; No Border Network 2004). A 
diverse set of actors continued mobilizing in the early 2000s, with new self-
organized groups by precarious migrants (Odugbesan and Schwiertz 2018). 
However, and despite a proliferation of migrant support and self-organized 
migrant protest in Germany since the late 1990s, activism has remained 
fragmented and mostly localized. Grassroots groups have rarely interacted 
with more professionalized organizations and migrant collectives never at-
tracted national attention until the 2012 Oranienplatz mobilizations (Jakob 
2016).22 From the second half of 2014, the situation profoundly changed, 
when Germany witnessed the nationwide proliferation of volunteering 
for asylum seekers (Karakayali and Kleist 2015: 19), which further picked 
up steam during the “long summer of migration” in 2015 (Hess et al. 2017). 
Widespread media attention to the humanitarian crisis in Syria as well 
as the challenges of municipalities in the reception of asylum seekers 
mobilized a large share of Germans who had formerly neither been active in 
volunteering nor politically engaged (Speth and Becker 2016; Fleischmann 
and Steinhilper 2017). At a surprising pace, support of migrants diffused 
from a marginalized faith-based and radical left niche to the mainstream. 
Hundreds of support initiatives were founded, tens of thousands collected 
and distributed clothes, food and organized German-language courses. 
While engagement in support of migrants has rapidly proliferated during 
22 Given its importance in the recent history of precarious migrant protest in Germany, 
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the so-called Oranienplatz protests in Berlin-Kreuzberg between 2012 
and 2014.
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the “summer of migration” in Germany, the antiracist and highly politicized 
tone as well as the mobilizations by precarious migrants have lost visibility.
As this overview of patterns of contention around migration in Germany 
and France suggests, the two countries differ in at least two important 
regards. Firstly, in France the issue of migration has been politicized more 
holistically, framing precarious migration as a combination of asylum 
and undocumented migration, whereas in Germany, mobilizations have 
strongly focused on asylum. Relatedly, in Germany both asylum seekers 
and migrant support associations have problematized the hardships in 
the asylum system, whereas contentious actors in France have predomi-
nantly mobilized for the regularization of precarious migrants outside 
the asylum system. Secondly, for a long time, the French migrant support 
movement has been much stronger and more cohesive compared to its 
German counterpart, connecting a wide range of professionalized human 
rights NGOs, grassroots organizations and trade unions. In Germany, in 
turn, mobilizations have long remained more scattered and localized 
until the “summer of migration” reorganized the promigrant civil society 
profoundly, which caught up to or even surpassed the French movement 
in both density and activity.
Conclusion
The historical, discursive and regulatory contexts of precarious migration 
in France and Germany have signif icantly shaped and have been shaped 
by contentious episodes. Distinct administrative procedures regarding 
irregularity and asylum have also produced distinct grievances, on which 
individuals and groups have mobilized. In France, with its structurally 
undersized asylum accommodation system, as well as large established 
Francophone migrant communities and a more open job market, many 
precarious migrants have remained and mobilized outside the asylum 
system. Life in irregularity has been more complicated in the light of 
stricter controls in public spaces and on production sites in Germany. 
Therefore, the vast majority of precarious migrants opted for or was forced 
into the asylum system instead. Many also remained as individuals with 
Duldung in Germany when their asylum claim got rejected. Given the 
specif ic hardships of the German asylum system, numerous precarious 
migrants have protested against the asylum system with its detrimental 
effect on their (mental) health and social inclusion. In contrast to France, 
no large mobilizations by individuals self-identifying as undocumented 
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migrants have occurred. Public debates on both irregularity and asylum 
in France and, with a strong focus on the latter in Germany, have opened 
distinct discursive opportunities. These facilitated mobilizations for the 
regularization of precarious migrants outside the restrictive criteria of 
international protection. In France, interactions with and among trade 
unions and a diverse migrant rights movement have created a relational 
context in which the protests of undocumented migrants resonated. In 
Germany, in turn, the tight regulation of migration has contributed to the 
emergence of a migrant rights movement, which has strongly focused on 
asylum and has only in the course of the “long summer of migration” in 2015 
reached a similar density and visibility to its French counterpart.
The four comparative case studies of precarious migrant protest scruti-
nized in the subsequent chapters mirror these two distinct national contexts, 
which influence on the opportunities, resources and strategies of contentious 
actors. Yet, the chapters also document that dynamics of protest are as 
much influenced by these contexts, as they are by concrete interactions of 
players in the complex protest arena.
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The Bourse du Travail Protests, Paris, 2008-2010
“The sans-papiers are in the front row. The sans-papiers are the f irst victims. 
The supporters and the associations must not leave us aside; this is our struggle. 
We are the ones who know our diff iculties, our situation. The sans-papiers must 
understand that the struggle of the sans-papiers is their own struggle.”1
Abstract
In May 2008, three sans-papiers collectives occupied the Bourse de Travail 
in Paris, the headquarters of the CGT trade union. This was the start of 
one of the largest precarious migrant protests in recent French history. 
The sans-papiers protested against the trade union push for leadership in 
a movement previously self-organized by migrants. Analyzing the interac-
tive dynamics in these protests, the chapter carves out a key aspect of 
such precarious mobilizations: the fragility of ties both between migrants 
and allies as well as within heterogeneous precarious migrant collectives.
Keywords: Paris; sans-papiers; alliances; migrant protest; trade unions
After the highly contentious St. Bernard church protests by undocumented 
migrants starting in 1996 and lasting roughly until 2002, the visibility of 
self-organized protest by migrants in Paris temporarily faded (Nicholls 
and Uitermark 2016). The so-called circulaire Chevènement of 1997 had 
formalized a “case-by-case” approach of regularization. Various sans-papiers 
collectives had organized protest events but they increasingly focused on 
direct and often secret negotiations with the respective prefect’s off ice to 
obtain regularization for their members.
1 Quoted in CSP75 (2008b), author’s translation.
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This relatively routinized arrangement was shaken up profoundly in early 
2008, when the second-largest trade union at the time, CGT,2 launched a 
coordinated strike of sans-papiers. Aiming at a regularization of sans-papiers 
via proofs of employment, the trade union had since 2006 organized scattered 
strikes to pressure employers into issuing contracts for their illegalized work 
force. While being welcomed by many migrant support organizations, the 
intervention of the CGT spurred fierce opposition by sans-papiers collectives. 
Three of these collectives, including the Coordination 75 des sans papiers 
(CSP75),3 which claimed the legacy of the St. Bernard church protests, oc-
cupied the Bourse de Travail, the headquarter of the CGT trade union, in 
May 2008. It sparked one of the largest precarious migrant protests in recent 
French history, which lasted for two years.4
Analyzing the interactive dynamics in these protests, the chapter carves 
out two key aspects of precarious migrant mobilizations: the fragility of 
alliances and the importance of autonomy. This constellation of actors, 
antagonizing a leftist trade union and the autonomous sans-papiers col-
lectives, questions the “f iction” (Jasper 2014: 14) of a homogenous migrant 
rights movement. Targeting an increasingly inf luential player within a 
broader movement, the migrants involved aimed at underlining that their 
struggle was as much a struggle for rights including regularization as it was 
one for autonomy and recognition as autonomous political subjects. The 
chapter furthermore unveils the fragile nature of alliances within protesting 
migrant communities. Mobilizing within small “niche openings” (Nicholls 
2014) to a regular status, precarious migrants often internally compete for 
rights and recognition. This leads to f issures within compound players, 
whose unity is diff icult to sustain.
Protest Emergence: An Ally Turns Opponent
Within the isolated and internally heterogeneous f ield of autonomous 
sans-papiers collectives, the CSP75 has held a central role since its off icial 
creation in 2002. Claiming the heritage of the St. Bernard collective, this 
umbrella organization of three collectives held something like a “monopoly” 
2 Confédération générale du travail (General Confederation of Labor).
3 Coordination 75 des sans papiers is an umbrella organization of three sans-papiers collectives. 
The number 75 refers to the administrative department number of Paris.
4 Despite its longevity and numerical strength, the protests received comparatively little 
(academic) attention, not least because it unfolded parallel to the highly visible trade union-
organized strike movement (Barron et al. 2011).
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(Interview P29)5 in the self-representation of migrant claims in the public 
sphere, at least in Paris. Weekly rallies and occasional occupations of public 
buildings combined with regular meetings with the prefect’s office to discuss 
potential regularizations had introduced a mix, almost a routine, of disrup-
tive and nondisruptive actions into migrant activism. The usual procedure 
of the collectives was that they created dossiers (f iles) on their members, 
collecting proof of presence on French territory, employment and family 
ties, to be submitted to the prefect’s off ice. The order of submission usually 
privileged those who were regularly present during demonstrations. For 
this purpose, the members of the collective signed a list after every protest, 
which both added proofs to the files and guaranteed constant presence in the 
public sphere. The demonstrations and particularly the occupations – more 
than 30 between 2002 and 2008 (Laske 2009a) – were meant to render a 
structurally marginalized population visible continuously and to remind 
the prefect’s off ice of the mobilizing capacity of a large undocumented 
population in Paris (Interviews P14, P22): “We march every Friday. Because 
when we march, we disrupt, if we do not disrupt, no one cares about us. We 
are invisible but always in danger” (f ield notes, 16 June 2017).
When the CGT launched a coordinated strike of sans-papiers, the situation 
fundamentally changed. Aiming at a regularization of sans-papiers via 
proofs of employment, the trade union had since 2006 organized scattered 
strikes to pressure employers into issuing contracts for their illegalized 
work force – mostly in the sectors of catering services, construction and 
cleaning. The 2007 Hortefeux Law on immigration reform opened an ad-
ditional opportunity in this regard, as it introduced the employer as a key 
component in the process of case-by-case admissions based on economic 
utility (Kahmann 2015: 421).
Acting upon this opening opportunity, from early 2008 onward, the CGT 
and the migrant rights association Droits devant!! strategically targeted 
emblematic locations to attract the broadest visibility possible (Kahmann 
2015). Among them was La Grande Armée, a luxurious restaurant in the heart 
of Paris, which was regularly frequented by the political elites, including 
members of the ruling government (Le Monde Online 2008). Most of the 
established players in the migrant protest arena in Paris, such as GISTI, 
LDH and Cimade, predominantly welcomed the involvement of the CGT 
and particularly the new dynamic as a “turning point” in mobilizations for 
the rights of undocumented migrants.6 They had even created a working 
5 A list of interviews can be found in the Appendix.
6 See Carrère (2009); Interviews P8, P21, P29, P30.
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group on “trade unions and sans-papiers” (Carrère 2009) to coordinate their 
cooperation. During the mobilization, a new compound player referred to 
as Les Onze7 (The Eleven) emerged, comprising of both migrant rights 
associations and trade unions.
Encouraged by the substantial media coverage and positive responses 
received in April 2008, a coordinated strike movement was initiated by 
the CGT, particularly its Parisian branch, the Union departementale de 
Paris. Rapidly, the strike movement introduced the notion of the “sans-
papier worker,” framing undocumented migrants as a productive and 
well-integrated part of French society. This association with labor struggles 
also had a strategic component, as it naturally strengthened the role of 
trade unions in contentious migration politics around migration,8 who had 
previously mainly operated as logistic support for autonomous sans-papiers 
collectives (Kahmann 2015).
Yet, the intervention of the CGT also introduced fundamental ruptures. 
Firstly, the appearance of a powerful player on the scene undermined the 
previously central role of the autonomous collectives of sans-papiers and 
their struggles for both regularization and recognition as political subjects. 
Secondly, the CGT aimed at targeting a new constituency for their trade 
union and focused on migrant workers, thereby, more or less deliberately 
excluding those not f itting into this category. The autonomous sans-papiers 
collectives, in turn, had since the 1990s resisted a privileged treatment of 
those undocumented migrants with a higher likelihood of regularization 
(Interviews P22, P14). Thirdly, the CGT focused on strikes of illegalized 
workers at their work place. This, again, excluded the so-called “isolated 
workers,” meaning individuals scattered across multiple companies without 
the bargaining power to collectively exert pressure on the employer (CSP75 
2008a; Carrère 2009).
The CGT and also Droits devant!! had provided logistical and ideational 
support for the sans-papiers collectives, at least since the St. Bernard pro-
tests in the second half of the 1990s (Cissé 2002; Diop 1997; CSP75 2008a). 
Consequently, the CSP75 had at the beginning enthusiastically welcomed 
the initiative by the two organizations and hoped for a concerted pressure 
7 The group consisted of the trade unions CGT, CFDT (Confédération française démocratique 
du travail, French Democratic Confederation of Labor), FSU (Fédération syndicale unitaire, 
Unitary Trade Union Federation), Solidaires, UNSA (Union nationale des syndicats autonomes, 
National Union of Autonomous Trade Unions), and the human rights associations Autre monde, 
Cimade, Droits devant!!, Femmes égalité, RESF (Réseau education sans frontières, Network for 
Education without Borders) and LDH (Veron 2011).
8 For a detailed analysis of the strike movement, see Barron et al. (2011).
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for the benef it of all sans-papiers (Barron et al. 2011; CSP75 2008a). The 
sans-papiers collectives, hence, joined the strike pickets of the CGT, yet, they 
were encouraged by the trade union to organize their own, independent 
strikes. However, as they routinely submitted f iles to the prefect’s off ice, 
they were rejected on the premise that the prefect’s off ice was busy dealing 
with CGT f iles. Encouraged by the prefect to join the activities of the CGT, 
the CSP75 envisaged not only the endangerment of migrant autonomy 
and leadership in sans-papiers mobilizations, but also feared losing their 
bargaining power with the state altogether (Interviews P22, P29, P30). The 
CSP75 felt deliberately sidelined and noted: “They think we are kids. We 
have understood that there was an agreement to block our movement. We 
were betrayed” (CSP75 2008a, author’s translation).
Outraged, more than 200 sans-papiers deviated from their traditional 
weekly demonstration route on 2 May 2008, and occupied the court and 
staircases of the historical labor house Bourse du Travail, the headquarter 
of the Paris branch of the CGT, which had initiated the strike movement 
(Remande 2008; Le Monde Online 2008). The occupation soon involved 
more than a thousand sans-papiers from various origins, mostly West and 
North African. Among them were men, women and children with diverse 
migration histories united by precarious lives. Some had arrived in France 
as political refugees and became undocumented later, and others were 
rejected asylum seekers or overstayers of a tourist or student visa (CSP75 
2008a, 2008f, 2008g). Targeting and exerting pressure on one of its long-term 
allies, the CSP75 demanded the CGT to either include them in their activities 
or leave the protest arena of undocumented migrant activism.
Protest Incubation: Interactive Dynamics at the Bourse du Travail
The protest arena initially consisted of four main compound players: the 
trade union CGT, the various “associations” (mostly referred to as one com-
pound player), the CSP75, and the French executive, mainly represented by 
the prefect’s off ice. Various players split in the course of the mobilizations, 
and others entered the arena at a later stage. During the occupation, im-
mediately, an agitated atmosphere unfolded between the sans-papiers 
and the CGT, resulting in a highly antagonistic rhetoric: “The CGT has 
taken our movement hostage. We’ve taken the Bourse du Travail hostage” 
(sans-papiers spokesperson cited in Remande 2008, author’s translation). 
In a public statement, the CSP75 further clarif ied: “Among our conditions 
is that, once and for all, the orchestrated infantilization of an autonomous 
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movement has to stop. We are upright men and women, responsible and 
capable of taking our movement into our own hands. We have our dignity” 
(CSP75 2008a, author’s translation).
For the CSP75, the involvement of the CGT in contentious migration 
politics was not only a question of leadership, but an assault on their proud 
tradition of autonomy since the St. Bernard protests. The CSP75’s view that 
the CGT tried to strategically undermine the collectives’ leadership was 
well-founded. With the strike movement, the CGT had explicitly aimed at 
gaining control of the sans-papiers movement, which they considered to be 
dominated by ineff icient autonomous collectives with a focus on hunger 
strikes and the occupation of public spaces. The organizers of the CGT viewed 
particularly the hunger strikes critically as a “sordid, individual mode of 
action, based on an apolitical human rights discourse” (Kahmann 2015: 420). 
Instead, following its mandate, the CGT aimed at redirecting the movement 
toward a focus on labor. This also allowed for limiting the engagement to 
those migrants already present on French territory without engaging in 
highly contested claims on less restrictive immigration policies. To mark 
its difference compared to previous mobilizations, the CGT used the term 
“sans-papiers” only in combination with the qualif ier “worker” (“travailleurs 
sans papiers”). One of the trade union organizers at the time recalled:
The question of work, immediately we perceived it as determinate. For 
a trade union, this question necessarily goes beyond manifestations of 
solidarity or support, things we have done in the past in our relationships 
with the sans-papiers collectives. This means that we enter into a dimen-
sion that is completely linked up with our traditions as a trade union 
that is to defend workers’ rights. […] From the very beginning, this was 
more understood as a trade union thing. (Quoted in Kahmann 2015: 419)
While the CGT profited from increased visibility and public recognition, as-
sociations involved in migrant solidarity also welcomed the new momentum 
introduced by the trade union. According to Marcus Kahmann,
the competences that unionists brought to the table [were also] clearly 
recognized and valued by employers and government off icials alike. 
They provided them with a clear advantage over other external groups 
(autonomous sans-papiers groups; immigrant rights and nationality 
groups) operating in the f ield. The latter lack technical and tactical 
competences to pursue a labor conflict and are considered as unreliable 
by the authorities. (2015: 420)
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To justify their recognition and newly acquired privileged status in ne-
gotiating with the state, the CGT pushed for effective leadership. Unlike 
in preceding mobilizations, migrants were gradually excluded from the 
decisions and the process was steered by a small core of white and male trade 
union organizers (Kahmann 2015: 420; Interview P29): “Well, [in the CGT] 
there are many who are socialized in a political tradition – very Marxist, 
centralist, a bit Stalinist you could say. They really wanted to be in control 
of the strike movement” (Interview P29).
Kahmann highlights the socialization of the main organizer, too, who 
“was an ex-public transport mechanic in his 60s with a marked background 
in revolutionary Communism” (2015: 417). Accordingly, the CGT organized 
the strikes their way: hierarchically, outcome oriented and with profound 
skepticism toward self-organized migrant collectives. Particularly, they 
showed little sensitivity regarding racism, emancipation and the lengthy 
struggles fought by sans-papiers for autonomy from nonmigrant French 
supporters of all kinds:
The CGT organized this movement […] secretly. […] Hence, it is true that 
the collectives at the time felt left aside. But it was also them who had a 
bit the monopoly in the struggles and I think an actor like the CGT, who 
enters the movement, could be also seen as a rival. […] I think there is this 
entire discussion, that unfolded in the movement of sans-papiers – the 
question as to whether the struggles should be totally autonomous [from 
the French supporter community]. And it is true that the fact that the 
trade union entering the movement could be perceived positively by many, 
but regarding the idea of autonomy, it shakes up the idea of autonomy. 
(Interview P29)9
Accordingly, the CGT and the CSP75 – two compound players with highly 
distinct visions of the movement regarding strategy and leadership – entered 
into a contentious interaction. While the CGT had an institutional interest in 
the leadership of the movement and an output-oriented strategy, the CSP75 
viewed their mobilization as an emancipatory process to gain recognition as 
political subjects and at modifying the power relations vis-à-vis nonmigrant 
pro-beneficiaries. Additionally, the CGT’s focus on collective strikes at the 
work places de facto meant the exclusion of large parts of the constituency of 
the CSP75, including all “isolated workers” without the option to pressurize 
collectively, as well as the women, the elderly and the sick without a job. 
9 See also Kahmann (2015: 422).
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When the CSP75 demanded from the CGT to recognize their role, and also 
include nonworking and isolated sans-papiers in their negotiations (CSP75 
2008a, 2008b), the CGT responded: “Our job is not to f ile applications based 
on family life or medical condition, etc. We are a labor union” (cited in Barron 
et al. 2016). While the CGT reiterated its strategic focus on the positive 
category “worker,” the CSP75 leadership and its members saw their “niche” 
toward regularization shrinking. The CGT intervention, hence, constituted 
a broad threat for their communities and identities, but also a direct threat 
to themselves and their personal interests.
In addition to the trade union and the CSP75, there was a third type of 
compound player involved: the myriad of “associations” engaged in migrant 
support with a historically ambivalent relationship to the sans-papiers 
collectives. Due to the success of the strike movement in terms of visibility 
and the f irst successful regularizations, most associations reacted with 
irritation to the occupation, noting that the CSP75 had chosen the “wrong 
target.” Instead they recommended dissolving the nonstop picket (Barron 
et al. 2014; CSP75 2008a) in order to prevent the fragmentation of what they 
considered the broader “migrant rights movement.” A representative of RESF 
stated: “They should target the Ministries of the Interior or Integration, not 
the CGT. Those really responsible [for the misery of undocumented migrants] 
are inside the government, not outside. An occupation is a hostile action. 
While we are dividing ourselves, the government is rubbing their hands 
with glee” (cited in Fouteau 2009, author’s translation).
The occupants were highly disappointed by this position and increasingly 
perceived the associations to be “on the side of the trade union” (CSP75 
2008b; Interview P22). This experience strengthened their sense of being 
dominated by the white French migrant rights environment more broadly 
(Interviews P14, P22). Various attempts to mediate in the stalemate, involving 
members of the most influential associations, including GISTI, LDH, and 
RESF, failed due to an increasing skepticism on the part of the CSP75 and 
the determination of the CGT leadership to stay in control of the strike 
movement. The longer the occupation lasted, the more the CSP75 became 
alienated from both “the associations” and the CGT (CSP75 2008c; Interviews 
P22, P29). Their reaction nurtured the sans-papiers collectives’ general 
suspicion toward nonmigrant organizations and their intuition to speak 
on behalf of sans-papiers:
The sans-papiers are in the front row. The sans-papiers are the first victims. 
The supporters and the associations must not leave us aside; this is our 
struggle. It is we who know our diff iculties, our situation. The sans-papiers 
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must understand that the struggle of the sans-papiers is their struggle. 
(Public statement at a meeting of various collectives in the occupied 
Bourse du Travail: CSP75 2008b, author’s translation)
Given also the long history of conflicts on questions of representation in 
the French migrant rights movement (Cissé 2003), the intervention of the 
CGT touched upon a highly sensitive point. Accordingly, the tone, at times, 
became extremely hostile:
We have had enough of the trade union’s colonialism! […] The sans-papiers 
of the CSP75 have the impression that they have been constantly exploited 
and got nothing in return. Nowadays in France, with the trade unions 
we thought of as our friends, it is just like in Africa in colonial times – it 
is like what our parents told us about. (CSP75 2008f, author’s translation)
The longer the occupation and the stalemate lasted, the more the migrant 
associations felt irritated by the CSP75’s irreconcilability (Fouteau 2009; 
Interviews P7, P21, P29). None of the numerous mediations were successful, 
as the occupants wanted to prove a more fundamental point, an “act of 
emancipation” against what they perceived an outrageous assault on their 
dignity. One of the activists involved at the time recalled: “The CSP75 has a 
very proud if not jealous tradition of their autonomy, which was also some-
thing that produced a lot of conflict. The CSP75 decides to do something. 
If you do not follow, they do it alone. There was not much compromise” 
(Interview P7).
Even though many associations rejected the strategy of the CSP75 and 
criticized what they considered an unwillingness to f ind “pragmatic solu-
tions” (Interviews P29, P30), they found themselves in an extremely awkward 
position. While they appreciated the efforts by the CGT, they refrained 
from outspoken criticism against the CSP75 (Interview P21). While the CGT 
and the CSP75 blamed each other, the prefect’s off ice remained almost 
entirely out of focus: “For the prefect’s off ice, it was a dream. It was the 
self-destruction of a movement. Everyone blaming each other. It was an 
inferno!” (Interview P7).
In the following weeks and months of the occupation, a paradoxical 
dynamic unfolded. While the occupants were increasingly isolated from the 
broader migrant rights movement, the occupation and the determination 
of the sans-papiers protesters grew.
In summer 2008, the Bourse du Travail occupation had around 1,300 
participants, including various families (Bonal 2008; Ginésy-Galano 
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2009). To sustain the occupation for months, eff icient structures of self-
organization were set up. Mattresses and cardboard were used in shifts, 
money decentrally collected and food prepared for all occupants, mostly 
by the women involved in the occupation (CSP75 2008c; Ginésy-Galano 
2009). As one of the CSP75 organizers at the time noted in an informal 
conversation, the protestors sustained the occupation “à la Africaine” 
(“in the African way”) in the absence of external support (f ield notes, 
16 June 2017). Through the use of this expression, he was referring to the 
experience of organizing subsistence and also political activism under 
precarious conditions with scarce resources. He also pointed at the existing 
internal resources of the sans-papiers, including the cultural capital of the 
CSP75’s leading f igures.
Firstly, some of the CSP75 organizers had been living in France for many 
years. One activist was even involved in the St. Bernard mobilizations 
in 1996 and was regularized in 2006 (after thirteen years in France) but 
decided to stay involved in the sans-papiers collectives, “to provide a 
connection” to previous mobilizations and experiences (Halissat 2016, 
author’s translation). Others had spent several years in France as legal 
residents, including as political refugees, and had subsequently become 
undocumented through legal reforms. Accordingly, they had accumulated 
crucial knowledge on political activism, legal and administrative processes 
and social capital. These f igures served as “entrepreneurs” or “brokers” for 
the movement, crucial for compensating or buffering the structural obsta-
cles of political mobilization in a condition of illegality.10 The memories of 
disappointments were the other side of the coin in this regard, since many 
of those with a more extensive history of activism in France transmitted 
frustrations from previous interactions with various compound players 
in the migrant rights movement. Secondly, the occupants could rely on a 
strong sense of solidarity, particularly within the Sub-Saharan and North 
African migrant communities in Paris. These social networks had ever 
since buffered some of the hardships experienced by those living a life in 
irregularity in the French capital (France Inter 2015). The migrant workers’ 
foyers, social housing complexes mostly located in the Parisian periphery, 
had for a long time become essential nodes in these social nets; as access 
points for newcomers, as reservoirs of information and social capital 
but also for the provision of basic needs such as precarious shelter and 
10 See also the chapter by Freedman, who has equally pointed to the role of “brokers” with 
specif ic resources in undocumented migrant activism in France (Freedman 2008). Zepeda-Millán 
(2016) traces similar patterns in the United States.
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food (France Inter 2015; Laske 2009a; Halissat 2016). Due to these internal 
resources, individuals within these networks, and to a certain degree 
also the sans-papiers collectives, have been less dependent on external 
support.11 The embeddedness in the migrant networks and particularly 
the foyers were important spaces to mobilize participants and resources 
for the occupation of the Bourse du Travail, necessary to guarantee its 
continuation (CSP75 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008e). Thirdly, and related to 
the two previous types of resources, the occupying sans-papiers originated 
from a wide range of countries. Yet, including the spokesperson, they were 
Francophone, by majority, which allowed them to communicate with 
the local media and supporting citizens directly. Consequently, despite 
a continuous and at times deepening alienation of the CSP75 with both 
the associations and the CGT (Fouteau 2009), the protesters succeeded 
in sustaining the occupation and reaching out to external players. In the 
so-called “débats sur matelas” (“mattress debates”) – referring to practice 
of placing all the sleeping mattresses for the occupants in one room of the 
occupied building – the protesters shared experiences of a life in irregular-
ity, discussed the strategy of the struggle, but also met potential supporters 
and allies. Every Wednesday a protest march was organized from the 
occupied building to the prefect’s off ice, and every Friday a demonstration 
took place in front of the occupied Bourse du Travail (CSP75 2008b 2008; 
Ginésy-Galano 2009; Interview P15). With the “exits,” as they called it, the 
protesters aimed at sustaining visibility and disruption. As the organizers 
noted, “If you plant a tree, you have to water it. The demonstrations are 
our water” (CSP75 2008d, author’s translation).
Interactive Dynamics at Rue Baudelique
In June 2009, after fourteen months of occupation, during which the CGT had 
no functioning headquarters and accepting that no signif icant rapproche-
ment was taking place between the competing compound players, the CGT 
ordered the eviction of the premises. When the majority of the occupants 
had left for one of their regular demonstrations, the security services of the 
CGT entered the Bourse du Travail with batons and tear gas and, according to 
11 This has importantly distinguished members of the West African migrant community 
from the newly arriving migrants coming from other regions, who were without established 
networks and therefore remained entirely dependent on French supporters in the La Chapelle 
protests scrutinized in Chapter 4.
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the newspaper Le Monde, “brutally” evicted the sans-papiers (Van Eeckhout 
2009). In a press release, the CGT Paris remarked:
The delegates [of the sans-papiers] have cultivated the idea that the 
occupation of the Bourse du Travail might lead to the regularization of 
isolated undocumented workers. Voluntarily, they have led these migrant 
workers into a deadlock. They could have, like others, chosen to organize 
in the trade unions to engage in collective struggles at the work place. 
(CGT Paris 2009a, author’s translation)
The communiqué continued, touching upon the fundamental dilemma 
which had characterized the protest from the outset:
Who can understand an occupation motivated by a need for help and at 
the same time the refusal of any kind of proposal [to solve the stalemate]? 
Even more fundamentally: how is it to be understood that the CSP75 
wants to damage the trade union movement and particularly the CGT 
while at the same time demanding its support? (CGT Paris 2009a, author’s 
translation)
In the media, the CGT reiterated its position, justifying the eviction with 
a need to re-establish order, and focused on the strike movement “in the 
front row for the regularization of sans-papiers” (cited in Le Monde Online 
2009). While the CGT had succeeded achieving the regularization of more 
than 2,000 sans-papiers since the initiation of strikes (CGT Paris 2009a), it 
was exactly its position “in the front row,” and the authoritarian push for 
leadership, that caused the protest in the f irst place. An activist involved 
at the time as a representative of an association, who later became a CGT 
trade union organizer, recalled:
I think the CGT is not proud of it. But, at a certain point, it was not tenable 
any longer. It is not only [the CGT] in the building; there are also other 
trade unions. There is work to do. […] It was a very painful moment for 
many. And no one really understood why no compromise could be found. 
(Interview P29)
The eviction left the migrant rights movement in Paris more fragmented 
than ever (Fouteau 2009). Hundreds of precarious migrants, including entire 
families, found themselves stranded on the sidewalks of the Rue du Temple 
in central Paris. With plastic tarps and mattresses, a makeshift camp took 
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form within sight of the CGT headquarters (CSP75 2009). By being expelled 
from the Bourse du Travail, and hence by disrupting the public with an 
(improvised) protest camp, the former occupants re-emerged as a conten-
tious issue on the agenda of the prefect’s off ice, which had deliberately kept 
a low profile in the previous months. Moreover, the violent intervention had 
temporarily reattracted widespread media coverage (Laske 2009b; Fouteau 
2009). Troubled by this new politicization, and to avoid the perpetuation of 
the makeshift camp in the streets of Paris, the prefect’s off ice offered the 
CSP75 to treat 300 cases “benevolently” under the condition that the group 
dismantled the camp (Fouteau 2009; Laske 2009b).
The offer fundamentally deepened internal divisions, which had already 
started within the occupied Bourse du Travail (CSP75 2016; Interviews P7, 
P29). Given the f ixed number of cases referred to by the prefect’s off ice, 
immediately conflicts emerged on the selection of the 300 f iles out of the 
roughly 1,300 protesters, all exhausted by months of protest in precarious 
conditions and deeply afraid of missing this opportunity for regularization. 
One of the dissidents, criticizing the CSP75 leadership, noted:
The delegates of the CSP75 have secretly created a list of names [of 
individuals to receive regularization] and when the f irst meetings at 
the prefect’s off ice started, we realized that there were names [on that 
list of people whom] we did not even know, who had never been present 
during the occupation, the demonstrations and now on the sidewalk. 
(Quoted in Van Eeckhout 2009, author’s translation)
In addition to those who did not appear on the list, there were also those 
who knew they would never qualify under the off icial criteria of regulariza-
tion on economic grounds and had therefore chosen to participate in the 
occupation as a last resort (CSP75 2009, 2010). As a result, the protesting 
group experienced its f irst split into various competing players, when about 
a hundred protesters rejected the offer and decided to stay at the Boulevard 
du Temple. They rebaptized their group as the Collectif sans-papiers solidaire 
de Paris12 (Van Eeckhout 2009).
Alongside some of the sans-papiers, various individual supporters looked 
for a way out from the impasse (Fouteau 2009; Laske 2009b). For many, a 
rapprochement between the sans-papiers collectives, the CGT and the 
migrant support associations was only possible on the condition that the 
former occupants cleared the sidewalks outside the Bourse du Travail. It 
12 Sans-Papiers Solidarity Collective of Paris.
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was believed that the immediate spatial confrontation with the CGT needed 
to be overcome in order to enable the antagonists to approach each other 
(Fouteau 2009). Consequently, in late July 2009, those former occupants 
who were willing to leave the sidewalks at the Bourse du Travail and who 
remained loyal to the CSP75 joined supporters of different backgrounds to 
occupy a large empty building complex in the north of Paris (NPA 2009; 
Laske 2009b). The supporters included factions of the CGT who had opposed 
the eviction of the Bourse du Travail and demanded to “f ind a place for [the 
protesting migrants], where they can breathe, gather resources and continue 
to make themselves heard, and to exchange with all the others in the same 
situation” (CGT organizer, quoted in Van Eeckhout 2009, author’s translation).
The protest arena, hence, was complemented with an additional location, 
which gradually led to a reordering of the main compound players involved, 
since some split, or left the arena, while others emerged on the scene. During 
the f irst moments of the new occupation of the former health insurance 
administration located on Rue Baudelique, these factional dynamics became 
evident. When some of the sans-papiers recognized a CGT badge on one 
of the supporting activists, they inquired: “Are you from the CGT? […] Is 
the CGT f inally willing to align with us? The militant answered: ‘The CGT 
is not a block from the basis to Thibault [secretary general, at the time], it 
consists of very different people’” (cited in Laske 2009b).
Indeed, while the eviction had fragmented the occupants, it had also 
profoundly affected some of the trade unionists and associations, who 
criticized the CGT’s reaction (Interviews P7, P29). On the blog “Ou va la 
CGT?,”13 rank and f ile members of the trade union who deviated from the 
CGT position expressed fundamental criticism of the CGT leadership and 
declared their solidarity with the sans-papiers collectives (Ou va la CGT? 
2009b, 2009a): “There is this contempt, f lavored with paternalism toward 
our sans-papiers comrades, who demand to organize themselves; who 
want to lead their struggle themselves, without putting their destiny in 
the hands of trade union experts, of the CGT or whomever” (Ou va la CGT? 
2009a, author’s translation).
The off icial position of the CGT, yet, remained irreconcilable. On several 
occasions, the trade union leadership reiterated that the eviction was without 
alternative and attributed the stalemate and conflict entirely to the CSP75:
After fourteen months of unfriendly occupation to say the least, and an 
avalanche of f ierce accusations from the CSP75, it is difficult to re-establish 
13 Translates as “Where is the CGT going?”
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a normal relationship with those responsible until they have recognized 
that the occupation of the Bourse du Travail and the pressure on the 
trade union movement was not a good choice. They have to clarify their 
relationship with the CGT f irst. (CGT Paris 2009b, author’s translation)
Directly after occupying the abandoned building in the north of Paris, the 
CSP75 activists baptized it the “Ministry for the Regularization of All Sans-
Papiers,” deliberately deviating from the CGT’s focus on the “sans-papiers 
workers” (Barron et al. 2016). The enormous spatial capacity of the new 
protest headquarters of sans-papiers activism initially allowed for protest 
incubation. The occupation rapidly numbered several thousand members. 
A total of sixteen collectives (CSP75 2010) joined the movement, including 
1,300 members of a collective of Turkish and Kurdish sans-papiers. Most 
of them had left Turkey for political reasons; however, they were never 
granted asylum and ended up undocumented (Bell and Dilber 2009). The 
weekly demonstrations and “mattress debates” continued in addition to a 
wide range of other activities, from political organizing to adult literacy 
programs and media workshops (Bell and Dilber 2009; Interview P30). 
During a national sans-papiers demonstration in October 2009, organized 
from the Rue Baudelique headquarters, more than 10,000 sans-papiers 
gathered (Libération Online 2009), which made it the largest demonstration 
by undocumented migrants in French history up to that point.
Yet, despite a high level of protest activity and positive experiences in 
organizing sixteen collectives made up of a total of 25 nationalities, the 
protests attracted very little public attention (CSP75 2010; Bell and Dilber 
2009). The rupture with the CGT and the network of migrant rights associa-
tions had left the autonomous movement without their public voices. While 
proving their capacity to mobilize several thousands of precarious migrants 
and to organize an occupation without major internal conflicts for extended 
periods, they experienced a reduction in leverage vis-à-vis the state. In 
parallel with the occupation at Rue Baudelique, the CGT strike movement 
expanded further and eventually succeeded in achieving the regularization 
of several thousand sans-papiers (Barron et al. 2011). Both public attention 
and the priority of the prefect’s off ice had shifted toward the CGT-led 
strike movement and the violent eviction had not lastingly damaged their 
reputation among influential players. Aware of this impasse and invisibility 
in comparison to the CGT-coordinated strikes of undocumented workers, 
the occupants of the building on Rue Baudelique announced a spectacular 
protest event in order to regain leverage: On 1 May 2010, protesters departed 
on a march from Paris to Nice, where the French-African Summit was to 
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be held at the end of the month (Maudet 2010). In choosing a long-distance 
march of almost 1,000 kilometers, the protesters symbolically aligned with 
previous marches by sans-papiers activists such as the march in 1997 from 
Angoulême to Paris (Siméant 1998). Furthermore, they intended to capitalize 
on the relational and demonstrative effects of eventful protest.14 One of the 
organizers noted: “Since St. Bernard, we have needed to have a disruptive 
event every two or three years to maintain the visibility of our movement” 
(CSP75 2010: 12, author’s translation).
Various migrant rights associations took the opportunity to declare 
their solidarity with the march and by this, also intended to send a signal 
of reconciliation to the CSP75 (GISTI 2010; FTCR 2010; Médecins du Monde 
2012). Despite this tentative rapprochement, the march did not result in 
increasing pressure on the prefect’s off ice. Some of the participants even 
argued that the direction of the march was strategically wrong, as it relocated 
the protest arena and deviated attention and pressure from the nucleus of 
contention from Paris to the French periphery (Interview P15).
Dynamics of Fragmentation: Niches of Regularization
The tangible outcome of the Rue Baudelique occupation in terms of regulari-
zations remained low, even after the eventful march. Indeed, the subsequent 
month unveiled the fundamental dilemma of sans-papiers activism: the 
prefect’s off ice had blocked the treatment of f iles by sans-papiers organized 
in Rue Baudelique until they had left the building. While protesting against 
the government, the sans-papiers depended on the state’s recognition. 
Under pressure to secure regularizations for their constituents, the CSP75 
organizers signaled a willingness to make concessions. In their explanation 
of the envisaged end of the occupation, the CSP75 spokespersons noted:
The prefect’s off ice told us that they did not want its [constructive] rela-
tionship with the CSP75, established over the last ten years, to suffer or 
come to an end as a result of the occupation. They assured us that, if the 
CSP75 left on its own, the relationship would be reinforced and our f iles 
would be treated in a timelier way and benevolently. If not, the relationship 
would end. The CSP75 didn’t want this, since it would have undermined 
the work of ten years. (CSP75 2010, author’s translation)
14 For a more extensive analysis of the expressive and relational effects of the march, see the 
comparative research by Monforte and Dufour (2013).
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Similar to what Jasper termed as the “rules dilemma,” the protesters found 
themselves trapped in rules they had aimed at changing in the f irst place: 
“Efforts to change an arena often end up following the rules of that same 
arena. Rather than ignoring it or using a different arena, an insurgent may 
end up embroiled in the arena’s rules for changing the rules” (Jasper 2008: 
163).
Despite spectacular protests, the CSP75 still remained with the f ixed 
number of 300 cases offered by the prefect’s off ice directly after the eviction 
from the Bourse du Travail. The CSP75 organizers were well aware that the 
decision regarding whom to include in the list of 300 individuals would once 
more introduce f issures in the movement. Nevertheless, their adherents 
also demanded tangible outcomes from the long and burdensome protest:
They [the prefect’s off ice] know in advance what they will obtain: the 
division and weakening of the struggle. This is because, on the one hand, 
the sans-papiers have been waiting for many years now. It is very human 
[to succumb to this kind of pressure], and they are not able to resist the 
illusory prospect of being regularized. On the other hand, those who 
know they will not qualify under the “criteria” [decided by the state] 
are not willing to end the occupation. (CSP75 2010, author’s translation)
As expected, the question led to f ierce internal divisions and fragmenta-
tion inside the occupying group about whether the conditions set by the 
prefect should be accepted at all, and on how to select the 300 f iles. These 
conflicts resulted in another split when more than 700 sans-papiers joined a 
newly established collective named Les oubliés de Baudelique15 (CSP75 2010; 
Interviews P15, P30). Many of the other collectives involved in the occupation 
criticized the unilateral decision of the CSP75 to end the occupation and 
to accept the deal offered by the prefect’s off ice. The formerly strong and 
well-organized compound player, which had sustained a highly diverse 
occupation for months, quickly disintegrated into its constituting subplayers. 
Their interests became fundamentally adversarial in the light of a small 
niche to regularization. One of those who opposed the agreement with 
the authorities and joined the new collective explained: “I don’t prefer the 
CSP75, nor the new collective. All I want is to know what happens with my 
case. It is important that the prefect’s off ice knows why others like me do 
not want to leave the building. It is because we do not know what is going 
to happen with our cases” (quoted in CSP75 2010, author’s translation).
15 The Forgotten Ones of Rue Baudelique.
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The very logic of individual case assessment, the regulatory context, 
permeated into the microinteractions within the contentious arena. In the 
context of a closing window of opportunity, the CSP75 had an interest to at 
least secure some success for its own adherents. Others suddenly realized 
their marginal role within the protests and desperately tried to f ind an 
alternative. The government authorities, well aware of the delicate unity 
of individuals in highly precarious conditions, from which they want to 
escape at all cost, strategically exploited these fragile alliances. Even though 
sans-papiers had for years chanted during demonstrations “le cas par cas, 
on n’en veut pas,”16 it was exactly this logic which fragmented the protests. 
Despite opposing the individual logic of regularization, the CSP75 and 
many other sans-papiers collectives were repeatedly forced into temporary 
cooperation with the state to obtain concrete results. On 7 August 2010, all 
the occupants left the building, bringing a two-year-long series of protests 
by migrants to a “painful” end (Interview P15).17
The termination of the series of protests at the Bourse du Travail and 
the Rue Baudelique left a deep mark on future mobilizations of precarious 
migrants in Paris. Interviewed seven years later, protagonists noted that it 
“left deep bruises” (Interview P22), and they described the effects as being 
“extremely painful” (Interview P15) and “profoundly damaging” (Interview 
P30). Some even referred to “the dirty memory of migrant struggles” (In-
terview P7). Directly after the eviction of the Bourse du Travail, the CSP75 
had even spoken of a “black moment in migrant rights mobilizations in 
France” (CSP75 2009). These bruises had long-lasting effects. While ten-
sions had been inherent in the migrant rights movement and particularly 
in the relations between migrants and “supporters” since the 1990s, the 
Bourse du Travail protests left the movement deeply divided: with rifts 
between the autonomous collectives in the St. Bernard tradition and the 
trade union-organized movement, between migrant support associations 
and sans-papiers collectives and within the sans-papiers communities. One 
former spokesperson of a collective involved in the Rue Baudelique occupa-
tion noted: “The Bourse du Travail episode was like the Paris Commune. 
There is no revolution after such moments. […] Now, I have more contact 
with sans-papiers in Italy than in Paris” (Interview P15).
Disappointed by the role of the wider migrant rights movement, the 
CSP75 has even further cultivated the conviction that they could not rely on 
nonmigrant support groups: “We prefer being autonomous. We know that 
16 Translates to “We do not want the ‘case by case’ logic of regularization.”
17 See also CSP75 (2010) and SUD Éducation (2010).
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we are deficient, we make mistakes. But we prefer this to being dependent” 
(Interview P22). Another organizer noted: “Cooperation with the CGT? No 
way, they evicted us! We do not forget easily” (f ield notes, 30 May 2017). 
Aware of the counter-productivity of these conflicts, which eventually 
benefitted the state as their common adversary, various attempts of rap-
prochements were made. However, the interactionist memories sat deep, 
as the following account illustrates: “There was a meeting to organize the 
twentieth anniversary of the St. Bernard protests in summer 2016. […] There 
were some, willing to move forward, but the old stories of the Bourse du 
Travail came up again. The stories of autonomy, of the CGT” (Interview P29).
Within the migrant community, the contentious interactions had lasting 
detrimental effects on unity as well. Distrust has prevailed, leaving the col-
lectives highly fragmented. Since the end of the Rue Baudelique occupation, 
three different groups with the same name of CSP75 (CSP75 2016) have come 
into existence in Paris. A powerful mobilization involving several thousand 
persons splintered into different, much smaller groups, allowing prefects 
to continue their strategy of divide and rule, thus cultivating competition 
between the different groups (Interviews P7, P29).
Conclusion
The interactive dynamics unfolding during the series of protest in Paris 
between 2008 and 2010 underline various aspects of relational fragility in 
precarious activism. Firstly, the very constellation of actors in the protests 
points to the fact that a “movement for the rights of migrants,” neatly 
connecting migrant rights associations, leftist trade unions and autono-
mous sans-papiers collectives, reif ies a questionable homogeneity. These 
mobilizations are best understood as contentious arenas, in which a wide 
range of players with highly distinct interests interacted: the hierarchic and 
outcome-oriented tradition of CGT with an interest in placing the trade 
union in the limelight; the conviction of self-organized groups to be the 
only ones to speak for themselves; the unease of many associations with 
either of the two positions; and the prefect’s off ice, on which, eventually, 
all actors depended but who governed the fragile ties, predominantly from 
a distance. In such processes of precarious contention, players emerge, split 
and change sides. As this account documents, the CGT as well as several 
other associations, all considered to be allies of the sans-papiers collectives 
at least since the St. Bernard movement (Cissé 1998), lost their credibility 
and became temporarily perceived as key opponents.
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Secondly, the analysis suggests that migrant mobilizations are often as 
much a struggle for rights as one for recognition as political subjects. Even 
if the intervention of the CGT might have favored a path to regularization, 
it was detrimental to the process of emancipation of precarious migrants. 
The series of strikes coordinated by the CGT and Droits devant!! achieved 
the regularization of several thousand sans-papiers (Barron et al. 2011). Yet, 
de facto, the intervention of the CGT introduced trade unions as a powerful 
intermediary between the state and the sans-papiers communities. By those 
sans-papiers with a years-long background in political organizing, this was 
perceived as a fundamental assault and a threat to the struggle for autonomy. 
Asymmetric positions of power, hence, introduced a sensitive breaking point 
in such fragile alliances. Alliances between sans-papiers collectives and 
pro-beneficiaries have been historically fragile, and have been repeatedly 
broken due to disputes regarding whom to focus on in campaigns. Hence, 
the experience of the Bourse du Travail and the Rue Baudelique arena fed 
into a tradition of widespread distrust for the CSP75 (CSP75 2008a).
Thirdly, as Nicholls has also convincingly argued, political activism of 
precarious migrants faces the structural dilemma of mobilizing within 
small “niche openings,” rather than political opportunities (Nicholls 2014). 
Such bottlenecks to regularization only allow for the passage of few, at the 
expense of the exclusion of others (Nicholls 2013, 2014). This poses particular 
challenges for internal unity, as despite a shared nonstatus, precarious 
migrants are highly heterogeneous in terms of their potential recognition by 
the state.18 Consequently, parts of the protest movement split from the rest on 
two occasions, arguing that they had been “forgotten” and left behind. In sum, 
this chapter carves out the interactive dynamics in precarious mobilization, 
which are echoed and complemented in the three cases to follow.
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4. Precarious Resistance
The La Chapelle Protests, Paris, 2015-2016
“I made my way [to France] to have a better future, and now we are stuck here. 
We have rights, too! It is not much what we demand. We are grateful to those 
who show solidarity today. Today is the f irst day of hope since I arrived in 
France. Today at this demonstration, I feel human again.”1
Abstract
In summer 2015, precarious migrants, mainly from the Horn of Africa 
and Asia, sought protection underneath an elevated metro line at La 
Chapelle, in the northeast of Paris. Dozens of tents, cardboard boxes and 
mattresses precariously accommodated several hundreds of protesters. 
From the moment the government intervened and broke up the makeshift 
camp, the situation, previously perceived as a humanitarian emergency, 
became increasingly contentious. This chapter scrutinizes the processes of 
political mobilization in the most disadvantageous contexts. It traces the 
visible and invisible acts of resistance by precarious migrants, incubated 
in autonomous spaces, such as makeshift camps and squats, where the 
interaction of migrants and supporters mobilized resources and temporar-
ily created visible sites of contention.
Keywords: protest; asylum seekers; Paris; “bare life”; camps; squats
As an important transit hub for asylum seekers on their way to Great Britain, 
the French capital Paris used to be an important crossroads, where migrants 
seeking asylum rested for some days or weeks, but rarely settled for long. 
Most, eventually, headed further north toward Calais, trying to cross the 
English Channel, hidden in trucks or trains. Political mobilizations in support 
1 Field notes, 10 June 2017, author’s translation.
Steinhilper, E., Migrant Protest: Interactive Dynamics in Precarious Mobilizations. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press 2021
doi: 10.5117/9789463722223_ch04
100 Migrant Protest
of and by asylum seekers, hence, primarily concentrated at the French 
border zones such as Calais and Nice. In many cases, migrants and their 
supporters mobilized in reaction to obstacles blocking the continuation of 
their journey, rather than demanding inclusion in France. In other words, 
most opted for “exit” instead of “voice.”
The situation fundamentally changed in the context of the crisis of Euro-
pean migration politics in 2015, when precarious migrants, mainly from the 
Horn of Africa and Asia, arrived in the city. In the absence of governmental 
assistance, they sought protection underneath an elevated metro line at 
La Chapelle, in the northeast of Paris. Dozens of tents, cardboard boxes 
and mattresses precariously accommodated several hundreds, eventually. 
From the moment the government intervened and broke up the makeshift 
camp, the situation, previously perceived as a humanitarian emergency, 
became increasingly politicized. A series of protests unfolded with and 
around individuals in highly precarious situations: homeless in the streets, 
abandoned by the state and dependent on the support of civil society actors. 
Against this background, the chapter scrutinizes the processes of political 
mobilization in the most disadvantageous contexts. It traces the visible 
and invisible acts of resistance, incubated in autonomous spaces, such as 
makeshift camps and squats,2 where the interaction of precarious migrants 
and supporters mobilized resources and created visible sites of contention.
Protest Emergence: Politicization of a Humanitarian Crisis
From the second half of 2014 onward asylum seekers – mostly from Afghani-
stan, Iraq, Eritrea, and Sudan – started to gather underneath a metro bridge at 
La Chapelle station. In spring 2015 a makeshift camp had emerged, precariously 
accommodating more than a hundred individuals (Baumard 2015). Neighbors 
and humanitarian organizations jumped in to compensate for the vacuum 
left by an absent state and provided basic needs such as tents, mattresses, 
clothes and food (Interview P2, P10). As asylum seekers, many of those gather-
ing under the metro bridge were formally entitled to public services by the 
French state. Yet, the situation unveiled a structural deficit. Considering itself 
mainly as a transit country for asylums seekers and deliberately intending 
2 This book uses the term “squat” when the subversive appropriation of a building includes 
an element of providing shelter for precarious residents. If the purpose is mainly disruptive 
and protest oriented, it is referred to as an “occupation” (see Chapter 3 on the occupation of the 
Bourse du Travail).
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to avoid creating a “pull effect,” France has been known for its chronically 
undersized system of asylum accommodation. A couple of numbers suffice 
to underline this fact: similar to other European capitals, the capital region 
of Île de France has for many years been a hotspot for arrivals and asylum 
applications. Nevertheless, in 2016, the entire region held a capacity of fewer 
than 9,000 places3 for asylum seekers (Préfecture de Police Île de France 
2016) for more than 18,000 asylum applications in 2015 alone (OFPRA 2016). 
Despite the structural causes of the makeshift migrant camps emerging in 
the French capital from summer 2014 onward, in the beginning, the situation 
was mainly perceived as a humanitarian emergency. Neighbors, shocked by 
these precarious existences at their doorsteps, organized the provision of basic 
needs and reached out to humanitarian professionals involved in care work.
The summer of 2015 initiated fundamental changes. With increasing 
arrivals of asylum seekers, the makeshift camp at La Chapelle grew fur-
ther. Despite widespread support from the neighborhood with its dense 
associative networks, the conditions in the camp deteriorated – due to 
a lack of sanitary facilities and, more generally, overpopulation in an 
extremely limited space, squeezed in between two busy streets. After a 
months-long absence, and following increasing media coverage, public 
authorities intervened on 2 June 2015, with an evacuation of the makeshift 
camp (Sabot 2015), pointing at risks to public health and order (Préfecture 
de Police Île de France 2015). This f irst coordinated police intervention 
constituted a critical juncture, transforming a situation formerly perceived 
as a humanitarian emergency into a protest arena, in which a plethora 
of players interacted.4 During the dismantling of the camp, police forces 
blocked the area and transferred all migrants who were present at that 
moment with buses to temporary emergency shelters throughout the entire 
region of Île de France. Two humanitarian organizations involved in service 
provision for the government, France terre d’asile and Emmaüs Solidarité, 
co-coordinated the process.5 Over 300 migrants were relocated and the area 
was subsequently secured to avoid reinstallation. More than half of the 
3 This number includes those in CADAs (reception centers for asylum seekers used for the 
entire asylum procedure) and emergency shelters, which provide only short-term housing. See 
also Chapter 2 for further details.
4 A more exhaustive descriptive account of the developments can be found in the section on 
Paris included in the booklet published by the research project Babels (Projet Babels 2017).
5 While a cleavage between “humanitarian” and “political” organizations was already latent 
in the migrant rights movement in France prior to the La Chapelle arena (Monforte 2014), the 
involvement in the evacuations by the state further (mutually) alienated those two organizations 
from the grassroots movement.
102 Migrant Protest
evacuated persons were off icially registered as asylum seekers in France 
and some had been already recognized as refugees under international law 
(Sabot 2015). Neighbors and activists who had been supporting the migrants 
during their precarious life in the camp observed the police intervention 
with suspicion, while some even tried to prevent the buses from departing 
(ATMF 2015; Sabot 2015). Particularly the strategy of dispersal applied by 
the public authorities without offering a sustainable solution for those in 
need of a roof spurred increasing resistance (Jaoul 2019).
Only a few hours after the buses had departed, precarious migrants 
started to gather again because they had missed the moment of transfer. 
On the evening of the f irst eviction, several dozen migrants and a handful 
of solidarity activists wandered around the eighteenth arrondissement of 
Paris, with mattresses and plastic bags containing their few belongings, in 
search of a place to spend the night. Food was collected through donations 
from various migrant-run restaurants and local grocery shops in the area 
(Interview P7). After two days, the group again counted around a hundred 
persons. Some had just arrived in Paris, others had returned to La Chapelle 
after a couple of days because their emergency accommodation had been 
only temporary or it was located remotely and cut them off from legal 
advice for their asylum procedure (Interviews P2, P9, P10, P20). For many 
of those providing support for the migrants in the camp for months, the 
intervention by the state had only aimed at hiding a structural shortage 
of asylum accommodation from the public eye (Sabot 2015; Jaoul 2019). 
Without a place to stay, migrants and a small group of supporters attempted 
to occupy the St. Bernard church, in an attempt to symbolically relate to 
the birth of the sans-papiers movement in the late 1990s.6
Nevertheless, the attempt was prevented by the police and the migrant 
group eventually settled down around the corner at Esplanade Pajol, until 
the police intervened again on 8 June 2015 (Jaoul 2019). This time, the state 
displayed its force and sent the riot police, the Compagnies républicaines de 
sécurité (CRS), to carry out the evacuation (Jaoul 2019; Interviews P2, P13). 
The use of force against peaceful asylum seekers fueled a deep indignation 
among neighbors and supporters. It contributed to the emergence of an 
increasingly politicized network, which perceived the precarious living 
conditions as a concrete failure of state response. In the aftermath of the 
police intervention at Esplanade Pajol, the collective La Chapelle en lutte7 
was founded, involving a diverse mix of academics, radical left activists 
6 See Chapter 2 for details.
7 Roughly translates as “La Chapelle in Struggle.”
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and newly politicized neighbors (Jaoul and Makaremi 2015; La Chapelle 
en lutte 2015). Members of the collective noted in an op-ed in the daily 
newspaper Le Monde:
The refugees […] were arrested en masse: more than 40 have been trans-
ferred to an immigrant detention center.8 The eviction at Rue Pajol was 
of unprecedented violence, but the most shocking thing is that they have 
sent CRS units against around a hundred refugees in the streets, who are 
trying to survive, who need to understand where they are, what rights 
they have and how an asylum application works. (Jaoul and Makaremi 
2015, author’s translation)
With the collective La Chapelle en lutte, a heterogeneous and influential 
compound player emerged on the scene. In the following months, a cat-and-
mouse game unfolded between the police on the one side, and migrants and 
supporters on the other (Projet Babels 2017; Jaoul 2019). The events always 
followed the same sequence: a critical number of migrants gathered in 
the absence of alternative accommodation, sleeping at times on layers of 
cardboard on the asphalt, at times on mattresses, at times in camping tents 
provided by neighbors and supporters. As soon as a camp became large 
enough to attract (media) visibility and cause a disruption to the “order of 
things,” government authorities, in cooperation with France terre d’asile 
(FTdA) and Emmaüs Solidarité, intervened to provide a temporary solution 
for the inhabitants of the camp by transferring them to emergency shelters. 
Many of these interventions – called “evacuations,” “evictions” or “raids,” 
depending on the political leaning – were conducted with a considerable 
amount of force by the police and a subsequent confiscation and destruction 
of its constituting infrastructure (Interviews P2, P7, P10).9 These contentious 
interactions with the state incubated the contention further, which rapidly 
expanded and also attracted experienced antiracist activists and leftist 
party representatives who had been largely absent as long as the situation 
was perceived as a humanitarian emergency.
Precarious migrants, supporters and public authorities subsequently held 
diametrically opposed interests concerning the emergence of the camps: 
the city of Paris and the police fundamentally resisted the establishment 
of makeshift camps as they opened up a visible protest arena in the public 
space, which raised the question of governmental nonresponse. Thus, in 
8 Literally “centre de retention administrative.”
9 See also Jaoul (2019).
104 Migrant Protest
order to discourage their perpetuation, the municipal authorities refused to 
provide sanitary facilities or other basic infrastructure, such as mattresses, 
blankets, and the like. For precarious migrants, in turn, the grouping in 
camps constituted a strategy of protection and survival but increasingly 
also a strategy to pressure the government to take action.
The individual stories and backgrounds of the migrants living in the 
camps were highly diverse. Yet, many had spent long and tiresome periods 
of (trans)migration: some through the Balkan corridor, some through Libya 
and Italy before arriving in Paris. Among them a Sudanese student of busi-
ness administration, who had in the context of the so-called Arab Spring 
organized protests against the former dictator of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir. 
Terrif ied by the repression in Sudan, he escaped to Libya, and f inally made 
his way to Greece via the Balkan route. Arriving in Calais, he paid €1,000 to 
be smuggled across the English Channel in a truck, as he expected to f ind 
better chances of social inclusion in the United Kingdom, given his fluency 
in English. However, he was detected and prevented from crossing. With all 
his money gone, he was stranded in the makeshift “jungle” of Calais, where he 
fell sick and came to require medical assistance. In summer 2015, he returned 
to the French capital and ended up living in the streets. He concluded his 
story by saying: “France was not my destination, but it became my destiny” 
(f ield notes, 21 June 2016). Another example is a young man from Darfur, 
who crossed the Mediterranean in an overcrowded rubber dinghy. When 
he arrived in Italy, he encountered an overburdened reception system and 
the Italian authorities gave him money to continue traveling north. At the 
border between Italy and France, in Ventimiglia, he got stuck for weeks as 
he was repeatedly detected and sent back during his attempts to cross the 
border. Eventually, he reached Nice and moved on to Paris. Directly after 
he arrived in the French capital, he ended up in one of the makeshift camps 
(f ield notes, 19 June 2017). There were also many Eritreans escaping the 
indeterminate military service in the country and many young Afghans,10 
who had escaped organized crime, “mafias” as they called it, and the Taliban 
militias (f ield notes, 8 June 2017).
As diverse the individual stories prior to their arrival in Europe were, 
they became much more alike from the moment of arrival in Paris. Most 
were stranded in the northeast of the city, for various reasons. Firstly, with 
the two railway stations (Gare de l’Est and Gare du Nord), the northeast of 
Paris is the main “gateway to Paris” (Interview P11) and an exit point for 
10 On the context of violence in Afghanistan, see Chapter 6 on protests in Berlin against 
deportations of refugees to Afghanistan.
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those heading north toward Calais. Secondly, the main access point to the 
asylum system in Paris is located in this part of the city. In France, asylum 
seekers were until 2015 required to go to a so-called Plateforme d’accueil des 
demandeurs d’asile (PADA),11 run by the nongovernmental organization 
FTdA, in order to make an appointment with the prefect’s off ice where their 
asylum claims are off icially processed. The PADA of Paris is located within 
walking distance of the two railway stations. Thirdly, the neighborhood has 
become well-known for having a large number of civil society organizations 
as well as exhibiting solidarity with refugees by providing for their basic 
needs. The names of the La Chapelle, Stalingrad, and Jaurès metro stations, 
hence, soon circulated within migrant communities. From spring 2015 
onward, many asylum seekers waited several weeks to be registered in the 
PADA and sometimes several months for an appointment at the prefect’s 
off ice. Others had already f iled their asylum claim but were not provided 
with accommodation, given the structural shortage outlined above. Some 
were even recognized as refugees but were not able to f ind housing, given 
the lack of language competence and limited revenues.
Makeshift Camps as Spaces of Survival and Precarious Resistance
In the absence of shelters provided by the state, migrants organized pro-
tection and survival in groups. Many gathered – often clustering along 
nationality and language – in the few public spaces providing minimal 
protection from both sun and rain, predominantly bridges, tunnels, and 
parks. With very scarce f inancial means, lack of information, and minimal 
French linguistic skills, the daily life for those (several thousand) living in 
the streets turned out to be extremely burdensome. “After I came back from 
Calais, I was tired of the long journey. I decided to stay. And I ended up in 
the streets. You have nothing more to lose. You have lost everything. You 
lose your basic human dignity” (Interview P20). Many had to rely completely 
on charity soup kitchens or the goodwill of French citizens. The hardship 
and frustration of living in extremely precarious circumstances is mirrored 
in countless testimonies:
I took the train toward the country I’d dreamed of visiting ever since 
my childhood. But in reality it was a real shock to f ind myself utterly 
dispossessed in the rain, cold and hungry in the heart of the so-called 
11 Translates as “reception platform.”
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“city of lights.” I’m sick and my health is not compatible with the suffering 
and the misery of the street camps. (Merhaba 2016b)
For thousands of asylum seekers from spring 2015 onward, basic survival 
and shelter became the main priorities. Reduced to being “human as such,” 
these individuals found themselves in a condition of “bare life” (Agamben 
1998), stripped off or without access to rights, and in a state of exception, in 
which violence was rarely sanctioned.12 The camps became a dehumanizing 
marker and sites of despair. Despite these dire conditions, the majority 
remained quiet, instead of protesting against their blatant exclusion and 
precariousness. They were trapped in a paradox. “[The life in the streets] 
means a lot of stress, but you do not have a choice. People say: stay calm, 
there are many like you in France. Keep quiet, eventually it will work out, 
be patient” (Interview P26).
On the one hand, many felt outraged by the nonresponse of the state 
(Interviews P7, P10). Yet, on the other hand, they were well aware of the 
ultimate dependence on the state to obtain shelter, assistance and ideally 
a regularized status. This legal and moral reliance is intrinsic in the system 
of international protection:
I have been a refugee two times in my life. Asylum seekers are in a fragile 
situation; often it is your very skin that is in danger. […] You are not a 
political subject; you are a political object. I was active before I came here, 
and then here, there was this sense of not wanting to give a bad impression. 
This sense of: “I demanded protection from this state and I have to respect 
the state.” That is why there need to be extremely severe circumstances 
for a claims-making movement to come into being. (Interview P18)
The combination of “bare life” and the ultimate dependency on the state 
made the makeshift camps precarious spaces of survival. In the absence 
of established migrant networks from the countries of origin, including 
Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, and Afghanistan, migrants were de facto entirely 
dependent on the care work of neighbors and humanitarian professionals. 
Humanitarianism, in turn, clearly has contradictory effects on agency, as 
it both alleviates suffering and risks reproducing patterns of dependency, 
subordination, passivity, and apathy (Ticktin 2011; Fassin 2012).
Yet, as the trajectory of protests at La Chapelle documents, the makeshift 
camps gradually became more than spaces of survival. They transformed into 
12 See Chapter 2 for details on the relationship between precarious migration and contention.
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protest arenas, in which visibility could be generated and scarce resources 
mobilized. On the evening of the second large evacuation at Esplanade Pajol, 
the local community garden, Bois Dormoy, in the same neighborhood opened 
its door to the migrants from the camp who had neither been evacuated, 
nor been taken to a deportation facility (Derveaux 2015). Even though the 
association in charge of the garden underlined that they could only host the 
migrants for a couple of days, the space provided temporary protection from 
the constant policing of the previous days (Interview P7). In this moment 
of recovery, the garden served as a space of encounter and politicization for 
migrants and supporters. First general assemblies were held in which the 
different communities of migrants expressed their demands (Jaoul 2019; 
Interviews P2, P7). The violent police intervention had also expanded the 
set of supporting actors. Besides neighbors and those few activists who 
had accompanied the migrants since the f irst governmental intervention, 
political activists and politicians from left and radical left parties entered the 
protest arena as additional players (Mouillard and Durupt 2015; Derveaux 
2015). In their op-ed in Le Monde, two supporters underlined the empowering 
and incubating effect of these early experiences in autonomous spaces:
These f ights have shown the necessity of spaces, where migrants have 
access to associations and to the solidarity of the neighbors. […] It is 
paramount to get out of the miserable situation in the streets […] and the 
cold of administrative governance, which often categorizes arbitrarily 
and bans migrants from our streets, from our cities, from our lives. (Jaoul 
and Makaremi 2015)
After leaving the premises of the garden the diverse group occupied the 
abandoned firefighters’ barracks at Château-Landon (Le Monde Online 2015), 
in close proximity to the previous sites of contention. During this action, 
profound conflicts emerged among the supporting factions, particularly 
between those with an autonomous tradition and those aff iliated with 
parties (Interview P7; Jaoul 2019; Lamothe and Fischer 2015). While some 
of the supporters were the f irst line in the occupation, others attempted 
to discourage migrants from participating in order not to take risks. This 
in turn, spurred f ierce resistance by other fractions, who qualif ied such 
interventions as paternalistic and against the deliberate decisions taken 
by the migrants themselves (Interview P7). The growing heterogeneity 
of the supporting players incubated the protest, yet, soon also resulted in 
conflicts on strategy, forms of action, and the role of migrants in collective 
decision making (Interviews P7, P28). Shortly after entering the barracks, 
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riot police blocked the building. Subsequently, in negotiations between 
the occupants and the town hall of Paris, an agreement was made. This 
resulted in the transfer of over a hundred migrants to emergency shelters 
(Le Figaro Online 2015a), where they were allowed to stay for a maximum 
of one week. The issue became further politicized thereafter, attracting the 
attention of high-ranking politicians. In a joint press release, Minister of 
the Interior Bernard Cazeneuve and Mayor of Paris Anne Hidalgo (both of 
the Socialist Party), accused supporters of “cynically exploiting for purely 
political reasons the dramatic situation of migrants” (Le Figaro Online 
2015a, author’s translation).
Within a very short period of time, the camps and the presence of migrants 
had been transformed from a humanitarian emergency into a visible rupture 
of the political life in Paris. In this protest arena, a multitude of individual 
and compound actors with distinct, often opposing, interests and stakes 
interacted. Accordingly, after the occupation of the f iref ighters’ barracks 
at Château-Landon: “There was a lot of pressure on the camps. They lasted 
two, three weeks and then there was an evacuation. Then the conflicts in 
the solidarity movement started. I tell you this, because such moments 
mean something.13 After that, it is very diff icult [for participants] to work 
together again” (Interview P7).
Through these contentious interactions involving migrants, supporters, 
and government authorities, the camps were transformed from spaces of 
mere survival to sites in which precarious resistance sparked. Immediately 
following the occupation, migrants started gathering again in the neighbor-
hood: individuals who had just arrived in the capital, those who had not 
been included in the agreement with the city hall and, after a week, some of 
those who had to leave the temporary shelter as well. Due to the increased 
media coverage and social media channels recently established to coordinate 
the scattered migrant support groups, the subsequent camps attracted a 
wide range of individuals and associations offering all kinds of services 
from food and tents, to language courses, legal assistance, and spaces for 
political exchange (Interviews P2, P10). The initial self-help arrangements 
of makeshift camps, hence, started to become also spaces of precarious 
protection, pools for resources and sites of recognition. The involvement 
of a wide range of actors criticizing the governmental nonresponse and 
providing resources altered the options for those precarious migrants, who 
were pushed toward a burdensome life in the streets. While interacting 
with all actors involved in the arena, the inhabitants of the camps were 
13 Literally, “ça crée des trucs.”
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never purely objects of care, political exploitation or governmental admin-
istration, as they were often presented. The makeshift camps constituted 
ambivalent spaces in this regard. On the one hand, the conditions in the 
makeshift camps served as important stigmatizing markers and reproduced 
marginalization. On the other hand, the camps opened niches for agency, 
through their protective, relational, and disruptive qualities. For most, the 
initial rationale for gathering in makeshift camps was a temporary means 
for basic protection, to stay in groups and to share scarce resources. Indeed, 
the individuals had all kinds of reasons for joining a makeshift camp, and 
even to avoid evacuation. Some saw it as a place for temporary recovery 
before moving on. Others expected better chances to access legal advice in 
central Paris compared to the remote emergency shelters (Baumard 2016c).
Nevertheless, the increasing politicization and the visibility of the camps 
gradually added a strategic element. Publicly displaying a social problem, 
the camps transformed protest arenas with a large audience, which became 
bothersome for the authorities and forced them to concede places in emer-
gency shelters. Hence, the gathering of migrants, the presence of migrant 
bodies in the streets, attracted attention to the issue itself. It was in line with 
Butler’s ideas on the performativity of assemblies (2015) being fundamentally 
political. In this vein, a migrant “who will not play his assigned role, who no 
longer stays in his place, who does not keep silent” (Agier 2010: 42) creates 
a rupture in the established order, and performs a “right to have rights.” 
Indeed, many inhabitants of the camps certainly were not interested in the 
symbolic dimension of their disrupting effect. However, they were aware and 
willing to exploit it instrumentally: “The priority was to get a roof, so when 
the camp helps to achieve this, great – we do it!” (Interview P24).14 Indeed, 
in quantitative terms, the strategy to obtain shelter through camps and 
evacuations was highly successful: between June 2015 and November 2016, 
the north of Paris witnessed the emergence of dozens of makeshift camps, 
accommodating between a hundred to at times several thousands of persons. 
According to off icial sources, 21,728 (often temporary) places in emergency 
shelters were offered, following more than 30 evacuations of makeshift 
camps (Préfecture de Police Île de France 2016).
In addition to providing protection and exerting pressure on the govern-
ment, the camps at times unfolded relational effects, generating trust among 
the diverse migrant communities, and mobilizing resources through social 
ties with individual supporters and associations (Jaoul 2015b, 2019). At many 
makeshift camps, language courses and legal advice were organized on the 
14 Similar statements were made in Interviews P26 and P30.
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spot, in this regard, providing more advantageous conditions than in most 
of the isolated emergency shelters offered by the state with usually poor 
access to services (Interview P30). Many returned regularly from remote 
shelters to the camps to access these crucial resources or eventually opted 
to move back for good (f ield notes, 19 June 2017; Interviews P26, P30).
As combinations of everyday survival and spaces of encounter the camps 
were sites in which public articulation of dissent by disenfranchised migrants 
sparked. In most camps, assemblies were held, often with translations into 
multiple languages (Interviews P7, P10, P30). Depending on the respective 
camps and their inhabitants, it was decided whether “silence” or “voice” 
was the preferred strategy to obtain accommodation and access to rights 
more broadly. The camps became arenas of internal debate and strategizing 
themselves: “Of course every camp was different, as heterogeneous as the 
migrant population. In some camps, the migrants wanted to do something 
politically. They are there and wait, and some want to use this time to do 
something. This offers a moment to discuss and organize” (Interview P10).
In the context of heavy policing, others considered public articulation of 
dissent as an additional risk in an ongoing or upcoming asylum procedure, 
or for the “Dublin cases,” increasing the danger of imminent deportation to 
another EU country (Interviews P10, P13, P23). In some camps, instead, the 
inhabitants chose to make their voices heard, organizing rallies and sit-ins, 
drafting flyers, or putting up banners with claims around the camps (Jaoul 
2019). During these traditional protest events, both general dissent and 
specif ic demands were articulated (Jaoul 2019): signs showed slogans such 
as “we want human rights,” “there are no human rights in France,” “humans, 
not beast,” “stop Dublin,” “we demand asylum,” “we want dignity” (NPA 2015; 
Degeorges 2016; ATMF 2015; La Chapelle en lutte 2015). While the decision 
to act and the specif ic claims were developed by the inhabitants of the 
camps, the infrastructure, such as material for banners and megaphones, 
were provided by supporting individuals and groups. Public demands were 
not only articulated during demonstrations but also in print and online 
publications emanating from the camps. One of these communiqués read: 
“We are a group of migrants and refugees. We demand our rights as they 
are provided by the law. We camp in a square, at the moment, we are on 
a sidewalk. […] We demand an acceleration and facilitation of the asylum 
process. That a sustainable and decent accommodation is found for refugees. 
We stay here until a solution is found.”15 Testimonies and demands of this 
kind were either published on social media, the alternative media platform 
15 Leaflet compiled during f ieldwork.
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Mediapart, or printed in the f ive issues of the grassroots magazine Merhaba, 
which had been created by migrants and supporters in the camps.
The temporary shift from silence to voice resulted from the interactions 
among a heterogeneous set of migrants as well as migrants and supporters 
in the makeshift camps. Over time basic trust, empowering emotions (of 
indignation rather than fear) and access to minimal resources could be 
achieved. Yet, these interaction involving highly diverse actors did not always 
unfold empowering effects. Not least due to the precarious living conditions, 
and a consequential instrumental reasoning. Accordingly, those inhabiting 
the camps did by no means always welcome the diverse mix of supporters 
with open arms, suspicious by the countless negative experience made.
[T]hey asked “but why do you come here, if you cannot do anything for 
me?” […] [The migrants] see so many people, the police, the OFII,16 FTdA, 
they do not know anymore, who is who, who does what. Some associations 
help us, others put us on a bus and take us to the middle of nowhere. Trust 
is diff icult. In fact, it is only with a regular presence on the ground that 
you gain the trust of the people. […] It helped us also that we have a lot 
of migrants in our group, who have been living in the camps, who work 
with us now. This facilitates trust building. (Interview P10)
While in some camps, the inhabitants opted for overt protest, in others, they 
explicitly asked supporters to remain patient and quiet. Often it depended 
on the subjective assessment of the advantages and risks of the respective 
strategy (Interviews P10, P24). Both remaining silent and expressing voice 
had become strategies, upon which migrants had a novel degree of choice. 
A young woman who lived in various camps and decided to join protest 
activities reflected:
[P]eople [referring to fellow migrants] attacked me a lot, saying, “Stop it, 
you will not get your case approved – they never give you papers if you 
are in an association or active, because in Europe they want people quiet. 
And if they meet me now, they say, “Still no answer from OFPRA? We told 
you, it is because you are involved.” (Interview P24)
The makeshift camps, hence, remained ambivalent spaces of both survival 
and precarious resistance. Due to their function as a space for civil society 
16 Off ice français de l’immigration et l‘intégration (French Off ice for Immigration and 
Integration).
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engagement, migrant agency and governmental critique, the camps en-
countered increased policing to prevent their emergence or were rapidly 
dismantled (Jaoul 2019). As protest arenas in public, space, the state at-
tempted to impose its rules to break up contention.
A Migrant Squat as a Space of Incubation and Alienation
Despite its strategic value, the cycle of makeshift camps and evacuations 
reached a deadlock. Only when larger camps emerged and attracted vis-
ibility, did the administration react with the provision of (often temporary) 
accommodation. Due to the continuing arrival of more migrants in the 
city and the return of those who had only obtained temporary shelter, no 
sustainable solution appeared in sight (Interview P23). To increase the 
pressure, by the end of July 2015, activists from the collective La Chapelle en 
lutte, who had already advocated for squatting in the f irefighters’ barracks at 
Château-Landon, together with several dozen asylum seekers, mostly from 
Afghanistan and Sudan, decided to squat in an abandoned school building 
(the Lycée Jean Quarré) in the nineteenth arrondissement (Interviews P23, 
P27, P28, P30). Besides providing shelter for migrants living in the streets, 
the squat was explicitly understood as a prefiguration of alternative migrant 
accommodation schemes – self-organized and centrally located (Coutant 
2017).17 Immediately after squatting in the Lycée Jean Quarré building, 
it was rebaptized as “La Maison des Réfugiés” (The House of Refugees). 
Accommodating around 150 migrants at the outset, the squat initially 
received overall supportive media coverage (Lamothe and Le Gohébel 
2015; Lamothe 2015; Le Figaro Online 2015b). The city of Paris also declared 
it would temporarily allow the squat.
Due to its visibility, the squatted building initially had an incubating 
effect. Given the lack of alternative housing options for precarious migrants, 
the squat grew rapidly in size. In addition, the inflow of donations was 
immense at f irst. This was also due to the simultaneous diffusion of images 
of a deceased Syrian boy, Aylan Kurdi, which fueled widespread solidarity 
with migrants in Paris. For a moment, the squatted school absorbed this 
indignation and support by parts of French society. Usually, a simple post 
in social media channels or an information board displayed at the entrance 
suff iced to attract the material resources needed to sustain the place. The 
17 The squat as a form of action to politicize (migrant) marginalization has a long tradition in 
France (Péchu 1999; Aguilera 2013; Bouillon 2017).
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accumulation of resources, ranging from clothes to language courses, medi-
cal support and legal advice in addition to a solid roof further increased 
the squat’s appeal for those migrants still living in the streets of Paris. 
Assembling a diverse mix of actors, similarly to the makeshift camps, but 
initially with more advantageous spatial characteristics (large building, a 
courtyard), the squat turned into a vibrant hub of social encounters and 
precarious resistance (Interviews P28, P30).
On the other hand, after a while, the building was bursting at the 
seams. Both overpopulation and a lack of internal organization of the 
temporary gathering of more than a thousand migrants increasingly 
spurred conflicts over sanitary facilities or the use of communal spaces 
(Interviews P23, P30; Coutant 2018). The building became a protest arena 
on its own, in which players tried to pursue their individual and group 
interest observed by an increasingly critical audience. Both media reports 
and the public authorities at the local and regional level subsequently 
shifted and predominantly pointed to the degradation of the place and 
suspected its exploitation by the radical left. Its inhabitants, more than 
a thousand migrants, were mainly portrayed as either victims of leftist 
activism or as a troubling mass. Yet, for those inhabiting the squat, the 
situation was highly ambivalent. Indeed, the squat unfolded highly contra-
dictory relational and spatial qualities for the emergence and incubation 
of migratory dissent.
The very fact that the number of inhabitants in the squat steadily grew 
from the point of its establishment to the time they were evicted, illustrated 
– despite the dominant negative media coverage – that many migrants still 
considered it as the best among very poor alternatives. Many asylum seekers 
who had been assigned accommodation in emergency shelters spent the 
day in the squat anyway, often because that was where they could access 
resources they could not f ind elsewhere – including French classes, primary 
medical care, legal support and others’ company. Such benefits were often 
hard to f ind in the remotely located provisional accommodation facilities 
offered by the state (Interview P30). Many migrants found space to develop 
a collective identity and engage in political organizing. Supporters, in turn, 
even those with a primarily humanitarian impetus, were confronted with the 
tremendous hardship of exile, disenfranchisement and poverty, experiences 
which they were unlikely to have experienced themselves. Accordingly, 
the space of the squat allowed for an intensif ied organizing compared to 
the makeshift camps in the streets. General assemblies were held with 
delegates from various migrant communities. Two large demonstrations 
were organized in the squat. Inhabitants worked on Merhaba, a movement 
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journal published in French, English, Arabic, and Dari in f ive issues in 2015 
and 2016 to share testimonies, experiences, and demands (Interview P10). 
One of the young Sudanese who became increasingly engaged politically in 
the squat noted: “The people […] were really enthusiastic to buy banners or 
write slogans. They were very responsive to the idea. They were eventually 
aware of their rights and wanted to take collective action to let people know 
that their rights were being abused” (Interview P30).
For those who wanted to express “voice” publicly, the interactions 
unfolding in the squat were initially benef icial. Given the heterogeneity 
of the squat, by far not all inhabitants were interested in any kind of visible 
protest activities. Similar to the makeshift camps, many regarded the 
precarious squat as a pragmatic solution for very concrete problems: access 
to shelter, to the asylum system and legal and social support. Indeed, 
many inhabitants of the squat maintained a profoundly skeptical attitude 
toward the politicized activists of the La Chapelle en lutte group (Coutant 
2018; Lamothe and Fischer 2015). Some Afghans, for instance, thought that 
it was not in their interest to enter into confrontation with the state, as 
their chances of being granted asylum appeared at that time reasonably 
high. Once more, the delicate position of simultaneously challenging 
and claiming the right to asylum from the state became evident and led 
to conflicts over the confrontational agenda of parts of the supporters 
(Coutant 2018).
Whereas the f irst phase of the squat was predominantly characterized by 
an incubating dynamic, over time mutual alienation and exhaustion due to 
the precarious conditions prevailed. With a growing number of inhabitants, 
degradation and conflicts multiplied, which, in turn, accentuated divisions 
among the different factions of supporters, among the migrant communities 
and between public authorities and supporters. When the donations for the 
squat ebbed due to increasingly critical media coverage (France Info 2015; 
Simon 2015), the competition for scarce resources ever more frequently 
escalated to physical conflicts:
People were grouped according to nationalities. Rooms were divided and 
some did not let others enter. There was the Afghani room, the Eritrean 
room, the Syrian room, the Sudanese room, the Iraqi room – they were 
afraid of each other. It is true that there was no trust. […] The situation 
there was also very stressful. People started to feel exhausted and they 
could not take it anymore. […] They fought with each other because there 
was not enough space to sleep. People started taking the belongings of 
others. (Interview P30)
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Furthermore, the relations with the neighborhood of the squat increasingly 
deteriorated over time. As Isabelle Coutant pointed out in her detailed 
analysis of the squat and its resonance in the neighborhood, the arrival 
of a large number of migrants added to the already existing challenges in 
one of the most underprivileged areas of the French capital (Coutant 2018). 
Indeed, the transformation of the abandoned school into a self-organized 
migrant shelter collided with plans to open a media lab for the local 
population in the facilities. Many neighbors considered it unfair that 
their area of the city was unwillingly dragged into bearing additional 
burdens. The visible overpopulation and degradation of the place fueled the 
opposition in the neighborhood but also among the local administration 
and the city of Paris.
Less than a month after its establishment, the squat had become pre-
dominantly portrayed as the emblematic result of ill-guided migrant support 
activism. Including the traditionally left-leaning newspaper Libération, 
which published a highly critical article on the squat, mainly criticizing the 
group La Chapelle en lutte for its dominant role and its “self-isolation” from 
both public authorities and the professional humanitarian organizations 
(Lamothe and Fischer 2015). Not least due to their exposure to the horrendous 
deprivation of many individuals inhabiting the place, the supporters in the 
squat had become increasingly critical toward the “placebo” response of 
the government and their role in creating the situation in the f irst place. 
In their view, media reports exclusively highlighting the existing and yet 
problematic conditions in the squat were merely reproducing governmental 
discourses aiming at discrediting migrant solidarity and hiding the underly-
ing systematic failure of the government response (Jaoul 2015a). Indeed, the 
absence of shelters had pushed more and more migrants into the squat, which 
contributed to its accelerated degeneration. The spatial qualities and rules 
of the protest arena at the Lycée Jean Quarré differed from the makeshift 
camps in important ways: while the camps exposed a social problem and 
the failure of the state to a broader public, the spatiality of the precarious 
squat sealed in the problems and allowed the shifting of the responsibility 
to the migrant support groups.
Soon, the situation reached a stalemate. Relationships between La 
Chapelle en lutte and the state were cut. Notwithstanding, given the pro-
liferation of problems in the squatted building, the migrant inhabitants 
increasingly demanded a sustainable solution. In reaction to the deadlock 
in negotiating a way out of the impasse, neighbors formed a new group, 
taking neither the side of the public authorities nor that of La Chapelle 
en lutte. The emerging new actor, Solidarité migrants place des Fêtes, was 
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mainly preoccupied with the social cohesion in the neighborhood, but also 
expressed its solidarity with the migrants living in the squat (Coutant 2018). 
Various attempts at mediation, involving representatives of the largest 
migrant communities in the squat and the local administration, failed. 
Eventually, the city of Paris issued an evacuation warrant. Almost three 
months after its establishment, on 23 October, the police evacuated the 
building, transferring more than 1,300 inhabitants to emergency shelters 
(Le Monde Online 2015). For many migrants living in the squat, but also 
for most of the supporters, the evacuation was a relief. The conditions in 
the squat had become untenable, external support had eroded and the 
external pressure on the squat had led to an internal fragmentation of the 
heterogeneous group La Chapelle en lutte (Interviews P23, P30). One of the 
squatting migrants summarized the dynamic as follows: “It was great that 
we occupied this place. We did not have an alternative. And we organized 
many things there. […] But I was really happy when it was evacuated because 
it had become unbearable” (Interview P30).
On the one hand, the absence of the culminating place underlined its 
importance in hindsight. During the squat, the idea was born to create 
a self-organized migrant association, to ensure sustainability and self-
representation (Interviews P20, P23). While the accentuating conflicts 
and everyday challenges in the overpopulated squat in the end absorbed 
everyone’s energy, the period after the evacuation proved to be even more 
challenging: “Afterward it was diff icult because only 10 percent were in Paris 
and the rest was sent out of Paris. […] When they moved to the emergency 
shelters and they were separated, a lot of this spirit was gone. […] In the squat 
it was easier because everyone was in the same place” (Interviews P23).18
On the other hand, the profound dynamics of alienation resulting from the 
contentious interactions in the squat left lasting ruptures. In the aftermath 
of the evacuation, La Chapelle en lutte fell apart, fragmenting into various 
groups and associations. Among them were the United Migrants, focus-
ing on the asylum seeker self-organization La Chapelle debout,19 which 
advocated a confrontational approach, and BAAM (Bureau d’accueil et 
d’accompagnement des migrants), which set up a political, yet pragmatic 
support association (Interviews P2, P23, P27, P28).
18 A similar point was made in Interview P30.
19 The Paris chapter of the nationwide Nuit debout movement unfolding in France in spring 
2016 drew heavily from the resources and links established during the mobilizations around 
migration. Many members of the La Chapelle debout collective previously involved in the camps 
and the squat document this personal continuity (Interviews P23, P28).
Precarious resistance 117
Fading Contention: Internal Division and the Humanitarian 
Governance
The end of the squat meant by no means the end of the protests. As in 
previous evacuations, some inhabitants had missed the moment and were 
not allocated a place in emergency accommodation. Others came back to 
Paris after a few days. Consequently, the cat-and-mouse game of street camps 
picked up steam again, involving both former inhabitants of the squat and 
parts of the supporters. Not least due to the experience in the politicized 
squat, the subsequent makeshift camps were explicitly understood as sites 
of contention (Degeorges 2016; Merhaba 2015c, 2016a, 2016b):
The mayor’s off ice said it would accommodate us but it was a lie; some 
were taken but other refugees were left in the street. We need housing 
and documents. We’re here [in front of the city hall] to f ind a solution 
to our situation today. Our priority is to have a roof above our heads. […] 
They evacuated the others from the high school but we’re still outside. 
The mayor’s off ice lied to us. They broke their promise. (Merhaba 2015c)
Following yet another series of makeshift camps, La Chapelle debout to-
gether, with over 300 migrants, occupied another abandoned school building: 
the Lycée Jean Jaurès (Pouliquen 2016). Drawing from the lessons learned 
during the squatting in the Lycée Jean Quarré and its undoubted mistakes 
(Interviews P23, P27), the rules in the Lycée Jean Jaurès were much stricter 
and more self-organized involvement by the inhabitants was demanded. 
Moreover, La Chapelle debout intended to bridge the neat division between 
“refugees” and “sans-papiers” that had characterized the mobilizations at 
La Chapelle. Indeed, the well-organized sans-papiers collectives had, so far, 
kept their distance from the unfolding protests. One of the protagonists of 
the Bourse de Travail protests20 noted:
We were there at the beginning, but the supporters did not want us there. 
They said: “This is not your struggle. These are asylum seekers and you 
are sans-papiers. This is something different.” I said: “But half of them 
will be rejected and they will become sans-papiers.” […] [And] they said 
to the people there [precarious migrants at La Chapelle]: “Your situation 
is different; you have much better chances to get a residence permit!” […] 
Anyhow. The thing is, we do not forget. (Interview P14)
20 See Chapter 3.
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The distinction in asylum seekers and undocumented migrants was not 
only made by some of the supporters, but also by many migrants in the 
camps themselves. For those who aimed at refugee protection, mingling 
with the sans-papiers meant mingling with those who “failed” (Interviews 
P27, P29). While some of the precarious migrants intended to get into the 
asylum system as asylum seekers, the sans-papiers never had a chance or 
were expelled from this very system. In the light of their precarious living 
conditions and scarce resources, the established sans-papiers collectives 
observed with suspicion a concentration of resources around the “refugees” 
at La Chapelle at the expense of a visibility and support for “their” struggles 
(Interviews P14, P22).
Aware of these divisions, the La Chapelle debout group, whose members 
shared the criticism of categorizing precarious migrants, proactively invited 
the experienced collectives of undocumented migrants (including the 
CSP75) to join the squat (Interviews P28, P27). This time, the squat was 
not evacuated, but evicted by the police two weeks after (Baumard 2016b). 
In contrast to previous experiences during the series of protests, none of 
the inhabitants were transferred to emergency shelters, and instead many 
were directly taken to deportation facilities. The state showed its muscle, 
presumably because the squat risked becoming a site of even greater conten-
tion, given its attempt to bridge two networks of activists that were, so far, 
largely disconnected. Disillusioned by the heavy repression, the activists 
refrained from squatting afterward and the Lycée Jean Jaurès remained the 
last squat of the series of protests.
In order to prevent new camps, the government intensif ied the policing 
of emerging agglomerations of migrants in the streets, confiscating tents, 
mattresses and cardboard boxes but also setting up material obstacles. 
Open public spaces underneath metro lines, and various parks got fenced 
(Jaoul 2019). One of the migrants living in one of the camps observed: “They 
are about to set up barriers everywhere in the neighborhood. […] Afraid of 
camps being set up again, they have closed the space under the elevated 
metro line at Stalingrad and they have fenced the Jardins d’Eole [metro 
stop]. They built a landscape of walls, like at the borders” (Baumard 2016a, 
author’s translation).
In the absence of alternatives, migrants continued to gather and they slept 
scattered on the walkways and parks with even less protection against heat, 
rain and cold (Interviews P2, P5, P8, P10). Including the established Médecins 
sans frontières (MSF), humanitarian organizations publicly denounced the 
“systematic police violence targeted against migrants wandering through the 
city” (MSF 2016). Given the tightened policing, migrants and the exhausted 
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and fragmented supporters encountered increasing diff iculties to establish 
and maintain the street camps:
We are migrants. We are homeless. We are in the Place de la République. 
We cannot sleep. It’s raining. Every time we put up tents […] the police 
push us and take the tents by force. So we are staying in the rain and 
in the cold without cover all night. […] We are not criminals. We want 
respect. We want rights. We want humanity. We want accommodation 
today. We will never give up until you accept our requests. We call on 
the people to help the refugees.21
In November 2016, the cycle of makeshift camps stopped abruptly. The city of 
Paris had adopted a new strategy in addition to policing to address the issue 
of both accommodation and contention. A large center of f irst reception for 
asylum seekers at Porte de la Chapelle was opened (Couvelaire 2016). From 
this moment onward, the center became the bottleneck into public services. 
Most migrants started settling around the center, hoping to get one of the 
400 places. At the same time, the police controlled the outskirts of Paris 
even more f iercely, confiscating tents and putting massive boulders on the 
sides of the road where camps could be erected. Combining humanitarian 
governance and policing the state had taken over. Frustrated and exhausted, 
many supporters left the terrain, and the protests cooled off in the winter of 
2016, even though hundreds of precarious migrants still remained without 
shelter and access to rights in the streets of Paris.
Conclusion
The La Chapelle protests unveil dynamics of migratory dissent in most 
disadvantageous contexts. Reduced to a condition of “bare life,” precari-
ous migrants got stranded in the streets of Paris, destitute and dependent 
on governmental and civil society assistance. Due to the precarious lives 
and dependence on the state, the forms of resistance that unfolded differ 
from other protests portrayed in this book. These precarious acts of resist-
ance were rather instrumental, aiming at solving immediate individual 
problems such as access to accommodation and legal advice during the 
asylum procedure. Notwithstanding, in the contradictory spatialities of 
makeshift camps and squats, the contentious interactions with the police 
21 Leaflet collected during f ieldwork.
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as well as a heterogeneous set of supporters allowed transforming feelings 
of indignation and dehumanization to be temporarily transformed into 
political mobilization. Despite the relational and disruptive qualities these 
precarious autonomous spaces unfolded, social ties with pro-beneficiaries 
and within diverse migrant communities were also highly fragile and prone 
to fragmentation in a context in which resistance is a mode of survival that 
necessarily prioritizes basic needs over long-term mobilization.
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5. Contested Spaces
The Oranienplatz Protests, Berlin, 2012-2014
“In the morning, when asylum seekers wake up, they are scared of being 
deported. If they want to meet friends, the Residenzpflicht1 prevents them 
from doing so. Everywhere in their life, hurdles exist, built by the state, 
because we are not meant to be part of society.”2
Abstract
In early 2012, the suicide of an Iranian asylum seeker in Würzburg initiated 
the most disruptive precarious migrant protests in German history. Starting 
as a spark of protest against the living conditions in one specif ic asylum 
facility in southern Germany, the dissent soon spread. Tent camps emerged 
in other cities and in September 2012, the scattered camps joined forces and 
organized a bus tour as well as a 600 km protest march to Berlin. This chapter 
analyzes how precarious migrants were able to raise public attention and 
mobilize asylum seekers and the media by moving from socially and spatially 
isolated locations into urban centers. In organizing central protest camps, 
marches and bus tours, they broke the routine of precarious migrant invis-
ibility or victimization. In and through contested spaces, they temporarily 
succeeded in tapping the resources needed to sustain political mobilizations.
Keywords: migrant protest; space; protest camps; interactions; alliances; 
Berlin
Despite countless protest events, and more or less sustained organizational 
structures since the 1990s, precarious migrant protest remained at the margins 
of German society. National newspapers rarely reported on the activities and 
1 Mobility restriction in German foreigners’ law. See Chapter 2 for details.
2 Cited in Jakob (2013), author’s translation.
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solidarity was limited to the radical left and some faith-based associations. This 
changed fundamentally in early 2012, when the suicide of an Iranian asylum 
seeker in Würzburg initiated the most disruptive precarious migrant protests 
in German history. In reaction to their friend’s death, fellow Iranians started 
to politicize the suicide, boycotted their food packages, and demonstrated in 
front of the city hall, demanding the improvement of living conditions during 
the asylum process, accelerated procedures, and an end to all deportations. To 
increase the pressure, the protesters left their assigned accommodation, set 
up very basic tents in the city center, displayed photographs of human rights 
abuses in Iran and declared they were going on hunger strike. Starting as a 
spark of protest against the living conditions in one specific asylum facility in 
southern Germany, the dissent soon spread. Tent camps3 emerged in other cit-
ies, loosely knit together in the “Refugee Tent Action” campaign (International 
Refugee Center Berlin 2015). In September 2012, the scattered camps joined 
forces and organized a bus tour as well as a 600 km protest march to Berlin. In 
the upcoming months, until its dissolution in April 2014, the camp constituted 
the center of self-organized precarious migrant protest in Germany.
The trajectory of the protests furthermore clearly shows that the protest-
ers did not react upon opening opportunity structures, as the traditional 
social movement theories would expect. Instead, their protest, emerging in 
the most restrictive regional context for asylum seekers in Bavaria, actively 
opened up opportunities. Yet, the account also illustrates the dynamics of 
fragmentation related to internal heterogeneity, volatile external support 
and precarious life conditions, which make protest hard to sustain.
Resisting Spatial Exclusion: Protest Emergence in Würzburg
On 29 January 2012, the young Iranian Mohammad Rahsepar committed sui-
cide in his room in a facility for asylum seekers in Würzburg, in the German 
state of Bavaria. According to fellow asylum seekers and Rahsepar’s doctor, 
the miserable accommodation, lack of adequate medical assistance, and 
the insecurity and waiting in an isolated facility had gradually pushed him 
into depression (Jungbauer 2012). In reaction to their friend’s death, fellow 
Iranians accommodated in the same facility started to politicize the suicide, 
associating it with the precarious conditions, structural disintegration, lack 
3 The camps differ markedly from the makeshift camps described in Chapter 4, since they 
were primarily set up for disruptive purposes and not to provide precarious shelter as in the 
case of the La Chapelle protests.
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of autonomy and limited mobility in the German asylum system. Indeed, 
an investigation following the suicide of Rahsepar in 2012 concluded that 
“the fact that someone commits suicide does not say anything. However, it 
is a system, exercising structural violence” (cited in Jakob 2016: 108, author’s 
translation). The respective collective accommodation center in Würzburg 
was, like many others at the time (Wendel 2014), a repurposed army barracks, 
located in an industrial area at the outskirts of the city, surrounded by 
highways and production sites, separated from ordinary social life.
While the spark of protest emerged within this restrictive and isolated 
environment, its continuation was strongly shaped by a relocation of the 
protest from the urban periphery to the city center. After a f irst protest 
outside the asylum facility, the protesters left their assigned accommodation, 
set up a very basic tent in the city center and displayed photographs of 
human rights abuses in Iran, to underline the legitimacy of their presence 
in Germany and the indignity of their treatment. Soon, the protesters were 
surrounded by a heterogeneous mix of actors declaring their support, ranging 
from members of the regional and national parliament from the Greens and 
the Left, anarchist and communist groups, the Iranian diaspora in Germany 
and local antiracist and faith-based associations (Grünberg 2013; Jungbauer 
2012). The involvement of a radical supporting milieu from the outset, in 
addition to the local migrant rights scene, was not coincidental, given the 
biographies of several members of the core group of Iranians. Many had been 
engaged as students in the Iranian “Green Movement” against authoritarian 
Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009 and were prosecuted 
subsequently. Due to this background, they had some links to the Iranian 
exile community, and as Marxist students, an aff inity to radical left-wing 
groups (Interviews B11, B22, B26). After a couple of weeks, the protesters 
increased the pressure and declared they were going on hunger strike:
We suffer from the extremely long asylum process that sometimes takes 
even years and we hope every day that the torture of uncertainty will 
change for the better. […] This uncertainty, the fact that no autonomy is 
allowed to us in our daily lives, and that we are treated like prisoners, 
exhausts us and gradually – step by step – pushes us toward death. […] 
Now, we are forced to use the last of all means available and go on hunger 
strike on 19 March 2012, to f inally make our voices heard, and to be allowed 
a human life. (Hosinazadeh and Maorattab 2012, author’s translation)
Due to its central location and the radical tactic of a hunger strike, the 
unfolding protest arena immediately attracted the attention of the local 
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population, the media and asylum seekers from other cities in the region 
(Litschko 2012b; Przybilla 2012b; Jungbauer 2012). Set up in one of the 
central streets in Würzburg, the very presence of the asylum seekers in 
the public space constituted a rupture of the exclusive routine, leading to 
both open opposition of the protest and expressions of solidarity (Grünberg 
2013).
The Bavarian minister of social affairs, Christine Haderthauer (CSU4), 
refused to meet the protesters – arguing that the state would not be 
“blackmailed” (Main Post 2012a) – yet the deputy director of the German 
asylum agency, in charge of refugee status determination (BMBF5), came 
for a meeting. The public exposure attracted visibility and resources for 
the continuation of the protest. Increasingly aware of this incubating ef-
fect, the municipality of Würzburg employed various tactics to get rid of 
the camp by imposing bizarre rules: First, the administration limited the 
amounts of chairs and beds allowed in the camp (Jakob 2016: 109). The 
administrative court annulled this prohibition shortly after. Furthermore, 
the municipality increased the control of those individuals who joined 
the camp in Würzburg but were off icially registered in other districts and 
thereby subject to Residenzpflicht (restrictions on mobility) (Refugee Tent 
Action 2012).
The socialization of the core group of Iranian protesters in an authori-
tarian regime soon became both the force of their determination and an 
irritation to some of those acting in support. At the outset, many actors, 
including local politicians, supported both the forms of action and the 
demands of the protesters. Yet, this changed in early summer 2012, when 
the protesters further escalated the conflict. In an open letter, they reiter-
ated their demands, which they concluded with the line “There is nothing 
more to say; everything has been said” (cited in Grünberg 2013: 166). After 
that, two protesters sewed their lips to underline their voicelessness and 
determination. Five other Iranian asylum seekers followed their example 
during the upcoming week. This choice of strategy had an ambivalent effect. 
On the one hand, the images of sewed mouths were diffused heavily in the 
German media, and the visibility of the protests expanded even further on a 
national scale (Augsburger Allgemeine 2012; Die Welt 2012; Przybilla 2012a, 
2012c). On the other hand, the self-destructive means alienated parts of the 
players acting in support. The vice-director of the largest asylum-related 
NGO in Germany, Pro Asyl, criticized the timing of the escalation of protest 
4 Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union).
5 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Off ice for Migrants and Refugees).
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and noted that his organization had “immense problems with any kind 
of protest, which is directed against one’s health” (cited in Die Welt 2012, 
author’s translation). Also the Refugee Council of Bavaria, which was usually 
strongly supportive of the group, criticized these actions (Przybilla 2012c). 
Mathias Grünberg, a local politician for the Greens who had supported the 
protests for weeks, remarked in an open letter:
The sewing of your mouth is unacceptable! From this moment, I cannot 
come any longer to your info point. I – and it is not only me – cannot 
do anything politically. The implementation of your just demands will 
take months, indeed years. I do not consider this action [lip sewing] to 
be appropriate to advance your – our – demands. No, it only damages 
your health, indeed, your life. (Grünberg 2013: 102, author’s translation)
Simone Tolle, a member of the regional parliament for the Green Party, 
also distanced herself. She noted that the protest repertoire had not only 
alienated her but “a lot of persons have contacted me [to say that] they have 
problems with this kind of protest” (Grünberg 2013: 106, author’s translation). 
Indeed, the leading local newspaper commented:
You do not make friends like this, no matter how good and just the cause is 
for which the Iranian refugees are protesting. This “new rigidity” [a quote 
from the protesters] will backf ire on them. Until now, they have built 
their protest on the sympathies in sections of society, […] but by doing 
things like this, needy refugees quickly become incalculable radicals. 
(Main Post 2012b, author’s translation)
One of the supporters responded sarcastically in a published letter to the 
editor:
What kind of protest do you expect? Knitting socks for the winter? A 
concert by an Iranian strikers’ choir, combined with collecting money 
for asylum seekers? Once more a day of sympathy from the population, 
which ends the next day when a demonstration disrupts the routine of 
Saturday shopping? No, here, human beings f ight for their rights. It is 
not about who likes whom and who does not. It is not about friends and 
sympathy. It is about humanity. (Neuert 2012, author’s translation)
This change in the repertoire marked a critical shift as it restructured 
the supporting milieu. The more institutionalized actors (most party 
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representatives, NGOs) became somehow alienated after a strong initial 
support, whereas decentralized antiracist groups stepped in:
We declare our unconditional solidarity with the demands of the refugees. 
With consternation, however, we have realized that some groups and 
individuals defame their protest. […] The questions is: Are those expressing 
criticism overwhelmed by this freely chosen form of protest or do they 
feel threatened in their role as paternalistic pro-beneficiaries? (Cited in 
Grünberg 2013: 165, author’s translation)
What started as a debate about “adequate” repertoires of action eventually 
broadened into a general debate about the legitimacy of nonmigrants to 
evaluate protest by precarious migrants:
The radicalized hunger strike of the Iranian refugees with sewed lips is, 
without doubt, a last, desperate attempt to make self-determined claims 
and to prove their ability to act. No one, particularly no one living in 
Germany, who enjoys all political and liberal rights, can presume to be 
in a position to judge which means refugees are allowed to take. (Möller 
2012, author’s translation)
The protesting migrants, in turn, disqualif ied criticism as “desolidarization” 
(Refugee Tent Action 2012). By the end of June, one of the protesters pushed 
even further and stopped drinking water. The protesters ended their hunger 
strike and removed the threads in their lips when the majority of protesters 
were granted refugee status (Przybilla 2012b, 2012c). Due to their determina-
tion, the Iranians quickly earned a reputation for being extremely resolute 
and less inclined to engage in lengthy debates with supporting environments 
(Interviews B11, B15, B22, B34). This led to a tension-prone interaction with the 
established players of the precarious migrant self-organization such as The 
Voice and the Caravan network. Even though the Caravan had supported the 
tent actions, by offering the use of their bank account to receive donations and 
by visiting the camp in Würzburg repeatedly (Grünberg 2013: 246), conflicts 
over representation and strategy emerged early on (Interviews B11, B25, B34). 
Moreover, the old generation was not given credit for their share in the new 
generations’ success – the knitting of networks, mobilization in camps and 
the gradual establishment of a refugee subjectivity within the German left.
The dynamics of 2012 was not something that just fell from heaven. The 
solidarity, the power of 2012, had been built up over 20 years. When I f irst 
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came to Germany, the relationship between the antiracist movement 
and the self-organized groups was different. They ignored you. If the 
old activists […] had not started to push the idea that refugees should be 
actors, very particular actors in their own struggle, the protest march 
would have been crushed. Otherwise, you would have seen refugees 
standing behind white activists in the front line. (Interview B22)
Thirdly, the sensitive relationship was furthermore rooted in partly an-
tagonistic supporting milieus and ideologies: among the early supporters of 
the Iranian core group were also adherents of the so-called “anti-German” 
faction in the German radical left (Interview B34), whose members deduce 
a strongly pro-Israel and pro-US (as the main guarantor of the state of 
Israel) position from the German fascist past and a fear of rising Ger-
man nationalism since the early 1990s (Ullrich 2013). As opponents to the 
strongly anti-Semitic former president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
the Iranians who were involved in the Green Movement in 2009 were 
considered natural allies. Yet, other support milieus, and particularly the 
Caravan, are rooted in an anti-imperialist and pro-Palestinian tradition. 
Conflicts accentuated when in late August, the new generation of protesters, 
still predominantly led by the Iranian core group from Würzburg, was 
invited to the “Break Isolation Summer Camp” in Erfurt, organized by the 
Caravan and the Voice:
In October 2011, when we started organizing the summer camp for 
August 2012, we thought it would be the f irst and only refugee camp in 
Germany that year. But when the Iranian refugees started their protest 
tent in March, and the hunger strike of refugees spread to other cities 
and towns, we realized that many camps were on the way to the refugee 
summer camp in Erfurt. (The Voice 2012, author’s translation)
Questions over representation, leadership, and the role of the former asylum 
seekers, who had gained a regularized status in the meanwhile, were fought 
out rigorously from the beginning. Nevertheless, in a moment of collective 
euphoria about the very fact that precarious migrant protest had come into 
the limelight, cooperation continued. But “the bruises from Erfurt” were 
remembered and resurfaced later (Interview B25).6
6 Similar expressions were used in Interviews B17 and B34.
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Centralizing Dissent: The Protest March to Berlin
When the protest had spread in the loosely connected “tent action campaign,” 
but temporarily appeared to stagnate, the core group employed another 
spatial strategy to revitalize the emerging movement: a march and a bus 
tour to Berlin. Relocating their dissent from the geographical and social 
margins of society to the German capital was explicitly meant as a claim 
to centrality: “We are going to the center where everything is close – the 
authorities, the parliament. We are going to bring the action there. If it was 
in other places, they can say, ‘This is Bavaria, this is local,’ so we have to 
bring it to the center” (Interview B4). Despite the disputes in Würzburg and 
Erfurt, the Caravan and many other groups supported the march to Berlin 
logistically since the Iranians could point at their strategy of escalation 
being successful. At least in the short run, they had politicized the topic of 
asylum in Germany in an unprecedented way.
The decentralized activist nodes of the Caravan organized accommoda-
tion and food on the stops of both the march and the bus tour, building 
upon local promigrant grassroots infrastructures, including associations 
as diverse as radical left social centers, sports clubs and faith-based youth 
organizations (Loschert 2012; Interviews B15, B34). As one participant of the 
bus tour recalled: “We went to the Caravan, to the Voice [and said], you have 
been here for a long time: we need connections. First of all, we need a place 
to meet people. We connected to antifa[scist] and antiracist [organizations] 
because they are everywhere. They also are in contact with the refugees. 
They know where the refugees are – we don’t” (Interview B4).
Similarly, while criticizing the timing of the escalation by the Würzburg 
group, Pro Asyl and the refugee councils (Landesflüchtlingsräte) of Bavaria 
and Berlin raised money and public awareness for the march (Landes-
flüchtlingsräte and Pro Asyl 2012; Pro Asyl 2012; Pro Asyl and Flüchtlingsrat 
Berlin 2012). “The regional refugee councils and Pro Asyl align with the 
demands of the refugees and call for support of the protest march. The 
refugees urgently depend on donations for food, logistics, and publicity 
materials” (Landesflüchtlingsräte and Pro Asyl, 2012, author’s translation). 
Without this support, the march and the bus tour to Berlin could not have 
been organized in such a short time.
The march and the bus tours turned out to have an important relational 
effect in connecting a geographically dispersed population of asylum seekers 
in the German periphery. The mobile protest to Berlin was planned to pass 
deliberately by numerous asylum facilities in order to “pick up noncitizens 
wherever they are. In every camp, in every room. The movement needs 
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to stay in motion” (Houmer Hedayatzadeh, cited in Jakob 2013, author’s 
translation). Every stop during the month-long march added nodes to a 
growing protest network.
The mobile repertoire, moreover, had an expressive element, since 
activists intended, symbolically and practically, to appropriate and enact 
rights. Moving forward, in a literal sense, disrupted the feeling of “being 
stuck,” forcefully immobilized by a lengthy and burdensome administra-
tive procedure. One of the protagonists hence noted: “We did not ask for 
rights; we did [practiced] our rights” (Interview B4). Underlining their 
determination to resist forced immobility during the asylum procedure in 
Germany, the activists tore up their identity documents for asylum seekers 
(Aufenthaltsgestattung) on the march from Würzburg to Berlin at the former 
inner German border (Guyton 2012), symbolically relating to a continuity 
of borders within Germany for those considered unwanted. The internal 
effect of this “eventful” (della Porta 2008) protest was a deepening of strong 
emotional ties among those participating.
After four weeks and 600 kilometers of marching, the protesters reached 
Berlin. By this action, they relocated the spatial center of the protest arena 
around precarious migration to the German capital. This shift resulted in 
a continuity of some players, the fade-out of the local involvement by the 
groups and institutionalized politics in Würzburg and, most importantly, 
the addition of multiple new players in a much more complex, multilayered 
and heavily mediatized environment in Berlin.
OPlatz as a Space of Protest Incubation
Upon arrival in Berlin, the marchers set up a protest camp at Oranienplatz 
(also referred to as OPlatz), a square in Kreuzberg, which soon became a 
complex protest arena, in which multiple individual and compound players 
interacted. Thousands of supporters from a wide range of backgrounds 
– radical left groups, migrant associations, neighbors, faith-based groups – 
either welcomed the marchers on their arrival or offered their support over 
the following days. Media coverage was mainly supportive (Guyton 2012; 
Lindner 2012; Markus 2012) and even the primetime edition of Tagesschau, 
Germany’s most important public television news outlet, reported on the 
protest (ARD Tagesschau 2012). Kreuzberg’s district mayor from the Green 
Party, Franz Schulz, who had been informed about the camp beforehand, 
publicly articulated his support for the protest (Rogalla 2012). Even though a 
small “tent action” protest camp had existed before in the neighborhood, the 
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arrival of the march sparked an atmosphere of collective euphoria: “During 
the [tent action camp] at Heinrichplatz, we, from [the tenant initiative] 
Kotti & Co, were in close contact, we also did some night shifts, if support 
was needed. But when the march arrived in Berlin, at the beginning there 
were f ive supporters for every refugee” (Interview B8).
Even more than in Würzburg, the central location and visibility of the 
protest resulted in a magnetic effect that attracted hundreds of individual 
supporters and groups as well as migrants from remote asylum facilities to 
join the protest. During the f irst months of the camp at Oranienplatz, the 
support from the local population was immense. Tens of thousands of euros 
were donated, but also food, clothes, and tents; local residents and owners 
of shops surrounding the camp offered their sanitary facilities for use. In 
most cases, it was enough to post an item on the “We Need” billboard at the 
entrance of the camp and it was organized shortly after. “When we arrived 
in Berlin […] there was a lot of attention because 600 kilometers marching 
is something special. And when people [who wanted to support us] came, 
we said: it is good that you are here, and we need this and that” (Interview 
B4). Resources needed to sustain the protest could be mobilized on the spot, 
as the camp bundled multiple “weak ties” to civil society organizations, 
individual supporters and the media.
Immediately the Oranienplatz camp became a vibrant hub of political 
activity. Shortly after its establishment, the protesters called for a demon-
stration, to which around 6,000 people attended. It was by the time one of 
the largest demonstrations led by precarious migrants in German history 
(Schreiter and Jakob 2012). Activist from the OPlatz joined forces with the 
Voice and occupied the Nigerian embassy in Berlin to draw attention to 
the African governments’ role in deportations (Wendt 2012). Members 
of the Iranian core group, who had initiated the march in Würzburg, led 
a fourteen-day hunger strike at the Brandenburger Tor (Schreiter 2012), 
creating another protest arena with additional players, rules and audiences. 
The photos of hunger strikers in front of the famous landmark became 
iconic and attracted further attention to the protesters’ demands. Warned 
by the incubating effects of inner-city hunger strikes in Würzburg, the 
conservative Senator for the Interior and Sport of Berlin, Frank Henkel 
(CDU), consequently tried to avoid the establishment of a protest camp 
in the political heart of the city and ordered harsh policing, including the 
confiscation of sleeping bags, sleeping pads and tents. This, in turn, gener-
ated further visibility of the protests, which culminated in a meeting of 
the striking migrant activists with members of the Committee on Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Aid and the Committee on Internal Affairs of the 
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German parliament, the Bundestag (Spiegel Online 2012). In a very short 
period of time, the protesters had with their choice of sites and forms of 
protest both literally and metaphorically moved from the periphery to the 
very center of German politics. By this, the new generation of protesters 
achieved what previous self-organized migrant protests and the German 
promigrant movement had failed to do.
Simultaneously, in the midst of an icy Berlin winter, migrants and support-
ers from the second protest camp at Oranienplatz squatted an abandoned 
school building (the Gerhart-Hauptmann-Schule) within walking distance 
of the tent camp (Litschko 2012a). Imagined as a safe space for the winter, 
one floor of the building was transformed into an International Women’s 
Space – a self-organized political space for migrant women (Interviews 
B4, B24).
Via online communication and word of mouth, many precarious migrants, 
both asylum seekers living in asylum facilities outside the urban centers 
and illegalized migrants, learned of the existence of the autonomous space 
and left their assigned location in asylum facilities (Interviews B4, B12). 
Dozens of precarious migrants had experienced the sheer existence of 
the OPlatz and its satellite (the occupied school) as a motivation to leave 
their designated asylum facilities in different parts of Germany to join the 
protests in Berlin or to engage in local refugee activism (Interviews B3, B12, 
B24). The camp was a docking station to meet other politically engaged 
people, to tap resources and to develop new ideas for political opposition. 
While many of the founders of the movement had previous experiences in 
political activism in their countries of origin, such as the Iranian core group 
in the Green Movement, the existence of the camp also attracted many for 
whom the camp was a space of politicization and socialization into activism. 
Indeed, the protesters actively encouraged asylum seekers from all over the 
country to join the protest: “We ask all of you, refugees and asylum seekers, 
around Germany to break the isolation and to break the silence and join 
your brothers and sisters at the protest camp at Oranienplatz to take what 
is your right” (Refugee Revolution 2013).
Hence, the camp, due to its magnetic effect on resources and activists, 
was not only a space of protest incubation, but also a space of encounter for 
an extremely heterogeneous group of precarious migrants and supporters 
with a plethora of legal status, social backgrounds, and ideologies. While 
“safe spaces” beyond the crippling control of the state have been considered 
key for all kinds of oppositional movements (Sewell 2001: 69), asylum seekers 
and undocumented migrants are situated in an even more restrained system 
of control and precariousness, from which autonomous camps can provide 
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(temporary) relief: “When we came here, it was reducing and healing the 
trauma. Because I got to know people here not by force. […] In the Lagers 
[asylum facilities] […] you have to be in this place whether you like or not. 
You are not allowed to move about. But here we can move freely. Nobody 
can say, ‘Do not go there’”.7
This experience of autonomy and hope led various activists to (re)develop 
a sense of agency, which had gradually been replaced by apathy and despair 
during the asylum process. Asked by journalists why the protesters did not 
accept the deal offered by the local administration of Kreuzberg, to move back 
into asylum camps and get individual reviews of their asylum claims, an activist 
answered: “We are alone there; we cannot fight together. The authorities can 
take and deport us easily” (cited in International Refugee Center Berlin 2015: 77).
Assemblies were organized, translating interventions into multiple lan-
guages and, indeed, the process of developing and negotiating a collective 
identity did not evolve without frictions. Nevertheless, both camps created the 
very basis for developing “strong ties” among migrants and between migrants 
and supporters. The “eventful” character of the camp and the collective 
actions deepened a sense of collectivity despite diversity. Precarious migrants 
had, at least temporarily, resisted their social and spatial marginalization 
and articulated their political claims center stage: “They want to put us out 
of the city where nobody knows that we are existing. […] Right here where 
we are is the right place” (International Refugee Center Berlin 2015: 8).
As this account underlines, precarious migrants had rapidly transformed 
themselves from “weakly resourced,” isolated and dispersed individuals into 
an emerging movement with astonishing resources and means to organize 
and sustain the protest. The precarious migrants did not need to beg for 
scarce support but could even choose among various kinds of assistance 
offered by a multitude of actors. Due to this magnetic effect and the shift 
in power relations between migrants and supporters, at the beginning little 
energy was needed to sustain the protest activity.
OPlatz as a Space of Protest Fragmentation
As a result of the tremendous popularity, the supporters also partly changed, 
compared both to Würzburg and previous episodes of migrant activism. 
The dominant actors supporting the protesting migrants were individu-
als, referred to as “supporters,” not the grassroots organizations forming 
7 Transcript of public interview, anonymized.
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the migrant rights movement at the time. For the protesting activists, the 
volatile and decentralized “support” base was convenient at the outset. 
Negotiations or compromises with established groups with explicit agendas 
were simply not necessary, and deliberately denied to guarantee autonomy: 
“We say it is self-organized because we ourselves will not connect to any big 
organizations. We don’t want money from big organization. We get money 
from the population. We get support from the population” (Interview B4).
Grassroots organizations and NGOs active in the f ield of migrant support 
remained in the background or entirely absent. They either felt superfluous 
in light of the widespread individual support or had diff iculties f inding their 
role vis-à-vis the protesting migrant protagonists. Decisions were taken and 
information was shared with those present in the camp. This did not f it for 
those who had a representative role and only joined occasionally. Others 
were furthermore alienated by the spontaneous and action-oriented protest.
Sometimes, it was overwhelming to occupy an embassy, having a demo or 
being on a hunger strike every day. […] In some moments, there was a lot 
of action and little coordination. I think those who conceived themselves 
to be more settled, both in terms of age and organizational experience, 
were overwhelmed by the spontaneity. (Interview B9)
What prevailed in the f irst phase of the protest was a dedicated group of 
supporters with an orthodox reading of “critical whiteness,” which presup-
posed an articulately neutral role for the supporters. While decisions were 
taken by a migrant-only plenary, supporters sustained the infrastructure 
of the camp, engaged in care work, such as cooking, translation, organizing 
lawyers, and providing counseling and legal aid, organized PR activities 
such as press conferences and press releases (Langa 2015):
[Critical whiteness] has def initely led to a change of perspective, how 
racism is addressed, whose voice should be considered more important 
because of racism, and has pointed to the problems in the politics of 
representation. […] My position, for instance, in the plenary, was to stay 
in the background. I really do not want to take up a lot of space, as a white 
guy with long experience in political activism. (Interview B25)
Nevertheless, this rigid distinction between the roles of “refugees” and 
“supporters” was also profoundly contested within the German antiracist left 
at the time (Karakayali et al. 2012; Jakob 2012). The conflicts had escalated at 
a “no border” camp in Cologne only a few months before the Oranienplatz 
138 Migrant Protest
camp started and left their marks: “German activists became messengers. 
This is how it developed. The refugees make decisions; the nonrefugee activist 
can build the tent, clean the tent, cook, collect money, but no discussion. 
[…] This stigma came out of the ‘no border’ camp [in Cologne]. It made them 
[German activists] feel: ‘Do not speak’” (Interview B22).
Accordingly, many German supporters took a loyal and predominantly 
supporting role. The inner circle of regular encounter was also populated 
by members of the older generations of precarious migrant activism, such 
as the Caravan. Even though these interactions were crucial to access 
networks established in past mobilizations, the questions of representa-
tion and leadership that had emerged even before the march in Erfurt 
continued to be a constant source of conflict at Oranienplatz. This became 
particularly visible when the Iranian core group explicitly introduced the 
concept of “noncitizens,” explaining: “Of course, we make a distinction 
between ourselves and recognized asylum seekers, even if they f ight at our 
side. The recognized refugees can go home after the protest – we cannot. 
We do not have a home. On the contrary, we can be deported” (Jakob 2013, 
author’s translation).
The result was a fundamental alienation of the Caravan activists, who 
considered this f irst and foremost as a strategy to silence opposition and 
secure their leadership in the emerging movement.
You cannot build trust like this, because you are suspicious. With these 
“noncitizens” who were the leadership you were taken to the point that 
you were automatically excluded when you had obtained papers. […] The 
point was not so much the willingness to learn, it is more the question 
of how much they were influenced by their mindset of where they come 
from. […] At the end the Caravan decided to pull out and let them do 
what they wanted. (Interview B11)
The debates had an impact on the trajectory of the protests early on. Indeed, 
the Iranian core group’s decision to go on hunger strike at the Brandenburger 
Tor reflected these early dynamics of fragmentation. After the hunger strike, 
some of the protest protagonists did not even return to the Oranienplatz 
camp but split apart and opted for a continuation of their independent 
protest in Bavaria. While these internal divisions were present from the 
beginning, initially they could be compensated, given the incubating effect 
of a protest camp, attracting visibility, people, and resources.
In spring 2013, the situation changed gradually, but fundamentally, for 
various reasons. Firstly, a new compound player entered the arena: a growing 
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number of mostly Sub-Saharan migrants, who had escaped the Libyan civil 
war via the Italian island of Lampedusa. Among those who eventually 
formed the Lampedusa group in Berlin were many who had temporary 
humanitarian protection status in Italy, without the right to work or social 
entitlements in Germany. Due to a lack of alternatives, many joined the 
squatted school and the occupied square, contributing to an increasing 
degradation of the places caused by overpopulation (Interviews B2, B15, 
B25). Many had never even f iled an asylum claim in Germany and did 
not plan to do so. In consequence, the different legal status of precarious 
migrants in the square left their mark (Interviews B15, B21, B25) as it entailed 
fundamentally different political priorities.
The claims def initively changed. From the claims that were related to 
the situation of the “f irst generation,” such as no camps, no deportation, 
no Residenzpflicht to those with Italian papers, who wanted access to the 
labor market – this was, in fact, their only claim. At the beginning they 
did align with the other claims and supported demonstrations as well, 
but it was obvious that they were not directly affected. Many did not even 
know what a refugee camp was, because they had never lived in one. […] 
They also did not have experience of Residenzpflicht with their Italian 
papers. Hence, it was simply a totally different group. (Interview B21)
Whereas the initiators of the march and the camp had strong claims against 
the German asylum system and some had been politically active in their 
country of origin prior to arriving in Germany, the “new generation” faced 
a different legal situation, with an Italian humanitarian protection status, 
exhausted by long transmigration and time living on the streets in Italy 
and Germany. The “old generation” wanted to keep the square due to its 
incubating effect for protest. This “new generation” needed it as a space of 
subsistence and longed to put an end to their precarious life on the square: 
“Those who did not have any other place to stay were those with Italian 
papers and many of the first generation with more political demands [against 
the asylum system] already had shared flats, girlfriends or whatever and 
did come to the square for political f ights and could leave in the evening 
to sleep in their warm beds” (Interview B21).
Hence, differences in status and levels of precariousness introduced 
divisions between the “generations” of precarious migrants occupying 
the square, with the tents of the Lampedusa group and the old genera-
tion starting to be deliberately separated within the camp (Doppler and 
Vorwergk 2014). The protest arena at Oranienplatz increasingly became a 
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site in which internal actors competed for influence. These conflicts also 
involved the supporters of the early protest days with an articulate political 
and anticapitalist ideology:
I would say, those from the second generation wanted to become part of 
the system against which the supporters were f ighting. […] The people 
in the square, in fact, wanted to become part of the capitalist [world]. Of 
course, this does not apply to all of them, but many did, indeed, ask why 
the supporters thought the system was so terrible. They believed it was 
not so terrible – they just wanted to get into it. (Interview B21)
The combination of the camp as a space of subsistence and political activism 
in the same location had its downside. Initially, it mitigated the obstacle of 
mobilizing dispersed and financially precarious communities to participate 
in the protest and encouraged many to join. Yet, the longer the protest lasted, 
the more diff icult and precarious the daily life in the tent camp became, 
gradually exhausting its inhabitants. This translated into f ierce debates 
on how to spend the donations (for subsistence or political activity) in a 
moment when resources had stopped flowing in and the political context 
had shifted.
The same developments unfolded in the occupied school, a protest arena 
with its own specif icities in terms of players, interests and rules. The place 
over time became predominantly a shelter, a place of subsistence rather than 
a space for political organization. The availability of shelter also attracted 
hundreds of individuals who were in need and only partially aff iliated to the 
political struggle for rights and recognition. With an increasing population 
and unclear rules, conflicts multiplied. While this was also the case at OPlatz 
(Ünsal 2015), the material features of the occupied building posed specif ic 
challenges with regard to assuring the security and basic functioning of 
the place, including internal debates on access restrictions: “To squat the 
school was maybe our biggest mistake. We built our own Lager [camp]. We 
locked ourselves in again. With less visibility than in the public space and 
more controversies” (Interview B34).
The place became overcrowded and increasingly contested, receiving 
predominantly negative media coverage following outbursts of violence (Der 
Tagesspiegel 2013; rbb-online 2013; Soos 2014). These developments played 
into the hands of those who wanted to dismantle the disruptive sites of 
protest even long before, most prominently the conservative Senator of the 
Interior Henkel, who took the occasion to intensify his agitation against the 
protesters and the laissez-faire approach of the Green district government.
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In this phase the volatile and decentralized support base, which at the 
outset had contributed to the protest momentum, showed its downside. The 
lack of cultivated ties with established groups and organizations backfired, 
when the “hype” (Interviews B2, B4) around the camp faded and only a 
small and increasingly exhausted support base remained. In consequence, 
with the new generation of the Lampedusa group, a new generation of 
supporters emerged on the scene. Given the core interest of the group in 
eventually settling and improving their living conditions, some of the new 
supporters did not necessarily prioritize the political f ight against the 
German asylum system. The multiple lines of internal divisions of both 
migrants and support groups, combined with the increasingly precarious 
conditions in both the school and the square, accentuated in the summer of 
2013. Internal conflicts regarding sexism and homophobia (Refugee Strike 
Berlin 2013; Ünsal 2015) as well as conflicts involving neighbors (Kubsova 
2013) were rapidly taken up by the media (Litschko 2013a; Biewald, Löbker, 
and Wehmeyer 2013). An inhabitant of the camp was stabbed by a Turkish 
migrant (Kopietz 2013). In this highly chaotic and contentious climate, a 
delegate for the Green Party in the district assembly decided to move into 
the tent camp to appease and moderate:
And then there was the day in June […] when the knife attack happened. 
I lived in the neighborhood. […] I felt the mood of the neighborhood. The 
Turks in the corner were upset. There was disappointment as well. This 
is often the case here in Kreuzberg. It is densely populated, and we live 
with very few resources that need to be shared. Particularly for the poorer 
parts of society, it was also a loss that half of the square was simply gone. 
[…] And in my role as local representative, I saw that more and more locals 
came by, saying, “It is too loud – we cannot work, we cannot sleep,” etc., 
and they were just shouted at by the supporters, who said, “Why do you 
complain? These are refugees – they have real problems.” So people got 
upset. (Interview B8)
While relations with the neighborhood improved subsequently, the delegate 
was fundamentally rejected by the older generation of migrant activists, 
and their surrounding supporters. They saw this intervention f irstly as a 
return of paternalism with a white person representing the migrants and, 
secondly, as a clear move of co-optation by the district administration 
(Interviews B4, B25). “I def initely had the feeling that I was not welcome 
by some. Some people did not speak to me even once. It seems like some 
people did not like the idea at all that I moved into the camp. I did not even 
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think about the possibility that someone might be against this. I thought 
they were happy!” (Interview B8).
Increasing mutual suspicion and a change in leadership of the Green 
Party in Kreuzberg f inally introduced another major change. While the 
Green district administration had remained supportive of the camp for 
a long time (Litschko 2013b), and against the criticism of the Senator of 
the Interior of Berlin, the newly elected mayor of Kreuzberg, Monika Her-
rmann (still from the Greens), departed from her predecessor’s laissez-faire 
strategy regarding the camp (Interview B7) and aimed at its dissolution, 
arguing:
My impression was that this was not really self-organized. […] Yes, some 
of them from the Lampedusa group were also political, but the rest were 
not. They were f irst and foremost politically active with a view to leaving 
the camp and to getting a residence permit in Germany. But most of the 
protest originated from […] supporters. A lot was projected onto these 
struggles. (Interview B7)
For Herrmann, a member of one of the more grassroots and left-wing factions 
of the Green Party, a violent eviction of the camp was no option. Instead, 
she insisted on a negotiated solution even though the Senate strongly ad-
vocated for an eviction by force. The protesters who had set up the camp 
and experienced its incubating role strongly opposed all attempts aiming 
at a dissolution of this space of contention: “[T]his is where they used other 
techniques. Someone came who knew everybody and said, “You are [in 
the] Lampedusa [group]. You are different – you can have more than the 
other people. […] Until then they believed they were special. So we started 
f ighting with each other” (Interview B4).
The strategy of selective incentives was effective, with the Lampedusa 
group in Berlin starting to show an interest in securing the housing solu-
tion for its members offered by the Senate. Whereas the f irst generation of 
migrant activists wanted to keep the camp as a space of political protest for 
the rights of asylum seekers in Germany (Interviews B2, B4; Loy, Buntrock, 
and Dassler 2013). In autumn and winter 2013, lengthy negotiations unfolded 
between the protesters, the Senate and various observing associations, 
culminating in the so-called Oranienplatz Agreement signed in April 2014 
by some factions of the protesters (Amjahid 2014). The agreement included 
a list of reportedly 462 (Amjahid 2014) individuals in the school and in the 
square, who agreed to dismantle the protest camp themselves in exchange 
for an individual (re)assessment of their legal status (Senate of Berlin 2014). 
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Some of the protesting migrants and supporters, however, f iercely opposed 
the agreement.
On the day of dissolution, a bizarre scene unfolded (Staiger 2014): migrants 
were tearing down tents and huts, at times shouted at by other protest-
ers of the f irst generation and supporters. The supporters on the scene 
found themselves in the confusing situation where they were not mainly 
confronting the police, as expected, but instead were facing some of the 
very individuals they had been protesting with previously. While episodes 
of violence erupted between the two groups, the heavy police presence 
remained mainly in the background. A migrant rights activist recalled, 
disillusioned: “Toward the end of Oranienplatz, the movement was easy to 
attack, because it was easy to divide – this is what the Senator used in the 
end. Inviting only some factions of the camp, offering incentives and selling 
it as a solution for the entire Oranienplatz” (Interview B19).
Within the f irst generation and some of the supporters, the expression 
“divide and rule” (Interviews B4, B24, B25) became the standard descrip-
tion of the f inal phase of the camp. Herrmann and the Greens lost their 
credibility and from being an ally turned into one of their key opponents 
(Flüchtlingsrat Berlin 2014).
The dissolution of the camp wiped out the material and symbolic center 
of the protest arena. In its absence, the spatial importance of the camp for 
the movement became even more evident. Diff iculties for refugees to meet 
and organize grew substantially:
Now that there is no Oranienplatz anymore it is diff icult to meet. We all 
live in different places now. I live far away, far, far away, I tell you! By bus 
and train it takes maybe one hour before I get to the [occupied] school. I 
can’t go by bicycle. I would get lost as I don’t know the road! Now maybe it 
can be one month or two months that we do not meet each other, because 
now we are separate. But before, when we were living in Oranienplatz, you 
went there and there were many of us, every time! We could sit together, 
talk. (Quoted in Borri 2016)
Two months after the dismantling of the protest camp at Oranienplatz, the 
district intended to proceed similarly with the occupied school. Due to the 
symbolic value the school had obtained after the end of the OPlatz camp, 
as well as the resistance of some of its inhabitants on the roof, thousands 
of political activists and neighbors prevented an eviction of the place in 
summer 2014 (Danielzik and Bendix 2016). Despite this highly mediatized 
dissent of around two dozen activists, the majority accepted the offer, 
144 Migrant Protest
including most of the women who had been settled in the International 
Women’s Space. Particularly for the Women’s Space, which was, in the end, 
one of the few groups with an explicit activist focus in the school, the loss 
of this site was a hard blow.
It was a very diff icult moment. After the eviction, everyone was displaced, 
virtually everybody. […] Now we changed situations from having a place 
to work and sleep to not even having a place to meet, just something 
very basic. So, we started looking around for women’s organizations, 
which already have establishments, […] but we still did not enjoy the 
sense of freedom, the sense of everything, that we enjoyed in the school. 
(Interview B24)
The alternative accommodation which was offered in exchange for leaving 
the autonomous protest spaces were provided for six months. As it turned 
out, by the time the former occupants of the OPlatz camp were sent out of 
the reception centers and became homeless, the supporters network had also 
been notably weakened. Many had abandoned the movement because they 
did not want the Oranienplatz Agreement. Those few who remained now 
struggled to secure their basic needs and support the ongoing precarious 
protests, which had by now fragmented into many protests across the city. 
Public interest in the migrants and their claims had in the meanwhile 
diminished. The eradication of the main spaces of contention resulting in 
the dispersal of precarious migrants had effectively fragmented the protest.
Migrant protest continued throughout the summer and autumn of 2014 
at various locations in and around Berlin. They intensif ied particularly 
when those evacuated from the camp and school were ordered to leave the 
temporary shelters and return to their allocated district, where their asylum 
claim had been registered, or to go back to Italy for those with humanitarian 
protection status (Kögel et al. 2014; Berliner Zeitung 2014). In early 2015, 
the protests faded out, even though some of the migrant activists involved 
remain engaged in various antiracist groups until today.
Conclusion
The Oranienplatz protests unveiled that precarious migrants were able 
to raise public attention and mobilize asylum seekers and the media by 
moving from socially and spatially isolated locations into urban centers. 
In organizing central protest camps, marches and bus tours, they literally 
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left behind their excluded position and articulated a claim to urban and 
social centrality. The relocation from the periphery of their designated 
asylum facilities to the inner-city space furthermore broke the routine of 
precarious migrant invisibility or victimization through extensive media 
coverage, and by this tapped the resources needed to sustain political 
mobilizations. The camps generated “magnetic f ields,” attracting diverse 
support milieus from which asylum seekers had been previously cut off. 
The protesters gradually succeeded in compensating the lack of resources 
and even in altering established power relations between migrants and 
pro-beneficiaries. The latter were attracted to the prominent protesters, who 
had, hence, a degree of choice in deciding with whom to work and whom to 
ignore. In addition to constituting reservoirs for weak ties, the protest camps 
also served as spaces of encounter and trust building among a previously 
scattered precarious migrant community. Stories and opinions could be 
shared and a collective identity was developed, despite the tremendous 
heterogeneity of the actors involved. In consequence, individuals from a 
wide range of social and geographical backgrounds joined the movement 
and organized for an extensive period of time dozens of protest events and 
constituted themselves as political subjects in the public sphere. This account 
clearly shows that the protesters did not react upon opening opportunity 
structures, as the traditional social movement theories would expect. Rather, 
their protest, emerging in the most restrictive regional context for asylum 
seekers in Bavaria, actively opened opportunities that were subsequently 
incubated in the German capital.
Nevertheless, the trajectory of the OPlatz protests also unveil the 
contentious nature of interactions in precarious activism. It points to the 
diff iculties of uniting a highly heterogeneous compound actor, with distinct 
legal statuses and hence the eligibility for services, and the likelihood of 
detention and deportation. Such practices influence not only the status of 
the individuals in question but also their relationships within the migrant 
community, civil-society organizations and the state. Macroinstitutions 
such as legal systems (and hence, potential legal statuses) intervene in the 
making and breaking of social ties – not least in collective action – as they 
provide multiple incentives to defect from collective political campaign-
ing and opt for individual niche openings. Such individual solutions are 
particularly appealing when individuals f ind themselves in extremely 
precarious conditions for an extensive period of time. Precarious migrant 
activism is, therefore, characterized by multiple fault lines, which can be 
temporarily overcome under certain conditions, yet, remain a permanent 
Achilles’ heel for sustained contention.
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6. Threatened Lives
Afghan Protests against Deportations, Berlin, 2016-2017
“[T]he readmission agreement between Afghanistan and the German 
government – it’s a shame! Everyday people get killed there – innocent people, 
children, women, men, every day. […] It disgusts me. When I’m thinking about it 
I’m full of anger, full of anger.”1
Abstract
The decision by the German government in 2016 to resume summary 
deportations to Afghanistan sparked a series of protests in which thou-
sands of Afghans, mostly asylum seekers with a precarious legal status, 
organized marches, sit-ins and petitions in the German capital. This 
chapter traces the interactive dynamics leading to temporary mass protests 
despite contexts of marginalization of a group which has previously mostly 
abstained from contentious action. The chapter documents the role of 
Afghan diaspora and migrant support groups in Berlin in providing spaces 
of encounter and trust building. In these spaces, and in the context of an 
existential threat for precarious migrants at risk of deportation, a deeply 
ingrained fear and internal cleavages within the Afghan exile community 
could be temporarily overcome.
Keywords: migrant protest; deportations; threats; interactions; Afghani-
stan; Berlin
The summer of 2015 marked important changes in the salience and po-
liticization of migration in Germany (Grande 2018). While the country 
witnessed the emergence of an unprecedented citizens’ mobilization in 
support of migrants (Hamann and Karakayali 2017) and liberal turns in 
1 Interview B39.
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Chancellor Merkel’s position on refugees (Laubenthal 2019), the “long summer 
of migration” was also followed by a series of asylum law restrictions and 
an increasingly hostile public debate (Rea et al. 2019). Afghans, one of the 
largest groups of asylum seekers in Germany, have been particularly affected 
by this turning tide (Fischer 2019). In October 2015, government off icials 
declared the goal to reduce asylum applications from Afghanistan and 
introduced a series of restrictions. In autumn 2016, this culminated in the 
decision to resume summary deportations to the conflict-ridden country 
(Bundesinnenministerium 2016).
The readmission agreement between the German and Afghan govern-
ments sparked a series of protests, in which thousands of Afghans, mostly 
asylum seekers with a precarious legal status, organized marches, sit-ins and 
petitions in the German capital. This chapter traces the interactive dynamics 
leading to temporary mass protests despite contexts of marginalization of 
a group, which has previously mostly abstained from contentious action.2 
It documents the role of Afghan diaspora and migrant support groups 
in Berlin in providing spaces of encounter and trust building. In these 
spaces, and in the context of an existential threat for precarious migrants 
at risk of deportation, a deeply ingrained fear and internal cleavages within 
the Afghan exile community could be temporarily overcome. The protest 
trajectory furthermore illustrates how actors shift from strategic “silence” 
to “voice” (and back) in precarious mobilizations.
Politicizing Differentiated Treatment
Despite objective indicators of prosecution and systematic violence in 
Afghanistan,3 in the second half of 2015, top government off icials ac-
centuated a discursive and practical distinction between a small group 
of “welcome refugees” and those collectively deemed unwanted. In 
2 This chapter focuses on Berlin, yet, protests against deportations to Afghanistan were not 
limited to Berlin. Large-scale demonstrations were also organized in Frankfurt (Handelsblatt 
2017), Munich (Kaminski 2017) and Hamburg (Hamburger Abendblatt 2017). Yet, they were 
mainly rooted in local communities rather than tied together in a national network.
3 These are mirrored in corrected protection rates of 68% in 2014 and 79% in 2015, respectively 
(author’s calculations based on BAMF data (BAMF 2015, 2016). In contrast to the uncorrected 
number, the corrected protection rate counts only those cases that have been decided materially, 
hence deduces from the total number of decisions all those that have been rejected on formal 
grounds, e.g., for the reason of a Dublin transfer. This corrected number more accurately captures 
the risk of prosecution and violence in a respective country of origin (Mediendienst Integration 
2018).
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October 2015, the Asylpaket I (Asylum Package I) law entered into force. 
This entailed a liberal move granting asylum seekers from countries 
with a “good perspective to remain”4 access to “integration courses” with 
a strong language course component (Lochner 2018; Laubenthal 2019). 
While f ive countries fell into this criterion – Syria, Eritrea, Somalia, Iraq 
and Iran – it collectively excluded Afghans, although they constituted 
one of the largest asylum-seeking communities, given their uncorrected 
recognition rate of just below the threshold in 2015 (BAMF 2016). Less than 
a week later, the public opposition against Afghan migrants was made 
explicit. On October 28, then Minister of Interior Thomas de Maizière 
declared the high number of asylum applications from Afghanistan to 
be “unacceptable” noting that “the Afghan youth and the middle-class 
families should remain in Afghanistan and rebuild their country” (Die 
Bundesregierung 2015, author’s translation). This discursive turn fore-
shadowed targeted policy restrictions on migration from Afghanistan. 
In December 2015, Chancellor Merkel publicly warned Afghans from 
migrating to Europe, underlining that “a hope for better life is no reason 
to be granted asylum or a right to stay in Germany,” and offered the 
Afghan government money and logistics to prevent departures (Zeit 
Online 2015, author’s translation). In an overall context in which political 
conflicts over migration to Germany multiplied, the Merkel government 
continued a process of increasing differentiation of precarious migrants 
in Germany. Therefore, Afghans became the most prominent example of 
“second class asylum seekers” (Ruttig 2017). A second major asylum law 
restriction in early 2016 (Asylpaket II) further aggravated the situation for 
Afghans, as it entailed the two-year suspension of family reunif ication for 
individuals with a subsidiary protection status (Pichl 2016). This hit the 
Afghan community particularly hard. Despite an unabated continuation 
of conf licts with a record number of civilian casualties in the Central 
Asian country (UN OHCHR 2016), the rejection rates of asylum seekers 
from Afghanistan increased drastically from 22.3% in 2015 to 39.4% in 
2016 (BAMF 2017, 2016b).5 However, as the objective danger for civilians 
in Afghanistan remained high, less generous protection status such as 
subsidiary protection or protection on humanitarian grounds proliferated 
among Afghans (BAMF 2017). Also in 2016, advocates for further asylum 
4 This criterion is operationalized by a protection rate of above 50% for individuals of the 
respective country in the previous year.
5 The off ice in charge (BAMF) justif ied rejections by pointing at the possibility to internally 
relocate Afghans to areas less affected by violence (Pro Asyl 2018).
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law restrictions mobilized acts of violence perpetrated by asylum seekers 
and other migrants. Thus, highly mediatized felonies by young Afghans 
further spurred an increasingly widespread position to collectively limit 
the arrival of asylum seekers from Afghanistan and their presence in 
Germany (Ruttig 2017; Fischer 2019).
In this general climate, the German government intensif ied the negotia-
tions with their Afghan counterparts. Following up on previously negotiated 
financial benefits in exchange for controlling emigration, a focus was now put 
on readmission agreements for deportations (Reuters 2016). In October 2016, 
both the German government and the EU signed agreements with the Afghan 
government (EEAS 2016; Bundesinnenministerium 2016), with “the objective 
to establish a rapid, effective and manageable process for a smooth, dignified 
and orderly return of Afghan nationals who do not fulf il the conditions in 
force for entry to, presence in, or residence on the territory of the EU” (EEAS 
2016).6 According to public sources (Deutscher Bundestag 2016), more than 
12,000 Afghans with a rejected asylum claim were at immediate risk of being 
deported, and potentially thousands more with a pending asylum case, 
considering the decreasing recognition rates (Gerner 2016). In December 2016, 
for the f irst time in twelve years, Germany resumed summary deportation 
flights to Afghanistan (ARD Tagesschau 2016).
Protest Emergence: A Mobilized Diaspora
This rapid shift for Afghans did not remain unnoticed by the Afghan exile 
community in Berlin. While the overall perception of a German “welcome 
culture” prevailed (Laubenthal 2019), Afghans continuously accumulated 
countless experiences of their differentiated treatment, and the negative 
repercussions it had on their lives. A young Afghan who arrived in 2015 in 
Germany together with his family, recalled the concrete effects of these 
discursive and policy changes: “My wife is from Iran, I am Afghan. We went 
to the language school, and they said, ‘Your wife can come to the integration 
course. She is more than welcome. But you cannot.’ I was shocked. Why?” 
(Interview B41).
Yet, at the beginning, the Afghan diaspora community intended to deal 
with the situation with noncontentious means. Those in an ongoing asylum 
procedure felt the discrimination, but chose to remain silent, considering 
this be the best strategy to obtain a right to stay. Those parts of the more 
6 Both agreements were almost identical in scope.
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established Afghan community who were willing to engage in the support of 
their compatriots with a precarious legal status joined in to the proliferating 
movement of asylum seekers support in Germany. Given their skills but also 
due to their knowledge of the complicate situation for Afghans, they tailored 
their services to the specif ic needs of Afghans, offering language courses 
and translation and legal advice during the asylum process (Interviews 
B38, B40). However, they increasingly realized that their engagement was 
futile and unable to balance the proliferating discursive and administrative 
restrictions. The frustration turned into indignation, when they learned 
about the governmental goal to prepare the legal ground for summary 
deportations to a war-torn country. One of them, a young Afghan journalist, 
expressed a widespread sentiment: “We Afghan refugees are discriminated 
against in Germany. Compared to Syrian refugees, for instance. No doubt, 
the situation in Syria is horrendous. But in Afghanistan, we experience a 
war for 40 years. […] Afghanistan is extremely insecure but nevertheless 
we are not welcome” (Interview B36).7
The signature of the readmission agreements constituted a crucial 
turning point, since it posed an existential threat for asylum seekers 
and a source of fundamental indignation for all those familiar with the 
security situation in conflict-ridden Afghanistan: “Within less than one 
year, the ‘welcome culture’ has been transformed for Afghans into a 
deportation culture” (Interview B35). This external event triggered a 
politicization of various individuals and groups, which engaged in organ-
izing the heterogeneous Afghan community to actively converge, and to 
create a contentious compound player powerful enough to be listened 
to. Up to this point, the Berlin-based Afghan diaspora had remained 
fragmented along the lines of religion, ethnicity, language and ideology. 
As a result of a four-decade-long conflict in Afghanistan, with shifting 
power constellations, distinct parts of the Afghan society were forced 
to leave the country. These divisions and memories of oppression have 
been kept alive in exile, which was why Afghans have rarely mobilized 
based on a collective national identity, in Berlin (Romeo 2001; Daxner 
and Nicola 2017).8
The decision by the German government to resume summary deporta-
tions to Afghanistan constituted a “moral shock” (Jasper 2014) among parts 
of the Afghan exile community. While Afghans with a pending asylum 
7 Similar expressions were used in Interviews B37, B39.
8 In previous episodes of precarious migrant protest in Germany, Afghans had also not played 
a major role despite their numerical size (Jakob 2016).
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case were immediately affected by the successive restrictions and, it was 
particularly a diverse group of more established Afghans in exile who were 
rapidly politicized. No matter if they had previously organized language 
courses, cultural festivities or sports for Afghans, all of a sudden they 
became involved in a f ight for a right to remain (Interviews B37, B38, B40): 
“We had already been involved in direct support – language courses, legal 
advice, translation, and the like. Our explicit political work started after the 
agreement between the German and Afghan government. […] We couldn’t 
believe it; […] that anyone could be so presumptuous to deport people to 
Afghanistan. We were shocked” (Interview B38).
While a pending asylum case or a temporary suspension from deportation 
(Duldung) had been a source of uncertainty and worry for many Afghans 
even before, the possibility of large-scale deportations planted an existential 
threat for all asylum seekers with a precarious legal status. Despite the fact 
that those initiating the mobilization were the “lucky ones” with a right to 
stay, they had developed a sense of responsibility vis-à-vis their compatriots 
under an increasing threat of deportation: “I managed to leave the asylum 
facility and get a right to stay. But it is not about myself. Having gone through 
this and knowing what it means urges me to assist my fellow compatriots 
now” (Interview B39).
Given their own biography of forced displacement, those Afghans who 
had already obtained a secure status not only empathized with the panic 
felt by those who had not but were also outraged by the German government 
denying a reality of insecurity. One of them, an Afghan TV journalist who 
had herself escaped from Kabul to Germany after a thwarted acid attack 
in 2014, noted: “The readmission agreement between Afghanistan and the 
German government – it’s a shame, everyday people get killed – innocent 
people, children, women, men, every day. […] It disgusts me. When I’m 
thinking about it, I’m full of anger, full of anger” (Interview B39).
Precisely because they were familiar with the precarious and demo-
bilizing effects of an ongoing asylum procedure or even more so, with 
the anxiety related to a risk of imminent deportation, the organizers felt 
they had to play a central role in the mobilization. Initially fragmented in 
various groups with limited or no interaction, associations run by Afghans 
or Germans of Afghan descent (such as Yaar e.V., Itehad e.V., Newsgroup 
Afghanistan, Afghanisches Kommunikations- und Kulturzentrum e.V.9 and 
Hazara World Council) and also individuals, realized that they had to join 
forces against what they considered an outrageous injustice (Gürgen 2017; 
9 Afghan Center for Communication and Culture.
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Weissenborn 2016). Despite their diversity in terms of age, ethnicity, religios-
ity, permanence in Germany, and experience of activism, the readmission 
agreement brought up a common cause. Interactions multiplied to open 
spaces for exchange, and strategizing. From summer 2016 onward, when 
information of a readmission agreement f irst spread, and even more so 
after its signing, associations and individuals started to get in touch with 
Afghans living in the asylum facilities to make it clear: “In case you want 
to stay in Germany, you have to become active. We have to raise awareness 
for our problems and the situation in Afghanistan. If you stay silent, you 
will have no chance” (Interview B43).
The spark of protest was set, but it needed to be incubated and f ind 
resonance in the large population of directly affected Afghans with a 
precarious legal status. Simultaneous to increased networking within 
the Afghan diaspora in Berlin, exchanges also intensif ied with larger 
migrant support associations, such as Flüchtlingsrat Berlin,10 BBZ Berlin,11 
KuB,12 and Verein Iranischer Flüchtlinge,13 which were already in contact 
with Afghans in their counseling sessions, as well. These associations 
with a long tradition of precarious migrant support were surprised by 
this unprecedented interaction with a range of diaspora groups and the 
involvement of individuals with an influential role in the various Afghan 
communities. This novel set of actors eventually joined forces and founded 
a new compound player, the Berlin Alliance against Deportations to Af-
ghanistan (Interviews B35, B36, B38). Before this collective actor mobilized 
thousands to the streets of Berlin and became visible as a public player, 
an intense process of organizing was necessary. Networks were knit and 
spaces were created to cut through the deeply engrained emotion of fear 
and to temporarily bridge the internal cleavages within the Afghan exile 
population. The core aim was to act as and be recognized as a compound 
political and contentious player.
Given their familiarity with the demobilizing effects of the asylum process 
and particularly the accommodation in collective facilities in remote areas, 
the core set of initial protest organizers, were aware of the need to reach out 
to the precarious Afghan population and built trust. The main challenge 
10 Refugee Council Berlin.
11 Beratungs und Betreuunszentrum für junge Geflüchtete und Migrant*innen, a center for 
the counseling and support of young refugees and migrants in Berlin.
12 Kontakt- und Beratungsstelle für Flüchtlinge und Migrant_innen (Contact and Counseling 
Off ice for Refugees and Migrants).
13 Association of Iranian Refugees.
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was to gradually cut through a deeply rooted fear and intuition to remain 
silent instead of speaking out:
The f irst step for every refugee [in the German asylum system] is to live 
in a f irst reception center. It is the f irst institution where you learn basic 
information about Germany. And what do they do there? They silence 
you. From the very beginning, everyone urges you: If you want to stay 
in Germany, be silent, be a good refugee, integrate into society. Plus, 
they isolate you physically. You are far away and surrounded by fences. 
They separate you from the rest of society as if they wanted to deny your 
existence. (Interview B39)
From their own experience and through exchanges in counseling, they 
knew the widespread state of fear and disillusion among the asylum seek-
ers (Schleiermacher 2017; Starzmann 2017). Instead of protesting against 
exclusion, in these contexts of marginalization, many individuals become 
apathetic and gradually lose their sense of agency (Täubig 2009; Pieper 2008). 
When rumors spread in the asylum facilities that Germany will resume 
deportations to Afghanistan, the omnipresent fear (Starzmann 2017) and 
uncertainty became an existential threat. One of the Afghan organizers, 
who has been granted subsidiary protection but continued living in an 
emergency shelter, recalled:
Since Germany deports, all Afghans are terrif ied. Everyone who does 
not have a residence permit is constantly afraid. I personally witnessed 
the situation when a young Afghan jumped out of the second floor of the 
asylum facility, when he saw a police car parking in front of the building. 
They did not come for him, but he was panicking. (Interview B43)
This constant anxiety had intensified, since the German government started 
to allow deportations without prior notice in October 2015 (Pichl 2016). From 
then on, rejected asylum seekers had to expect a deportation at any time, day 
or night. Given this internalization of fear, when organizers started reaching 
out to Afghans with a precarious legal status and proposed organizing a 
protest, they encountered reluctance. Despite sharing a sense of injustice 
and anxiety about a potential deportation, the strategy of confronting the 
state was considered counterproductive. Due to the dependence on the 
state in obtaining the right to stay, many initially opted for “silence” instead 
of “voice”: “At the beginning, many Afghans were afraid to attend demon-
strations. They said: if we go to a protest, perhaps the German politicians 
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and administrators will see this and we will get our cases rejected or even 
deported. We will stay at home instead and try to stay as silent and invisible 
as possible” (Interview B43).
The fact that many of the core organizers were Afghan, or Germans with 
a personal migration history from Afghanistan, facilitated outreach, as 
information could be shared and doubts be discussed in the main Afghan 
languages, Dari and Pashtu. On the other hand, the deep cleavages within 
the Afghan exile community also posed, at times, additional obstacles that 
had to be overcome. Some asylum seekers in the collective accommodation 
facilities were immediately suspicious when an Afghan broker from a distinct 
ethnicity than their own got in touch to inform them and offer spaces of 
encounter and strategizing (Interview B38).
In this climate, the diverse activities offered by Afghan community asso-
ciations, but also other migrant support organizations working with Afghans, 
became the spaces for encounter, mutual trust building, empowerment and 
politicization. Itehad e.V., the f irst Afghan soccer club, originally founded to 
provide moments of relief from a burdensome life in exile, became a space 
to discuss possibilities to counter the turning tide against Afghan asylum 
seekers (Weissenborn 2016; Interview B37). Newsgroup Afghanistan organ-
ized platforms for young Afghans to meet and exchange views (Borkowsky 
2019; Interview B45). The magazine KulturTür by and for persons with a 
history of forced displacement brought together individuals to share stories 
of their life in exile, which also included stories of exclusion and resistance 
(Interviews B36, B45).14 Yaar e.V. and Afghanisches Kommunikations- und 
Kulturzentrum served as “bridges of communication between Afghan 
refugees and other Berliners” (Rezaie 2018a, author’s translation). These 
associations both facilitated the convergence of different actors within the 
Afghan population in Berlin and brokered ties to larger migrant support 
organizations, such as Verein Iranischer Flüchtlinge, BBZ, and Flüchtlingsrat 
Berlin, which also contributed to (self-)organization with the provision of 
rooms and expertise. These social spaces organized by and for migrants, 
which were often not political in their original purpose, became spaces of 
empowerment and encounter for a previously fragmented and politically 
demobilized Afghan exile community in Berlin.
While these spaces of encounter were initially almost exclusively created 
by individuals with a secure legal status, asylum seekers with pending cases 
soon became actively involved as well. They played an important role, since 
they served as additional and credible relays to precarious migrants, who 
14 See also Rahimi (2018), Rasuoli and Yaghobi (2017), and Rezaie (2018b).
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still considered “silence” an effective strategy to achieve a right to stay. 
One of the young Afghans who became an active organizer serves as an 
illustration of the interactive dynamics, which contributed to the incubation 
of precarious protests in Berlin: In summer 2016, he was still anxiously 
waiting for the decision on his asylum case. Accommodated in the city’s 
largest emergency shelter, Berlin Tempelhof Airport,15 with thousands of 
other asylum seekers, he heard about an Afghan cultural event and hoped 
for a moment of relief (Interview B45). At the event, Newsgroup Afghanistan 
had set up “Afghan Memory,” a space in which Afghans could share their 
stories from a life before exile. The contacts he made there, and the feeling 
of empowerment prompted him to stay engaged and become a member of 
the group himself, even after his asylum claim got rejected and the risk of 
deportation grew:
I was afraid at the beginning, too. If I go to the demo, if I show my 
face publicly, on television, this would be bad for my asylum case. […] 
But then I thought, “Germany is a free country and a democracy,” and 
I realized, if you are afraid and stay at home, they can do whatever 
they want with you. I knew a lot of people, talked with others in our 
[newsgroup about politics. […] If I am afraid, the others are afraid, too, 
I thought I have to do something to give energy to others to do the 
same. (Interview B45)
During regular interactions with other Afghans at various events organized 
by different diaspora groups, he realized that patience and silence was 
the wrong strategy in light of an imminent threat: “If I do not f ight, they 
will send me back. […] I have to f ight for my life” (Interview B45). When 
the f irst summary deportation flights were scheduled, the Berlin Alliance 
against Deportations to Afghanistan announced a demonstration. While 
established migrant rights organizations formed a part of the alliance and 
contributed with their resources and expertise, the news about a protest 
of Afghans was also diffused in the newly created networks of the Afghan 
exile community. Calls for protest in Dari and Pashtu rapidly circulated 
in Afghan social media groups, during cultural and sports events, and 
as leaf lets in collective asylum facilities (Interview B36). The spaces of 
encounter created before had produced decentralized messengers within 
15 Berlin Tempelhof Airport (which had ceased operating as an airport in 2008) temporarily 
hosted thousands of asylum seekers in highly precarious conditions (Berliner Morgenpost 2015).
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the precarious migrant community: “By the time I still lived in ‘the hangar.’16 
I knew a lot of people there and in other facilities. When a demonstration 
was planned, I called all my contacts and posted it on Facebook to let the 
[Afghan] people know” (Interview B45).
Protest Incubation: From “Silence” to “Voice”
The call for action for the f irst demonstration of the Berlin Alliance docu-
mented the combination of an existential threat inducing constant emotional 
stress and the indignation to be deported to a country with one of the 
most fragile security situation worldwide: “We demand […] the immediate 
EU-wide halt of deportations to Afghanistan; the immediate stop of psycho 
terror by both the media and public institutions with their constant threat 
of deportation to human beings who have been on the run from war and 
terror for almost four decades” (cited in KuB 2016, author’s translation).
On protest day, 10 December 2016, days before the f irst summary 
deportation to Afghanistan was executed (ARD Tagesschau 2016), 1,500 
demonstrators marched to Brandenburg Gate in central Berlin, despite 
freezing temperatures (Die Welt Online 2016). As an emblematic case of 
transnational migrant activism (Steinhilper 2018), the protesters carried signs 
with slogans such as “Afghanistan is not safe” and “We are human beings, 
not numbers,” but also photographs of human rights abuses in the Central 
Asian country, articulating claims against the German government and 
the insecurity in Afghanistan. In contrast to other promigrant or antiracist 
demonstrations in Berlin, German protesters remained a minority. It was 
mostly the Afghan community itself that took to the streets, and among 
them, many at immediate risk of deportation (Ehrich 2016). They expressed:
What will happen in case I am deported? It is obvious. Today, three 
hours ago, in the Afghan province of Helmand in the city of Lashkar Gah, 
fourteen persons were killed and eight injured. In case we get deported, 
what will happen? Thousands of young Afghans died in 2015 and 2016 in 
suicide attacks. The same will happen to all of us. (Newsgroup Afghanistan 
2017, author’s translation)
The desperate situation and an existential threat to their lives, mobilized 
a community, which had long hoped to be granted a right to stay by silent 
16 Refers to the emergency accommodation in the former airport.
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“integration.” Among the protesters were many young males with a par-
ticularly high risk of deportation and many members of the ethnic group 
of the Hazara,17 who faced particular risks upon return:
If they decide I have to go back to Afghanistan, they sign my death sen-
tence, because I am Hazara. The so-called Islamic State and the Taliban 
said that they do not care if we have the same religion or culture. If you 
are Hazara, they will kill you. Perhaps it will take one or two months, or 
maybe a year or two. But if I return to Afghanistan, I will die. (Newsgroup 
Afghanistan 2017, author’s translation)
Aware of the precarious conditions of asylum seekers and their unlikely 
attendance at demonstrations, the Berlin Alliance organizers had expected a 
larger turnout of Germans acting in solidarity, yet the Afghan participation 
exceeded their hopes (Interview B38). The combination of an existential 
threat, as well as their efforts to provide spaces of empowerment and access 
to resources, had contributed in overcoming the odds of mobilization in 
contexts of marginalization.
The f irst demonstration was just the kickoff for a series of protest events. 
In February 2017, the Berlin Alliance again mobilized more than thousand 
people to the streets (Berliner Morgenpost 2017). Also in this second protest 
event, the majority of the participants were Afghans, again, many with a 
precarious legal status (Newsgroup Afghanistan 2017; Berliner Morgenpost 
2017). Using the momentum of the f irst two demonstrations with large turn-
outs, regular protests followed, targeting the various actors involved in the 
precarious situation of Afghans. These included the German refugee agency 
(BAMF) and its practice of increasingly issuing rejections on asylum claims 
by Afghans (BBgAA 2017b), the Ministry of the Interior (Hillebrand 2017), the 
Afghan embassy for its cooperation in the readmission agreement (BBgAA 
2017c; Schleiermacher 2017) and the off ice of the state of Bavaria in Berlin, 
from where the first summary deportations to Afghanistan were effectuated 
(BBgAA 2017a). The Berlin Alliance invented the hashtag #Bleibistan,18 
launched a large Twitter campaign and joined in broader campaigns for 
migrant rights in Germany (Interviews B36, B45, B38). Picketing took place 
when terrorist attacks occurred in Afghanistan in order to draw attention 
to the argument that Afghanistan was anything but safe and German 
17 The Hazara are an ethnic minority in Afghanistan, which has experienced discrimination 
and violence for decades (Fischer 2019).
18 A German wordplay fusing the terms “bleiben” (remain) and Afghanistan.
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politicians claiming the opposite were hiding the truth (Rasuoli and Yaghobi 
2017): “We escaped from war, from lies and incompetent power holders in 
Afghanistan. Now we are exposed to the lies of some German politicians” 
(Rasuoli and Yaghobi 2017, author’s translation). Previously absent from 
the contentious arena around asylum and migration in Berlin, the series 
of protests and its supporting networks introduced Afghans as a visible 
compound player and connected it to the resources of larger migrant rights 
organizations in the German capital.
The case of protests against deportations to Afghanistan thereby echoes 
previous research on patterns of activism in contexts of marginalization. 
Firstly, it documents the ambivalent effect of fear on political mobiliza-
tion. While on the one hand, fear tends to discourage protest, it can have 
the opposite effect once it is perceived as a collective threat, to which a 
collective response is needed (Zepeda-Millán 2014). Secondly, precarious 
mobilizations are often organized around a few influential personalities with 
organizational and linguistic skills and experiences in activism (Nicholls and 
Uitermark 2016) serving as brokers to these disenfranchised communities. 
Also in undocumented migrant protest, associations and groups without an 
explicit political agenda, such as sports and cultural clubs, have obtained 
a crucial function in resource mobilization and trust building in times of 
threats.
Dynamics of Demobilization
Despite the continuation of protest activity of the Berlin Alliance throughout 
the summer and autumn of 2017, also including a long-term picket with a 
hundred participants, directly before the German national elections in 
September (BZ Online 2017), the visibility and size of protests decreased 
markedly, and abruptly, three months after the f irst demonstration. This was 
the reaction to the shifting position of another player: in response to public 
pressure to which the protests contributed and internal debates, the center-
left regional government of Berlin, which had only shortly before the protests 
taken off ice, declared on 22 February 2017 to temporarily suspend summary 
deportations to Afghanistan with the exception of convicted criminals 
and individuals labeled as “potentially dangerous terrorist offenders”19 
(Die Welt Online 2017). Even though other German states continued with 
the summary deportations of Afghans, this public statement reduced the 
19 In German: “Gefährder” (Die Welt Online 2017).
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imminent threat for precarious migrants in Berlin. The relieving news 
rapidly spread within the same networks, which had previously led to the 
large turnouts during demonstrations. Participation in subsequent protests 
visibly dropped:
[W]hen the Afghan migrants were relatively sure that they will not be 
deported […] many did not participate in the subsequent protest activities 
with the same urgency. For instance, when we organized a demonstration 
in front of the Representation of the State of Bavaria20 in Berlin after a 
deportation flight of Afghans from Munich, many fewer people showed 
up. (Interview B38)
As soon as the acute threat of imminent deportation decreased, three dynam-
ics set in. Firstly, many Afghans drew their attention toward addressing 
other pressing questions of a life in exile. Since a suspension of deportation 
reduced the imminent threat, but did not solve the hardships of a life with 
the nonstatus of Duldung: “[W]e would get more attention if our fellow 
Afghans would not rest on the highly fragile and temporary commitment 
that Berlin does not deport ‘ordinary’ Afghans. But they have tons of other 
problems and often still internalize the position: the more discrete we are, 
the more merciful the German society will act toward us” (Interview B38).
Accordingly, with a decreasing threat, many precarious migrants shifted 
back to a repertoire of silent inclusion, which they considered more effective 
to address their urgent needs like finding a housing alternative to the precari-
ous emergency shelters, getting access to language courses, and f inding a 
job to sustain their families (Interview B35). Considering the alternatives, 
many opted against a long-term sociopolitical engagement and for f inding 
individual solutions to their immediate problems.
Secondly, after a moment of resistance without alternatives, many 
Afghans were drawn back again into a state of apathy, typical for a life in 
legal limbo. One of those precarious migrants who stayed engaged referred 
to his Afghan roommate to underline this demobilizing dynamic:
I have a roommate. He is Afghan, too. We both got our asylum claims 
rejected. When I try to motivate him to get engaged, he says, “No, I will 
not do anything until I get a right to stay. I cannot. Even when I go to 
school, I forget everything. I think too much about what will happen if I 
get rejected again.” (Interview B45)
20 Every state (Land) is represented with an off ice in the capital city Berlin.
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And lastly, with the fading threat, the fragile unity of a highly heterogene-
ous player with multiple internal cleavages collapsed. The alliances built 
during mobilization were strong enough during an exceptional time, 
yet, soon, the old conflicts and divides became dominant, and distinct 
players within the diverse Afghan community pursued distinct and often 
opposite interests:
The division and distrust resulting from 40 years of interethnic and 
religious violence is also present within the Afghan exile community. 
In Berlin, the debates between religious and secular Afghans have been 
going on for decades. The religious faction obviously has an interest in 
advocating for a conservative lifestyle. […] It is easy to discredit the protest 
movement from a conservative perspective. They argue, for instance, 
that if you go to a demonstration, there will be homosexuals there, and 
people f ighting for women’s rights, and this is not in line with the religious 
values. (Interview B38)
The temporary success in bridging between various religious and ethnic 
groups, was replaced again by prevailing distrust and reluctance: one of the 
organizers noted with disillusioned realism that “the Afghan community [did 
not] exit” (Interview B37) but consisted of competing subplayers: “[People] 
argued increasingly, this association is religious, this one is not, they are 
more ‘Afghan’ than these, this group only caters to this ethnic group. […] This 
fragmentation, which has always existed, is now an obstacle to sustainable 
mobilization” (Interview B38).
Despite the dynamics of visible demobilization in terms of numbers, the 
core of Afghan individuals and associations, who had converged for the 
f irst time in preparation of the protest, remained connected afterward. 
They had also gained new members willing to keep the recently emerged 
contentious Afghan diaspora “in abeyance” (Taylor and Crossley 2013); to be 
prepared to organize mass protest in case of a resumption of deportations 
to Afghanistan from Berlin. Aware that a united Afghan voice would be 
necessary to move beyond the protest against deportations and press for 
inclusive policies in Germany, they continue, against all the odds: “Personally, 
I don’t agree with most of them [Afghan refugees]. I’m not a Muslim; I am 
an atheist and a Marxist. Yet, we are all human beings” (Interview B39). 
“We continue working on bridging these divides. But perhaps we need to 
wait one generation, until the bruises of 40 years of conflict start to heal” 
(f ield notes, 12 December 2018).
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Conclusion
The interactive dynamics unfolding during the series of protests against 
deportations to Afghanistan between 2016 and 2017 in Berlin carve out two 
key aspects of precarious migrant mobilizations: the mobilizing effect of 
threats, and the important role of mobilized diasporas. Firstly, the chapter 
underlines that threats, rather than opportunities, are crucial for under-
standing protest dynamics in contexts of marginalization (Zepeda-Millán 
2017). Confronted with various challenges of a life without secure legal status, 
the strategy of protest is chosen in moments of existential hardship. Whereas 
in most situations of precariousness, individuals concentrate on getting 
by through silent adaptation. The decision by the German government to 
resume deportations to the conflict-ridden country posed such an existential 
threat among precarious migrants from Afghanistan. Individuals and groups 
in regular contact with Afghan asylum seekers, from both the diaspora 
and migrant support groups, immediately sensed the seeds of panic the 
readmission agreement had planted. This confrontation with anxiety, but 
also with their own familiarity with the context of violence in Afghanistan, 
sparked deep indignation among a small set of Afghans and Germans with 
a biography of forced displacement from Afghanistan. A “moral shock” 
prompted them to take action and work on the convergence of an exile com-
munity, strongly divided along the lines of ethnicity, religion and ideology. 
Those asylum seekers directly at risk of deportation f irst tended to react 
with a strategy of silent adaptation, and they hoped invisibility rather than 
“voice” would allow them to stay in Germany. In this ambiguous context, 
individuals and groups from the Afghan diaspora played a crucial role in 
the dynamics of mobilization. Through repeated encounters in settings, 
which did not have a political purpose, such as sports and cultural events, 
they facilitated both an empowerment of disenfranchised individuals, and 
they built a temporary bridge between different factions of the Afghan 
diaspora. The combination of an existential threat and a space provided by 
the more established Afghans and migrant support associations allowed the 
creation of a large compound player with an Afghan identity. It eventually 
encouraged thousands of precarious migrants to overcome their fear and 
take the streets.
Besides these dynamics of protest emergence and incubation through 
interaction, the case study also documents the fragile unity in precarious 
activism, which complicates long-term mobilization. The convergence into 
a collective compound player, as well as large turnouts for demonstrations, 
were strongly dependent on the perception of an acute and direct threat for 
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the persons involved. When the regional government in Berlin declared a de 
facto deportation ban, many Afghans shifted back to “silence,” invisibly try-
ing to cope with the multiple challenges of a life in continuous uncertainty. 
When the uniting threat decreased, the internal fragmentation of the Afghan 
exile community resurfaced and decomposed the compound player into 
ethnic, religious, and ideological factions, with competing individual and 
group interests.
Notwithstanding this demobilization, for the f irst time, both individual 
Afghans and exile associations have knit dense networks within and among 
migrant support groups in Berlin, which might be remobilized in case the 
threat of deportation intensif ies. Indeed, the temporary suspension of 
deportations from Berlin could be revoked at any time, since the removal 
of rejected asylum seekers has remained a core priority for high-ranking 
politicians and many regional governments have continued with forced 
returns after the regional suspension of deportations to Afghanistan from 
Berlin. Minster of the Interior Horst Seehofer (CSU21) proudly announced 
in summer 2018: “Coincidentally, on my 69th birthday, 69 persons have 
been deported to Afghanistan” (Spiegel Online 2018). One of the deportees 
committed suicide right upon arrival in Kabul (Zeit Online 2018), underlining 
the severity of the grievances on which Afghans had engaged in acts of 
resistance, against all the odds.
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 Conclusion
Interactive Dynamics, Ambivalent Spatialities and 
Regulatory Contexts
“I was [politically] active in Sudan – this is the reason I had to leave. When 
I came to France, I did not want to be political. When I understood the 
situation here, though, that was not possible. I realized that I had 
to continue f ighting to get back my dignity, at least, my basic rights. 
Wherever you go, no one can guarantee your basic rights unless you stand 
up for them yourself. I found that it works to let people know that our rights 
are abused in Europe and also, of course, in Africa and elsewhere.”1
Abstract
Episodes of precarious migrant protest are characterized by volatility 
and fragility, rather than by stability or structure. In the four case studies 
scrutinized in this book, the players’ interests, resources and options 
were shaped in the process. Players emerged, split and changed sides 
during the mobilizations. In some occasions and spatial configurations, 
microinteractions incubated sparks of dissent into large and powerful 
mobilizations. In other socio-spatial settings, diversity and precariousness 
favored fragmentation and demobilization. Against this background, the 
concluding chapter suggests an microinteractionist argument to the study 
of precarious protest. Such a perspective, which stresses agency despite 
contexts of marginalization, does not suggest that macroinstitutions do 
not matter. On the contrary, a “players and arena” approach precisely 
illustrates how different legal statuses, accommodation systems, and 
social movement traditions intervene in concrete contentious interactions 
shaping the complex dynamics of precarious mobilizations.
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In her seminal study on the sans-papiers movement in France, Siméant 
identif ied an “almost typical characteristic and evolution of illegalized 
migrant protest in terms of claims and repertoires of contention” (1998: 17, 
author’s translation). This resonates with a core ambition of the “players 
and arenas” approach to focus on both the particularity of specif ic periods 
of contention and “[grasping] the types of strategic interactions that can 
be considered ‘characteristic’” (Duyvendak and Fillieule 2014: 312). Com-
parative case studies thereby allow tentative propositions for dynamics of 
contention in certain issue areas more broadly. In this tradition, the f inal 
chapter of this book derives patterns from the four case studies of precarious 
migrant protest. Such patterns shed light on the grievances, emergence, and 
trajectories of mobilizations in contexts of marginalization. In conjunction, 
they stimulate theory building on both the odds of precarious protest and 
ways to temporarily overcome them.
Contentious Arenas and Contested Spaces
The diverse contentious subjects scrutinized in the previous chapters were 
engaged in arenas in which a myriad of actors competed for influence and 
recognition. In consequence, the social relations that developed during these 
series of protests were characterized by volatility and fragility, rather than 
by stability or structure. The players’ interests and options were shaped in 
the process rather than being predetermined. Players emerged, split and 
changed sides during the mobilizations; players conceiving themselves to 
be part of the same compound player in one moment in time, were at a later 
point considered to be key opponents. On some occasions and in certain 
spatial configurations, microinteractions incubated sparks of dissent into 
larger mobilizations, often involving both migrants and pro-beneficiaries. 
In other spatial settings, diversity and precariousness favored fragmentation 
and demobilization. Stressing the role of microinteractions in contentious 
arenas does not mean that macroinstitutions such as social, administra-
tive and legal contexts do not matter. On the contrary, an arena approach 
precisely illustrates how, in the case of migrant mobilizations in Berlin and 
Paris, different legal statuses, accommodation systems, and social movement 
traditions intervene in concrete contentious interactions. Indeed, in most 
of the cases studied, these proved to be important breaking points for the 
establishment or maintenance of social ties. Arenas are, thus, fundamentally 
“situated” in spatial and temporal contexts. As an illustration, migrants 
mobilized in Paris and Berlin in distinct “borderline citizenship regimes” 
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(Monforte and Dufour 2011) and relational contexts which made them 
mobilize mainly as “sans-papiers” in France and as “refugees” in Germany, 
despite at times having equivalent biographical features. However, institu-
tional opportunities and constraints were not essential as such, but rather 
in their effect on the making and breaking of social ties, which underlie 
all processes of political mobilization. Indeed, the accounts of the four 
arenas illustrate that the protesters did not react upon opening opportunity 
structures, and did not rely exclusively on internal resources as traditional 
social movement theories would expect. Instead, resources were mobilized 
in spaces with specif ic “relational qualities” (Nicholls and Uitermark 2016) 
and through contentious interactions with other players. Demobilization, 
similarly, was shaped importantly by direct exchanges leading to alienations 
and fragmentations rather than fundamental changes at the macrolevel. 
In some cases, certainly the action of other players, such as the decision 
by the Senate of Berlin to suspend deportations to Afghanistan, impacted 
the mobilization dynamics profoundly. Yet, these opportunities and threats 
were highly issue specif ic and microinteractionist, rather than structural.
An arena perspective combines a focus on interaction with an explicit 
integration of spatial and regulatory contexts. This spatial sensitivity is 
of particular pertinence given the disintegrating nature of many spaces 
migrants are forced to inhibit at various stages of their migrant trajectory. As 
“non-places” (Augé 2009) many asylum facilities in both Germany and France 
are located in peripheral areas, deliberately complicating mobility and 
access to social networks outside the centers. In addition to formal migrant 
accommodation centers, makeshift camps of migrants have proliferated in 
Europe (Projet Babels 2017). Such camps, in turn, are spaces that engender 
feelings of dehumanization and existential physical deprivation. Grasping 
mobilizations of marginalized individuals and groups requires specif ic 
attention to these geographies of exclusion, which constitute important 
obstacles and require specif ic strategies to overcome them. All chapters 
in this book suggest that marginalized protesters raised public attention 
and mobilized resources by moving from socially and spatially isolated 
locations into urban centers. In setting up camps, and organizing marches 
(in the case of Berlin and the CSP75), they literally left behind their excluded 
position and articulated a claim to urban and social centrality. The relocation 
from the periphery of the asylum camp (Germany), the migrant worker 
foyer (Paris) or the individualized life in the streets (Paris) to the inner 
city space broke the routine of migrant invisibility. Regrouping in central 
locations attracted media coverage, tapped resources that were needed in 
order to be recognized as political subjects, to perform “acts of citizenship” 
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and to organize political protest. While street camps in both Berlin and 
Paris attracted resources, they differed fundamentally. In Paris, migrants 
gathered in a situation of “bare life” as a combination of subsistence and 
strategy of visibility, whereas the tent camps in Germany were deliberate 
autonomous spaces, with comparatively less precarious living conditions. 
Despite these signif icant differences, as autonomous spaces in contrast 
to regulated asylum facilities, both types of camps generated resources, 
attracting a diverse set of supporters from which precarious migrants had 
been previously cut off. In Berlin, precarious migrants gradually succeeded 
in compensating for the lack of resources and even in altering established 
power relations between migrants and supporters. The latter were attracted 
to the increasingly prominent protesters, who had, thus, a degree of choice in 
deciding with whom to work and whom to ignore. In addition to developing 
magnetic effects for external resources, the protest camps also served as 
spaces of encounter and gradual trust building among previously scattered 
migrant communities, in which stories and opinions could be shared and a 
collective identity developed – despite the tremendous heterogeneity of the 
actors involved. While these socio-spatial dynamics unfolded and sparked 
protests in both cities, the condition of “bare life” with extremely scarce 
resources in the makeshift camps and squats of Paris added obstacles to 
such rapprochements.
In both Berlin and Paris, protesters appropriated buildings, which proved 
to be settings with ambivalent relational effects. At the Lycée Jean Quarré 
in Paris and the Gerhart-Hauptmann-Schule in Berlin, particularly in their 
initial phases, these autonomous spaces provided a less precarious environ-
ment for interaction compared to the exposed street camps. Through the 
encounter of highly diverse actors, a range of political activities developed, 
which also partly survived the eviction or evacuation of these places. The 
potential, however, increasingly faded when the spaces became overpopu-
lated, conflicts proliferated and the inhabitants became alienated from each 
other. Given the built environment of the arenas, the proliferating tensions 
were sealed in and, thus, accentuated in the building. Eventually, the spaces 
became instrumentalized by the opponents, since problems could be at-
tributed to the occupants themselves and their internal organization, rather 
than serving as empowering catalysts of migrant visibility and political 
subjectivity. The squats organized by migrants mobilizing as sans-papiers 
in Paris constitute exceptions in this regard. Due to their comparative 
strength, given the existing vast (Francophone) migrant communities 
and established structures of political organization, they succeeded in 
sustaining and effectively self-organizing the occupations at the Bourse 
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du Travail and the Rue Baudelique for extended periods of time with much 
fewer internal disputes.
Contentious Interactions and Fragile Alliances
Migrant mobilizations typically involve both migrants and a number of 
migrant support actors (Siméant 1998; Nicholls and Uitermark 2016; Giugni 
and Passy 2001). Such encounters of marginalized noncitizens and relatively 
privileged citizens often result in contentious interactions, in which ques-
tions of racism, paternalism and autonomy occupy a prominent place. In 
all the cases presented in the empirical part of this book, migrants were 
very soon surrounded by a wide range of actors with highly diverse institu-
tional agendas and modi operandi, including individual supporters without 
previous experience in activism, anarchist groups with radical repertories 
of action and professionalized NGOs with established channels to the 
government. Conflicts regularly arose concerning the roles of migrants and 
supporters. While all the nonmigrant associations and individuals involved, 
in principle, supported the cause of migrant rights, questions of leadership 
and strategies were heatedly contested. Many associations and individuals 
reacted with irritation to migrants actively claiming a position in the front 
row, or to their choice of strategies. They were profoundly uneasy about their 
role being limited to mere logistic support. Ties to established associations 
working on the issue of migration proved to be particularly fragile. Their 
traditional organizational identity of representing migrants and a focus on 
long-term “strategies” regularly collided with some migrants’ radical protest 
repertoire and their attempts to emancipate from a predominantly white 
migrant rights movement and the society at large. These disputes represent 
in Jasper’s language the “radicalism” and “universalism” dilemmas combined 
(Jasper 2008: 126, 153). In the resulting interactions, activist migrants felt 
their suspicions of ubiquitous paternalism and instrumentalization of 
their exclusion and suffering to be proven. In this context, it is key to recall 
that the sparks of protest at the St. Bernard church in 1996, at the Bourse 
du Travail in 2008 as well as in Würzburg in 2012 were ignited without the 
knowledge and initial support, and sometimes even despite the opposition, 
of a number of promigrant associations. At the same time, without the 
amplifying potential of a broader migrant rights movement, the episodes 
would have most likely remained scattered sparks.
Indeed, the migrant protesters found themselves repeatedly in a 
“strategic dilemma”: On the one hand, the migrant associations and 
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individual supporters offered fundamental logistic support, as well as 
symbolic and social capital without which the mobilizations could have 
hardly been sustained. At the same time, they had to renegotiate their 
autonomy constantly – in “acts of emancipation” also within the migrant 
rights movement. Conf idently protecting the autonomy vis-à-vis native 
associations at times came at the expense of losing important access 
to resources. The dependence on external resources, in turn, entailed 
being caught between opposing support interests. In numerous instances, 
associations, trade unions and grassroots groups engaged in their own 
skirmishes accusing each other of exploiting precarious migrants. Due to 
the structural asymmetry in terms of power, risks, and rights distinguishing 
those primarily concerned from those acting in solidarity, such social ties 
were characterized by an accentuated fragility. Certainly, with notable 
exceptions, but generally, relations kept a pragmatic, resource-oriented 
“weak tie” nature, rather than being emotionally deep “strong ties” of trust 
based on shared experiences of exclusion. Yet, the arenas also showed 
that unequal power relations between migrants and native supporters 
were not necessarily static. Indeed, the relocation of protest to visible 
and autonomous public spaces (such as the tent camps in Würzburg and 
Berlin, but also initially the squat at the Lycée Jean Quarré and some of 
the street camps in Paris) developed at times a magnetic effect, attracting 
considerable resources from a broad range of individuals and groups, among 
which the protesters could choose to a certain degree. While precarious 
migrants had to rely on external support in most cases to get access to 
information, tents, rooms, and money, the protest itself and the contentious 
localities where it evolved, expanded their room for maneuver. Thus, in 
some spatial settings, marginalized and weakly resourced challengers could 
compensate for an objective lack of internal resources without becoming 
dependent on specif ic actors.
As some of the cases clearly document, contentious interactions do not 
unfold in a vacuum, but involve actors with certain dispositions. These 
dispositions are rooted in histories of mobilizations and hence in memories of 
previous contentious interactions. In both Berlin and Paris, actors regularly 
referred to past interactions with certain players or types of players in 
previous episodes of migrant protest. In Berlin, the Oranienplatz arena 
left deep traces in the relations between supporters and migrants but also 
between different generations and “types” of precarious migrants. In Paris, 
the interactions around the occupation of the Bourse du Travail lastingly 
alienated the most influential sans-papiers collectives from both trade 
unions and some migrant support associations, which partly explained 
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their reluctance during the La Chapelle protests. In other words, contentious 
interactions in previous arenas have proven to feed into dispositions for 
future interactions.
Despite their shared nonstatus, among undocumented migrants, chances 
for legal recognition and social inclusion are highly diverse (Nicholls 2014). 
Given the absence of large political opportunities, illegalized migrants 
mobilize in small “niches,” which can only accommodate some at the expense 
of the exclusion of others. The boundaries of inclusion, usually set by the 
state, introduce breaking points in the social relations among undocumented 
migrant protesters. Similar to Jasper’s “rules dilemma,” dependent actors 
were trapped in the very rules they wanted to change in the f irst place 
(Jasper 2008: 163). As the empirical chapters in this book suggest, these 
f indings can be extended to precarious migrants more broadly, including 
asylum seekers.
The contentious subjects in the four arenas assembled a highly diverse 
group of individuals – in terms of origin, age, gender and, most impor-
tantly, in terms of (potential) legal status. While in Berlin asylum seekers 
mobilized mostly alongside rejected asylum seekers and individuals 
with a regular status in Italy under the label “refugees,” the two cases 
in Paris document a focus on sans-papiers activism, including rejected 
asylum seekers and political refugees turned undocumented migrants. 
The La Chapelle arena furthermore underlined an accentuated separa-
tion between mobilizations by and for asylum seekers in an ongoing 
procedure and those self-identifying as “sans-papiers.” In all four cases, 
heterogeneity and different propensities of regularization introduced 
sensitive breaking points during the mobilizations – even in groups that 
had started mobilizing as a “compound player.” In the case of the Bourse 
du Travail arena, different groups of precarious migrants eventually 
competed for a limited number of regularizations dictated by the state, 
which eventually led to internal fragmentation and demobilization. At 
Oranienplatz, asylum seekers and members of the Lampedusa group 
were increasingly alienated and focused on their specif ic group interests. 
Within the movement, players repeatedly split along the lines of origin 
and (perceived) chances to be granted rights and recognition compared 
to others. At La Chapelle, the sans-papiers largely abstained from the 
mobilizations of those referred to as “refugees,” not only because of negative 
memories of previous interactions with French supporters, but also because 
of perceived competition with comparatively more privileged asylum 
seekers. Furthermore, at La Chapelle, in the light of a heterogeneous set of 
asylum seekers, conflicts regularly erupted between different (national) 
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groups over scarce resources and competition to f ind a place in the “niche,” 
be it a place in an accommodation center or the support of associations. 
In Berlin, the internal cleavages among Afghan migrants along lines of 
ethnicity and ideology were an important factor for demobilization once 
a uniting existential threat of deportation faded.
Aware of the disruptive effects of certain spaces as well as the fragility 
of social ties, government off icials have in all four arenas at times delib-
erately governed space and social relations, often combining the two. In a 
structural variant, the German asylum system is deliberately designed to 
complicate the establishment of social relations between asylum seekers 
and German citizens, with a view to minimizing empathy, and facilitating 
deportation in cases of rejected asylum claims. Both Residenzpflicht 
and geographic dispersal in collective accommodation centers have 
been used as a tool by government off icials during episodes of political 
mobilization in order to discourage and sanction migrant participants. 
At La Chapelle, public authorities intervened in the built environment 
by fencing entire parks and public spaces under elevated metro lines, as 
well as by placing massive boulders in potential gathering spaces order 
to prevent migrants from regrouping and, hence, from drawing attention 
to their condition of continuous violation of fundamental rights. In both 
the Oranienplatz arena and the occupations of the Bourse du Travail 
and the Rue Baudelique in Paris, the public authorities offered selective 
incentives which combined spatial and relational strategies of control. A 
limited number of individuals involved in the mobilizations was offered 
an exit option (reassessment of individual cases) on the condition that 
the disruptive camps and occupations were voluntarily dismantled. With 
such means, the state could avoid open repression against marginalized 
protesters, which would potentially produce negative media coverage and 
increased empathy and support for the actors involved. The heterogeneity 
of (potential) legal status among migrants and the dependency on the state 
introduced f issures within the mobilizing groups upon which the respec-
tive state off icials could act. In both Paris and Berlin selective incentives 
were offered by the state which increased the likelihood for precarious 
actors to defect from collective long-term group interests. Accordingly, in 
contrast to many other mobilizations, precarious migrants (both asylum 
seekers and undocumented migrants) hold a massive individual stake in 
the conflict, with a lot to win and a lot to lose. This inherent characteristic 
of precarious migrant mobilizations adds additional motivations for 
individuals to defect from collective action and options for opponents 
to intervene.
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Precarious Lives and Resistances
The empirical f indings in this book suggest the need for social movement 
studies to refocus on everyday experiences of exclusion, when studying 
political mobilizations of marginalized actors. Rather than by opening 
opportunities and pregiven resources, migrants have predominantly reacted 
to existential threats to their own physical and psychological integrity and 
that of friends and acquaintances. While social movement studies have 
“tended to disregard the origins of discontent” (della Porta 2018a: 1), it is 
these “embodied grievances” that pushed most of the protagonists of this 
book to organize political protest against all the odds. Sparks of protest 
often emanated from tangible threats, while the subsequent trajectory of 
protest was fundamentally shaped by concrete interactions. In the Bourse 
du Travail protests, the intervention of the CGT trade union posed a broad 
threat against their communities and identities, but also a direct threat to 
themselves and their personal interests. In the La Chapelle protests, the 
highly precarious life in the streets posed a fundamental threat to physical 
integrity. The sparks of the Oranienplatz protests arose from a suicide, which, 
for those joining the protest, was a direct effect of a highly burdensome life 
in uncertainty, forced immobility and isolation. The Afghans taking to the 
streets in Berlin considered a potential deportation to their conflict-torn 
home country as a death sentence, which left no other choice than to resist.
Given the context of marginality, the cases studied show the contours 
of a particular repertoire of action employed by precarious migrants. In 
a condition of “bare life” in Paris, the protest took an instrumental form 
with a focus on immediate solutions to existential hardship, rather than 
structural change. In most cases, access to shelter, food and basic medical 
care was the priority, even though claims for recognition and dignity were 
also articulated. Accordingly, direct social actions at such camps proliferated, 
which combined precarious subsistence with a strategy of visibility. At La 
Chapelle, asylum seekers predominantly mobilized to get into the asylum 
system. In Germany, instead, with its rigid reception system, asylum seekers 
in most cases stepped out of the asylum system in order to mobilize resources 
and expose the living conditions of asylum seekers, which remained mostly 
hidden from the public eye.
The microscopic perspective adopted in this book with attention to the 
constituencies, their experiences, strategies and everyday practices by 
precarious migrants in exclusive migration regimes furthermore unveils 
that instead of, or at times in addition to, disruptive collective action, many 
migrants chose less “visible” forms of dissent. Many opted for “exit” instead 
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of “voice,” trying to gain inclusion in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. 
Others stayed and focused on survival in illegality or engaged in legal 
struggles for a right to stay. Precarious conditions brought about a myriad 
of more instrumental, at times short-term and at times “invisible” forms of 
resistance (Stierl 2018). Attention to the diverse microprocesses of political 
mobilization by precarious migrants sheds light on the heterogeneity of 
the actors involved. It unveils the widespread dependence of individuals 
in a situation of “bare life” but also the “weapons of the (not so) weak” 
(Zepeda-Millán 2016). Those mobilizing as “sans-papiers” in Paris had the 
comparative advantage of established ethnic networks in which various 
resources were embedded. These did not only contribute to partly buff-
ering the precariousness of a life in illegality in Paris, but also allowed 
self-constitution as an autonomous political subject with less dependence 
on pro-benef iciaries than those asylum seekers from origins without 
established ethnic networks. All cases, some more explicit than others, 
furthermore illustrate how individual (transnational) biographies shape 
protest by marginalized actors. Indeed, migrants in all cases were embedded 
in transnational social spaces, which resulted in a dual target of protest. 
Protesters in both Paris and Berlin considered their activism as a struggle 
for rights and recognition in the locality of destination but also aimed at 
pushing for changes in the locality of origin or transit. They demanded 
both a “right to remain,” hence, life-worthy conditions at “home,” and “a 
right to leave,” meaning rights and recognition in Europe. Even though not 
all arenas mirrored the same degree of transnationality, references to the 
region of origin and a responsibility to mobilize also for those left behind 
were expressed regularly.
Epilogue: Precarious Migration as a Form of Life
In the “long summer of migration” in 2015, a decade-old reality of mass 
displacement became a European “problem” and spurred both acts of com-
passion and resistance (Jäckle and König 2016; Hess et al. 2016; della Porta 
2018b). In most public portrayals, migrants have been either represented as 
an indistinctive mass, as a threat to the “occidental order” or as vulnerable 
and powerless victims. In some circles, idealized perceptions of a new 
revolutionary avant-garde have circulated. The protagonists of this book 
are f irst and foremost human beings striving for recognition and rights. 
They emerge as contentious political subjects, and break their silence and 
invisibility. Many of the resulting practices are precarious and contradictory. 
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Such radical and often irreconcilable “acts of emancipation” and “acts of 
citizenship” constitute ruptures and highlight that migration is a highly con-
tentious f ield in which fundamental rights and interests are (re)distributed. 
According to Bauman, “mobility has become the most powerful and most 
coveted stratifying factor” (Bauman 1998: 9, 74). Moreover, and in contrast 
to optimistic expectations, “the global expansion of capitalist modernity 
(intertwined with questions of race) did not produce a homogenization or 
a leveling of world economy and labor, but rather a ceaseless proliferation 
of differences, heterogeneities and hierarchies” (Mellino 2016: 100).
Purposefully, this book uses the broad notion of precarious migration, 
referring to specif ic legal categories only if necessary, to underline specif ic 
opportunities or constraints. All precarious migrant protagonists in this 
book had reasons relevant enough to take the tremendous risks of perilous 
journeys. Beyond an illusionary neat distinction between “forced” and 
“voluntary” migration (Scheel and Squire 2014), projects of precarious migra-
tion are, in most cases, a “combination of danger, poverty and hope” (Fassin 
2018: 42). Independent from their off icial identif ication, the protagonists 
in this book shared in Fassin’s terms a specif ic “form of life” (Fassin 2018), 
characterized by both social and legal uncertainty. This form of life has 
structural roots, and thus is not likely to decrease in scale any time soon.
In the light of proliferating conflicts, the detrimental effects of climate 
change and materially speaking “one of the most unequal worlds in all of 
human history, ever since the recording of income and wealth data” (Faist 
2017: 19), large-scale precarious migration will remain one of the key social 
questions in the decades to come. Accordingly, “the people knocking at the 
door of Europe tell something that needs to be listened to, they tell their 
moral fatigue toward the growing gap between the wealthiest and poorest 
segments of humanity” (Monsutti 2017: 454). This book on mobilizations 
in contexts of marginalization, therefore, serves as a document of the 
contradictory global realities, since “in order for injustice to exist, it must 
be able to be spoken” (Agier 2010: 42).
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 Appendix
Research Design, Methods, and Ethics
The study on which this book is based was designed as a “case oriented” (della 
Porta 2008) comparison of precarious migrant protest in Berlin and Paris. 
In such an approach, “a few cases are analyzed based on a large number 
of characteristics” in thick descriptions (della Porta 2008: 207), striking a 
balance between attention to detail and the potential of contrasting cases. 
This resembles the idea of “political ethnography,” in which “ethnography 
[…] implies attention to detail, to contextual factors, and to configurational 
thinking,” while “political” adds a perspective more open to cross-case 
comparison and deduction (Schatz 2009). Such an approach resonates fur-
thermore with a core ambition of the “players and arenas” approach to focus 
on both the particularity of specif ic periods of contention and “[grasping] 
the types of strategic interactions that can be considered ‘characteristic’” 
(Duyvendak and Fillieule 2014: 312). Comparative case studies thereby allow 
tentative propositions for the dynamics of contention in certain issue areas 
more broadly.
The decision to study four cases in two settings (Berlin and Paris) fol-
lowed the rational to capitalize upon the potential of both cross-spatial 
and diachronic comparison (della Porta 2008). Since, existing research 
has shown the distinct citizenship and “borderline citizenship” regimes 
in Germany and France (Brubaker 1992; Monforte and Dufour 2011), they 
constitute contrasting settings for precarious migrant protest. With a 
view to capture similarities, differences and continuities within settings, 
the study investigates two cases in each city. In this tradition, the book 
both provides detailed accounts and derives patterns from four cases of 
precarious migrant protest, shedding light on the grievances, emergence, and 
trajectories of mobilizations in contexts of marginalization. In conjunction, 
they stimulate theory building on both the odds of precarious protest and 
ways to temporarily overcome them in distinct settings.
A “case oriented” comparison poses specif ic challenges for the research 
process. In contrast to the traditionally extensive f ieldwork conducted in 
case study (for anthropologists usually one year or more in one locality), in 
case comparisons, researchers usually spend much shorter periods (months, 
rather than years) in a certain setting and combine various techniques of 
data collection, including interviews, observation and archival work (Schatz 
2009). The analytic narratives in the empirical chapters of the book are 
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based on f ieldwork in Berlin and Paris and, more specif ically, on insights 
gained through interviewing individuals, participating and observing 
practices, and identifying and compiling textual sources produced by 
protesters, allies, opponents and the media. Participant observation was 
used in both locations, Paris and Berlin, to access the f ield and identify 
interlocutors, but also to immerse with a group, in order to observe (politi-
cal) practices and perceptions. In Berlin, “non-continuous” (Balsiger and 
Lambelet 2014: 153) f ieldwork was conducted between January 2016 and 
January 2019, and in Paris between April and July 2017. Observation has 
been complemented with qualitative interviews for various conceptual 
and normative reasons: it is evidently only feasible to follow some activists 
for some time. For contextualization it is indispensable to ask for past 
experiences. Conceptually, furthermore, in studying perceptions and subjec-
tive attribution of meaning to certain practices, it is useful to triangulate 
observed practices with interviewed explication. Very fundamentally, also, 
“people generally don’t talk about what they take for granted” (Blee 2012: 
12). This requires unveiling practices and attitudes that are not explicitly 
addressed. Finally, interviews have a strong normative component. They 
“generate representations that embody the subject’s voice, minimizing, at 
least as far as possible, the voice of the researcher” (Blee and Taylor 2002: 96). 
This is particularly key in research with subaltern individuals and groups. 
This book draws from a total of 76 interviews,1 which lasted between 20 and 
150 minutes and had different degrees of structuration. Due to the research 
interest in interactions among various actors engaged in the four arenas, 
interlocutors included not only migrant activists, but also key informants 
from the migrant support movement, trade unions and politicians. The 
interviews were organized around four main areas of interest, which were 
raised in a changing order depending on the f low of the conversation: the 
personal motivation and path into protest; the mobilization of resources 
during protest; the quality and dynamics of social relations; and the role 
of certain spaces. Most interviews were recorded. When interlocutors did 
not consent to be recorded, extensive notes were taken directly after the 
conversation. Interviews were conducted in English, German and French 
and subsequently translated. In addition to participant observation and 
interviews, the empirical section draws from textual resources that have 
been produced independently from the research project. Such texts include 
interviews, comments and self-representations by migrant protesters in 
leaflets, (online) texts and videos, but also by allies and opponents and 
1 See list of interviews below.
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the media. These sources served to complement and cross-validate data, 
obtained f irsthand. Indeed, during the research process, in various occa-
sions, the interlocutors referred to statements made by influential actors in 
the media, or to other written sources. Often, these more extensive reports 
and self-ref lections were as valuable as the face-to-face interviews. The 
f lexibility in the phase of data collection necessary in studying volatile 
and precarious forms of contention (Malthaner 2014; Blee 2012a; Schatz 
2009; Chabanet and Royall 2014) poses a challenge for data analysis. The 
“steaming mass” of data (Katz 2002), consisting of interview transcripts, 
f ield notes, and documents, was analyzed in various loops of reading, as-
signing codes, and identifying patterns. Eventually, the analytical narratives 
were “punctuated by illustrative vignettes. […] In these descriptions, the 
researcher must mention all those details that are revealing. Superfluous 
details must be left out” (Bray 2008: 313). In order to facilitate the reading 
flow, interview passages were slightly smoothed in language and, at times, 
transparently marked, in order to omit passages not relevant to the core 
argument.
Research on precarious migrant protest requires specif ic ethical reflec-
tions, since it combines risks related to a precarious legal and social situation 
and an engagement in contention with state actors (Milan 2014; Krause 2017). 
During the research, most interlocutors were aware of the risks and f irst 
tended to be skeptical toward any kind of research. Particular reluctance was 
met during initial piloting attempts to gather standardized (network) data, 
which interlocutors associated negatively bureaucratic control procedures. 
In turn, “to talk to heal the trauma” (f ield notes, 20 April 2016), was accepted 
in most occasions. Accordingly, a flexible approach to data collection turned 
out to be both a practical need and an ethical obligation. In line with ethical 
standards in research with vulnerable individuals, all results have been 
anonymized. This entails omitting the names, but also the country of origin 
and other characteristic features to avoid possible identif ication. Evidently, 
anonymization stands in strong tension with the normative ambition not to 
speak “on behalf” of others. The book privileges the security of the individu-
als involved but simultaneously extensively quotes marginalized voices. 
Ethical concerns were regularly raised by interlocutors during the research 
process. Since many considered their practices as “acts of emancipation,” 
the terms of the research had to be constantly negotiated. One of the key 
homepages resulting from the Oranienplatz protests even explicitly states: 
“If you want to interview refugee activists for a research project, please 
consider your position in relation to people categorized as refugees and being 
active politically, and how refugee protests and the activists themselves 
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can benefit from your project.”2 Building and keeping trust also meant, at 
times, to accept and respect the limits of research.
References
Balsiger, Philip, and Alexandre Lambelet. 2014. “Participant Observation.” In 
Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research, edited by Donatella della 
Porta, 144-172. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Blee, Kathleen M. 2012a. “Appendix B: Research Strategy.” In Democracy in the 
Making: How Activist Groups Form, 144-149. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
––. 2012b. Democracy in the Making: How Activist Groups Form. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Blee, Kathleen M, and Verta Taylor. 2002. “Semi-Structured Interviewing in Social 
Movement Research.” In Methods of Social Movement Research, edited by Bert 
Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg, 92-117. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press.
Bray, Zoe. 2008. “Ethnographic Approaches.” In Approaches and Methodologies 
in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective, edited by Michael Keating and 
Donatella della Porta, 296-315. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Chabanet, Didier, and Frédéric Royall, eds. 2014. From Silence to Protest: Interna-
tional Perspectives on Weakly Resourced Groups. Farnham: Ashgate.
della Porta, Donatella. 2008. “Comparative Analysis: Case-Oriented versus Variable-
Oriented Research.” In Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences, 
edited by Michael Keating and Donatella della Porta, 198-222. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Duyvendak, Jan Willem, and Olivier Fillieule. 2014. “Conclusion: Patterned Fluidity: 
An Interactionist Perspective as a Tool for Exploring Contentious Politics.” In 
Players and Arenas: The Interactive Dynamics of Protest, edited by James M. Jasper 
and Jan Willem Duyvendak, 295-318. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Katz, Jack. 2002. “From How to Why. On Luminous Description and Causal Inference 
in Ethnography.” Ethnography 3 (1): 63-90.
Krause, Ulrike. 2017. “Researching Forced Migration: Critical Ref lections on 
Research Ethics during Fieldwork.” RSC Working Paper Series no. 123. Refugee 
Studies Centre, Oxford Department of International Development, University 
of Oxford.
2 Accessible via: https://oplatz.net/contact/.
aPPendix 191
Malthaner, Stefan. 2014. “Fieldwork in the Context of Violent Conflict and Authori-
tarian Regimes.” In Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research, edited 
by Donatella della Porta, 173-194. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Milan, Stefania. 2014. “The Ethics of Social Movement Research.” In Methodological 
Practices in Social Movement Research, edited by Donatella della Porta, 446-464. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Monforte, Pierre, and Pascale Dufour. 2011. “Mobilizing in Borderline Citizenship 
Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Undocumented Migrants’ Collective Ac-
tions.” Politics & Society 39 (2): 203-232.
Schatz, Edward. 2009. “Ethnographic Immersion and the Study of Politics.” In 
Political Etnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power, edited 
by Edward Schatz, 1-23. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

 List of Interviews
Interviews in Berlin
ID Date Location Actor Type Language
B1 12.03.16 Berlin Migrant French
B2 19.04.16 Berlin Migrant english
B3 20.04.16 Berlin Migrant French
B4 31.05.16 Berlin Migrant english
B5 02.06.16 Berlin supporter german
B6 05.06.16 Berlin Migrant French
B7 08.06.16 Berlin Politician german
B8 19.06.16 Berlin supporter, Politician german
B9 21.06.16 Berlin ngo/supporter german
B10 22.06.16 Berlin Migrant english
B11 01.07.16 Bremen Migrant english
B12 04.07.16 Berlin Migrant French, english
B13 08.07.16 Berlin Politician german
B14 17.07.16 Berlin Migrant French
B15 21.07.16 Berlin Migrant german
B16 24.07.16 Berlin Migrant French, english
B17 26.07.16 Jena Migrant english
B18 27.07.16 Potsdam Migrant german
B19 28.07.16 Berlin Migrant german
B20 29.07.16 Berlin supporter german
B21 24.08.16 Berlin supporter/ngo german
B22 29.08.16 Berlin Migrant english
B23 31.08.16 Berlin supporter/ngo german
B24 01.09.16 Berlin Migrant english
B25 05.09.16 Berlin supporter german
B26 06.09.16 Berlin supporter/ngo german
B27 23.01.17 Berlin Migrant French
B28 25.01.17 Berlin Migrant French
B29 27.01.17 Berlin Migrant French
B30 29.01.17 Berlin Migrant French
B31 08.02.17 Berlin Migrant german
B32 23.02.17 Berlin ngo german
B33 23.03.17 Berlin ngo german
B34 26.03.17 Berlin supporter german
B35 11.04.18 Berlin ngo german
B36 13.04.18 Berlin Migrant german
B37 15.04.18 Berlin Migrant german
B38 25.07.18 Berlin ngo/Migrant german
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ID Date Location Actor Type Language
B39 03.07.18 Berlin Migrant english
B40 29.06.18 Berlin ngo/Migrant deutsch
B41 29.06.18 Berlin Migrant deutsch
B42 18.05.17 Berlin ngo/Migrant deutsch
B43 28.08.18 Potsdam Migrant deutsch
B44 28.08.18 Potsdam Migrant deutsch
B45 14.01.19 Berlin Migrant deutsch
Interviews in Paris
ID Date Location Actor Type Language
P1 16.05.17 Paris ngo French
P2 17.05.17 Paris supporter French
P3 30.05.17 Paris supporter French
P4 30.05.17 Brussels Migrant French
P5 01.06.17 Paris Migrant, ngo French
P6 05.06.17 Paris supporter, ngo French
P7 08.06.17 Paris supporter French
P8 12.06.17 Paris ngo French
P9 12.06.17 Paris ngo, supporter French
P10 13.06.17 Paris ngo, supporter French
P11 14.06.17 Paris Politician english
P12 14.06.17 Paris ngo French
P13 15.06.17 Paris supporter French
P14 16.06.17 Paris Migrant French
P15 18.06.17 Paris Migrant French
P16 19.06.17 Paris ngo French
P17 19.06.17 Paris Migrant english
P18 20.06.17 Paris Migrant, ngo French
P19 20.06.17 Paris ngo French
P20 22.06.17 Paris Migrant english
P21 23.06.17 Paris supporter French
P22 25.06.17 Paris Migrant French
P23 25.06.17 Paris supporter english
P24 25.06.17 Paris Migrant english
P25 26.06.17 Paris ngo French
P26 26.06.17 Paris Migrant French
P27 26.06.17 Paris supporter French
P28 27.06.17 Paris supporter French
P29 27.06.17 Paris supporter, ngo French
P30 28.06.17 Paris supporter French
P31 13.01.17 online Migrant english
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